

POWER RELATIONS BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN NIGERIA ON HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW OF ITS TRAGEDIES

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ABSTRACT

The expectation of the people from the local government is to receive quality healthcare service delivery but this is not realized as expected due to the inter-power relations between the state and the local governments. Sequel to this, this study investigated the impact of power relations between the state and the local governments on quality healthcare services delivery in Ilorin West, Moro and Oyun Local Governments, Kwara State. This study addresses research objective on the workability of the joint account cum joint project on the quality healthcare service delivery. To achieve the said objectives, the study adopted both qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches. However, the findings of the study revealed that the power relations constitute a major problem to the poor performance of the local governments and this is because the interactions between the two organs subjected the local government to the dictate of state. The issue of joint account and projects is also responsible for the inability of the selected local government to perform to the expectations of the people simply because it make the revenue drive of the local government in the hand of the state. The study therefore suggests that there is a need for the local governments to be more proactive in their constitutional responsibilities and also the federal government of Nigeria needs to amend the constitution in order to abolish the policy of joint account/project, efforts should also be built by the federal government to allot full autonomy to the local governments to enable them viable and responsible to the people rather than the godfathers through the institution of the state.

Introduction

Power relation as a concept means a relation between people and it is expressed in simple symbolic notation (Robert, 2016). Robert further identified the following as the properties of power relations one of which is a time lag; however small, from actions of the actor who is said to exert power to the responses of the respondent. Whenever the President announces a new

policy, the agents immediately secure the compliance of the top officials. This point is what the local governments in Nigeria are experiencing as far as their relationships with the states; the state influenced the local governments' policies by announcing new policies that can only promote the interest of the state.

A second necessary property is like the first, is obvious and nonetheless important in research: there is no 'action at a distance' unless there is some 'connection' between two entities, then no power relation can be said to exist. In looking for a flow of influence, control or power from one entity to another, there is need to find out whether there is a connection or an opportunity for a connection. A cursory look at this condition could be traced to the connection between the state and local governments most especially in Nigeria where there is power to control and to make local government a residual legislative function of the state.

In examining the intuitive view of the power relation, it is further suggested that there should be a successful attempt by one level of government to get another level of governments do something it would not otherwise do. This hints at a way of stating a third necessary condition for the power relation. Here is a situation whereby the state government takes the total responsibility of the local governments as a result of power relations that exist between them. In the area of revenue such as Internally Revenue Generation (IGR), payment of local government staff, renovation and construction of local governments' schools, hospitals and roads.

Sergin (2016) viewed power as the capacity of an agent to impose his will over the will of the powerless, or the ability to force them to do things that they do not wish to do. In this sense, power is conceptualized as a possession, as something owned by those in power. Foucault (2013) opined that power is not something that can be owned, but rather something that can act and manifests itself in a certain way; power is more of a strategy than a possession: 'Power can be analyzed as something which circulates, or as something which can only function in the form of a chain. Concomitantly, Power is employed and empowered to exercise through a net-like organization . . . Individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application". This way of understanding power has two key features: firstly, power is a system, a network of relations encompassing the whole society, rather than a relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor; secondly, individuals are not just the objects of power, but they are the *locus* where

the power and the resistance to it are exerted. In any given situation where power is to be exercised, there is need for institutions that will play such power and it could be between the state and local government in a federating units.

Consequently, the Local government in Nigeria is a mechanism to develop the rural communities and to provide socio-political economy of the local communities, state and Nigeria at large. These therefore call for the inter-relationship between the state institutions, like local, state and federal governments in general. To achieve this development, Lev (2008) considered the power relations between the state and local governments with the concept of the inter-tier relations in Nigeria, which has designed to:

- i. promote peace and harmony among the levels of government
- ii. put in place a mechanism for the achievement of economic self-reliance;
- iii. promote natural economic integration among the levels of government;
- iv. generate co-operation rather than competitive federation; and
- v. put an end to the issue of rural-urban movement and poverty.

Hight(2008) defined Intergovernmental relation as an interaction network of institution at national provincial and local levels, created and refined to enable the various parts of government to cooperate in a manner which is appropriate to its institutional arrangements. In this view, Obi (2004) sees intergovernmental to mean the complex pattern of interactions cooperation and inter-dependence between two or more levels of government is further described as a plethora of formal and informal relationship and transaction that develop among levels of government within a nation state. In Nigeria for instance, it refers to the interaction that exists among the federal (central or national) state and local government, state and state interactions. All these put together refers to the pattern of relations. Inter-tier relations are the responses that have been developed to facilitate cooperative policymaking among divided governments within the federating system. Inter-tier relations are supposed to play a 'bridge-building' role to bring a degree of coordination and cooperation to divided powers (Business comment of Australia, 2006). Adamolekun (1983) considered inter-tier relations as an interaction that is established

among the different levels of government within a country. Considering this postulation, the inter-tier relations are the mechanisms that supposed to be a linkage pipe that will link the tiers of government together for the benefit and well-functioning of the system. Inyang & Bassey (2014) opined that an inter-tier relation is a term commonly used to describe the interactions between the different levels of government within a state. To him, the word 'level' implies a juxtaposition of higher and lower levels.

Inyang & Bassey (2014) further contended that to 'manage inter-tier relations', effort should be on the variety of political and administrative mechanisms as well as the judicial process. The prominent political mechanism is the constitution, which spells out the legislative powers conferred on each of the tiers of government. Inter-tier relations are nothing but the interaction among the various levels of government within a political space. Ojo (2014) sees the inter-tier government as a means to ensure that the government policies and programmes are well implemented and to ensure that government policies and programmes are in line with the stated rules and regulations. Although the opinion of Ojo is not accurate as far as Nigerian political structure is concerned, the state governments are using local governments to siphon both external and internal revenue, such as grants, loans among others.

Problem Statement

Governments at all levels exist primarily to provide services that will make life worth living for the people. More importantly, local governments as the third tier of government are created to bring government closer to the people at the grassroots and reach them through a satisfactory and high-quality healthcare service delivery that is timely, effective and adequately provided.

However, it is sad that Nigerian local governments generally have not been up and doing in terms of efficient and effective social service delivery to the grassroots which is evident from poor and deteriorating public school buildings, poor market facilities and above all is the dilapidated healthcare centers ranging from basic modern equipment, basic infrastructural facilities, hygienic environment and up to lack of sufficient number of personnel nurses, doctors and lab attendants that could attend to the needs of people (Agba, 2006, Olusola, 2011). Thus, the provision of basic social service of this nature in terms of quality healthcare delivery in the

local government is now both a myth and mirage (Agba, 2006). As a result of this abysmal failure of local governments in providing quality healthcare service delivery, the citizens at the local levels are beginning to lose interest and trust in the existence of the local government councils in Nigeria (Adeyemi, 2013). Hence, the hope for effective and high quality of healthcare services delivery in the local governments has been a big problem and mirage as successive local councils have grossly underperformed in their assigned responsibilities towards the people at the grassroots (Ibok, 2014).

The problem of poor services delivery, particularly the quality of healthcare services to the people in the local government can be due to a number of factors. Previous researchers have attributed this abysmal failure of local governments in performing its primary role to the issues of corrupt behaviours of those in authorities, leadership problems, administrative efficiency, unskilled workers, nonchalant attitudes of staff and inadequate and/or poor budgetary allocations, politico-administrative problems and lack of funds or financial constraints (Bello-Imam and Roberts, 2001; Eboh&Diejomaoh, 2010; Adeyemi, 2013; Agba, Akwara, &Idu, 2013; Ibok, 2014; Bolatito& Ibrahim, 2014; Chukwuemeka et al., 2014).

While the present study acknowledges the little contributions from the earlier researchers to pinpoint and establish the root-causes (as highlighted above) for poor healthcare services delivery and the likes of the local governments, a new dimension and direction such as power-relations between states and local governments has cut attention of this work to be a fundamental factor. This has been left out in the literature as the primary gap for the poor quality of the healthcare service delivery system in the local governments. Power-relation between states and local governments are in three-fold: namely autonomy, joint account-project, and constitutional bandage. As a matter of fact, the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria has put the local government under the control of the state in terms of the level of autonomy to freely discharge its primary responsibilities especially in the area of healthcare service delivery. This could be envisaged as a source of erosion of local government functions particularly in the revenue-yielding areas by state governments and their agencies which without much doubt would have a profound effect specifically on the delivery of quality healthcare services to the people at the

local rural communities. This is evident from the financial constraints of the local governments which have its root source from the level and nature of power relation between state and the local governments. For the local government to effectively provide quality healthcare services at the grassroots, enabling environment must put in place most especially the funds to carry out such responsibility. To buttress this view, Ibok (2014) pointed out that: aside from the fact that statutory allocations and grants from the federal and state governments to the councils are inadequate, the problem is exasperated by the low revenue generation capacity of the local government. Associated with this problem again is also irritated by the frequent sundry deductions of funds by the state governments from the councils' monthly allocations. Worst still is the failure of most of the state governments to fulfill their constitutional monthly statutory obligations to the local government by outright refusal to remit 10% internally generated revenue accrued to the state monthly. In some situations, it has become irritating that many local government councils cannot pay staff salaries not to talk about the basic need provisions in the healthcare centers (Ibok (2014).

Additionally, lack of political autonomy of the local government has rendered local council financially impotent, hence incapable of providing basic needs at various community healthcare centers to meet the expectations of the people (Eboh&Diejomaoh, 2010; Ibok, 2014). Lack of financial autonomy (Adeyemi, 2013) of the local government and the issue of the joint account has made it more difficult for many appointed chairmen (Ukonga 2012) to channel the little available scarce resources generated or allocated to them by the federal government towards development of healthcare projects and programs in the rural communities. In other words, state governments are ruling local governments with appointed administrators, most of whom are party loyalist and friend-kinds of relationship thereby turning the entire process of local government affairs into irrelevance kinship arrangement (Ukonga 2012). For example, evidence has shown in the award of inflated and fictitious healthcare contracts, subsequent abandonment, and overestimation of the cost of healthcare projects, inflation of staff salary, and inflation of prices of bought items in the local government health centers are due to that kind of arranged unconstitutional power-relation problem. Above all, the recruitments of staff at local government healthcare centers are under the control of the state government. Thus, according to Eboh &

Diejomaoh (2010), there is a high degree of external influence and interference in local government affairs by the state governments, which have rendered the performance of local governments woefully in this particular primary service delivery assignment. Furthermore, in the recent scenario of state-local government power relation, many states including Kwara have taken over upon themselves the financial allocation of local government, taxes, counterpart funding and duties in which constitution has statutorily defined as the primary role of local government. With this nature of power-relations, it is almost impossible for the local governments to deliver a favorable healthcare service to the people as expected.

Hence, there is need to carry out an investigation in this direction and establish how the current nature of power-relations between the states and the local governments affects the performance local government in the area of quality healthcare service delivery particularly in the Kwara State of Nigeria where a lot of numbers of instances are evident. This is considered to be an undue interference which has incapacitated the local government from effective performance on one hand, and alienated grassroots people from enjoying the healthcare service delivery expected of local governments in the state (Agba, Akwara, &Idu, 2013). Consequently, local governments now function mostly as an extension of the state governments (Eboh&Diejomaoh, 2010; Ajibulu, 2012). in the preliminary studies conducted, it was discovered that the Kwara State government allotted the sum of fifteen million, five hundred and seventy-six thousand and thirty-four naira only (N15, 576,713.34) to construct clinic building at Oloje cottage hospital in Ilorin west local government area, the project was claimed to have completed by the state but record showed that the net of the windows was not fixed, inadequate health personnel, no drug, and even the patients' cards, construction was contracted out by the state government (MLGCA/ZO/VOL.1/258/2016)

Research Question

Specifically, the study attempts to ask the stated:

To what extent does the joint account-project affect local governments' healthcare service delivery in Kwara State?

Objective of the Study

The study is designed to evaluate the objective stated below:

The study appraises the effect of joint account-project on quality healthcare service delivery in the local government areas of Kwara State.

Significance of the study

This study is designed to expose the functions of local governments in relation to the achievement of full autonomy in Nigeria and also to see how the benefits are to be derived in the adoption of state-local government relations. Secondly, this study will serve as mechanisms for the law makers to put-up policy programme that will enhance the productivities among the citizens of the local governments as well as the state. Lastly, this study will be a resource material for public policy practitioners, academics, students and researchers in politics and governance issues.

1.5 Research Hypothesis

H₀₁ There is no significant relationship between joint account /joint project on local government healthcare services delivery.

Scope of the Study

The study is aimed at assessing the impact of the state-local government councils' power relations on the healthcare service delivery, efforts are to some selected local governments, cut across the three senatorial districts, such as North, Central and South in Kwara State 'between 2014 to 2017' and the rationale for considering the state-local governments' power relations in Kwara State is because of the well pronouncement of politics of Godfatherism and the implementation of legislative lists in the Nigerian constitution.

Conceptual Framework

Lev (2008), explained that the Nigerian constitution provides for the participation of the three tiers of government in the delivery of core public services, such as quality education and sound

health. This, however, makes the policy coordination as an important pre-condition for effective and efficient service delivery. Several factors can be adduced as justification for building workable inter-tiers coordination mechanisms. He further illustrated that the:

1. Responsibilities for the quality service delivery should be a policy programme that needed to be shared among the non-coordinated interventions of different government levels in order to limit a risk for duplication of efforts and sub-optimal allocation of resources.
2. Governments at all levels need to align their actions with any priorities and thus complement each effort for the promotion of healthy environment. This is because, in common complex social systems, there is significant potential for synergies between coordinated policies and actions.
3. Finally, coordination of the programme among the levels of government could lead to better resources utilization through economy scale, quicker project completion, and more efficient use of limited resources (such as specialized technical expertise) as this will facilitate dissemination of best management practices. However, the issue of inter-tier policy coordination has become increasingly important in Nigeria in recent times. This is primarily because since 1999 the Nigerian fiscal system has gone through rapid decentralization.

For a better understanding of the issue of inter-tiers relations in Nigeria, there is the need to examine the concept of federalism, Federalism is the decentralization of the administrative system designed to cope with the size, differences, peculiarities of the regions or state and/or ethnic groups. Essentially, federalism connotes a discrete territorial division of the various units so that they are originally related. They are organic in the sense that they are stated in the constitution. In other words, their respective powers originated from the same source as those of the center. The units, therefore, have equal powers with the center through such equality is not in terms of one to one, but in terms of originality, since the powers they exercise are not the creation of the centre. The relationship between the centre and the component units is not superior to the units in a federation (Aigbepue&Ainabor, 2011).

Nkwoji (2013) cited in Ojo (2014) stated that inter-tier relations are associated with a state having a federal administrative system where the relationship between the federal, central or national government and major sub-national units (province, region or state) are formally spelled out in the constitution. The reason for this is to promote peace and harmony among the levels of government. The interaction will enhance the emergence of co-operation rather than a competitive federation. He further examined that this interaction will engage the tiers of government to solve the problem of rural-urban migration and poverty.

Wright (1995) while examining the concept of inter-tier relations pointed out some attributes that must be met which are stated below:

1. policy programme that will promote cordial relations
2. the total inclusion of government at all levels
3. the total inclusion of the people in respect of where they come from
4. the total inclusion of all types of public officials-especially administrators in addition to elected officials

Iyi (2013) alluded to the view of Anderson, (1960) viewed inter-tier relation as an important body of activities or interrelations occurring between governmental units of all types and levels within the federal system. Iyi (2013) further explained that the issue of interrelations between and among governments at international, national and local levels is an old one.

Looking at the conclusion of Iyi, it is evident that the Nigerian constitution is a formal institution but fails to address in detail the side effect of the relationship between the tiers of government, where the power to appoint is a residual function of the local government is constitutionally resides in the hand of executive governor of the state.

Nwatu & Okafor (2008) rightly observed that in the present democratic dispensation, the local governments are assigned roles and functions to partake in the inter-tier relations which hitherto prevail only between the central, state or regional governments alone. At the end of the reform of the local government, Annual Conferences of Chairmen of Local Governments in Nigeria was created and also the Bi-Annual Conference of Commissioners for Local Governments was established to promote inter-tier relations in the country.

Hence the new local government system in the new democratic Nigeria, in all its fundamentals has redefined; (i) the power relations between the states and the Local Governments; (ii) the power relations between the state and the federal governments in their combined relations to the government; and (iii) the relationship between the local government and Federal Government. Having reviewed the evolution of the institutions and processes of intergovernmental relations, essentially in terms of the relations among the levels of government, Nwatu & Okafor (2008:207) further argued that it was necessary to emphasize that a full analysis of inter-tier relations must also focus on the ordinary citizens reactions and o the activities of the public official who operate at the different levels of government. Also, the attitudes and roles of both political leaders and appointed officials at the different levels of government have significantly influenced both the substance and the style of inter-inter-tier relations in Nigeria.

Erunke (2016), stated that the state-local governments' relations involve both vertical and horizontal relationships that exist between the various organs and departments within the sovereign government of a particular country. However, Akinsanya (2005) classified inter-tier relations into six, namely:

1. Federal-state relations: - this is a relationship or interaction between the federal and state governments in terms of policy implementations, the best example of this, is the concurrent legislative list which is recognized by the constitution.
2. Federal-state-local relations: - this occurs in a country like Nigeria where the federal governments relate to the local government through the political channel of the state government. It becomes unusual for the federal government to directly relate to the local government without passing through the channel of the state government.
3. Federal-local relations: - this relationship is not common in every federal political system. It could be referred to as an interaction between the federal government and the local government. It occurs when local government faces natural disasters which are beyond the capacity of the state and local government to normalize. An example is this federal government intervention in Kwara State on flood disaster that motivated the federal government to allocate fund through the state government, also the area where the Federal Government and the state connected is on the issue of local government

education that has to do with subvention from federal government to ensure adequate education at the lower level known as the grass root.

4. State-state (interstate) relations: - this occurs between a state and another. It is enhanced occasionally possibly when two states belong to a political party. The major aim of this relationship is to jointly pool resources together to achieve developmental goals.
5. State-local relations:- this is a kind of relationship that occurred between the state and local governments, this is the most critical level of relationship in the configuration of the country, lots of issues here affecting the autonomy of local governments, such as:
 - i. Joint Allocation;
 - ii. Appointment;
 - iii. Internally Generated Revenue (IGR);
 - iv. Party Politics; and
 - v. Constitutional role.

Local-local relations:- this is another form of political interaction that exists between two or more local governments with the aim of eradicating of natural disasters or building a developmental project that will accommodate the future progress of their citizens.

Bello (2014) in Bello-Imam (1996) opined that looking at inter-tier relations from the perspective of the partnership model, reflects an inbuilt cooperation and understanding among the various levels of government, such that the functions of one tier of government can be performed by another tier on its behalf. For instance, in Britain where this model of inter-tier relations is near ideal, some services and functions which constitutionally belong to the central government are usually performed by the local governments on behalf of the center because the responsibilities in question are personal in nature and by extension performed close to or where the beneficiaries live. The following are the services discharged by the local government on behalf of the central government:

- i. social welfare services,
- ii. health and social security and
- iii. An aspect of immigration control.

Although, this model exists in the Nigerian political structure the case here is that the state governments have taken the statutory functions of the local governments such that local authority

is residing in the hand of state governments. The state government most especially the Kwara State Government determines the areas where the local government will spend their money, how and when to employ the staff, the time of transition programme in local governments, and removal and suspension of the local government's chairmen.

Local Government Autonomy

Samuel (2016) viewed that the concept of autonomy takes its roots from the liberal conception of democracy, that is, the government by the people at the grassroots. According to this conception, power belongs to the people (popular sovereignty) and those who exercise power do so on behalf of the people (consent of the governed). The nexus between the operationalization of the concept of “popular sovereignty” and the realization of the “consent of the governed” is found in the concept of autonomy or what (Langrod, 1953; Okoli, 1995). supported by Samuel (2016) calls, “the area or division of power” Local government autonomy is thus perceived as the grassroots democracy or local self-government.

According to Samuel (2016), autonomy means that each government enjoys a separate existence and independence from the control of the other governments. This means that autonomy would only be meaningful if there are no constitutional requirements for each level of government to accept dictation or directive from another. He further asserted that, local autonomy is primarily concerned with the question of responsibilities, resources and discretion conferred on the local authorities as such discretion and responsibility are at the core of local government. The notion of local autonomy here as opined by Adeyemo (2005) is that, local government must possess the power to take decisions independent of external control within the limits of the law. It must garner efficient resources, especially, finance to meet its responsibilities. In other words, local autonomy provides the freedom or independence in clearly defined issue or areas as well as separate legal identity from other levels of government.

Joint Account Policy

The Joint Account System was reintroduced into the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 162 (5) of the Constitution provides inter-alia. "The amount standing to the credit of local government councils in the federal account shall also be allocated to the state for

the benefit of their local government councils on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly". Also, section 162(6) provides as follows. "Each state shall maintain a specific account to be called "state joint local government account" into which shall be paid all allocations to the local government councils of the state from the federation account and from the government of the state".

These sections of the constitution proscribed direct allocation to the councils and put it under the supervision of every State Government. As a result, direct allocation to the councils was no longer possible as the money becomes allocated to the local authorities and now paid into the State Joint Account. It is, however, worthy to note that the issue of a joint account was given birth to in 1979 via the 1976 local government reforms. It is in this regard that Professor Bello-Imam (1996): asserted that


"The first major attempt of comprehensively looking at the finances of Nigeria Local Governments took place in 1976, during the nationwide Local Government reforms. The reform measures and the 1979 constitution identify adequate sources of revenue for the local Government to local governments".

In the light of the above Oguona (2004:26) argued "due to the persisted problem of inadequate revenue to the local government system, the Federal Government have been reviewing the revue grant to this third tier of government from time to time. Hence, between 1973 and 1975 during the oil revolutions of the seventies, that local government received grants and loans from the federal government. Then, from 1976, the local government through a statute were being granted varying amount of loans. However, during the second republic, based on the Okigbo's report, a revenue allocation act of 10% of the Federation Account was guaranteed to Local Governments. This was later adjusted to 15% and 20%.

Earlier, Omoruyi (1985:190) cited in LadipoAdamolekun (1985) related that "in an attempt to look for a better way of improving the finances to the Local councils, the then permanent secretary, Federal Ministry of Finance, Mr. Alison Ayida was asked if it would be normal in a federal system for the central government to deal directly with the local authorities in revenue allocation. He said he did not think that the Federal Government should relate directly with the

local governments, arguing that the essence of the 1976 reforms "was to make state governments have statutory allocation relationship with their respective state governments. He maintained further, that the state government should administer the local government account and warned that there would be the need for statutory guarantee written into the constitution against possible manipulations by the state governments. The foregoing depicts the genesis of the joint account. It is clear that the 1976 local government reforms were responsible for the introduction of the joint account system in Nigeria. Its introduction into the 1979 constitution may have occurred to assist in improving the financial condition of the local councils and protect the allocation of the councils against possible manipulations by the state authorities.

Structure of Intergovernmental Relations in Nigeria



Presentation of Data

Do you agree that Joint Account refrain direct statutory allocation to the Local Government by the State Government?

Joint account between state and local governments

Particular	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	95	52.8
No	85	47.2
Total	180	100

The table showed that 52.8% (95) respondents testified to the fact that local governments in Kwara State assess the statutory allocations from the state government but 47.2% (85) respondents indicated that local governments in Kwara State do not enjoy the disbursement of the statutory allocation from the state government through the policy of Joint Account Allocation.

Does the Joint Account Policy subservient financial autonomy of the Local Governments to the State Government?

Joint Account Policies and Financial Autonomy

Particular	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	118	65.6
No	62	34.4
Total	180	100

The table showed that 65.6 % (118) respondents stated that joint account policy subservient local governments financial autonomy in Kwara State the whereas 34.4% (62) respondents indicated that joint account policy did subservient the local governments the financial autonomy in Kwara State.

Do you agree that Joint Account Policy between the State and the Local Government Councils encourages illegal Deduction from the Local Governments’ Accounts?

Joint Account Encourages Illegal Deduction

Particular	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	119	66.1
No	61	33.9
Total	180	100

The table showed that 66.1% (119) respondents stated that joint account policy encourages illegal deduction from the local governments to account in Kwara State whereas 33.9% (61) respondents indicated that joint account policy did responsible for +the illegal deduction from the local governments account in Kwara State.

Do you believe that Joint Account Policies are Responsible for the delay in the Implementation of Local Governments' Statutory Responsibilities?

Joint Account and Delay in Implementation

Particular	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	142	78.9
No	38	21.1
Total	180	100

The table showed that 78.9% (142) respondents stated that the joint account policy encourages delay in implementation of local government statutory responsibility in Kwara State whereas 21.1% (38) respondents indicated that the joint account policy is responsible for the delay in implementation of the local governments' statutory responsibility in Kwara State.

Do you subscribe to the fact that Joint Account Programmes Promote Diversion of the Local Government Statutory Allocations?

Joint Account and Diversion Statutory Allocation

Particular	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	150	83.3
No	30	16.7
Total	180	100

The table 5.27 showed that 83.3% (150) respondents stated that the joint account policy encourages illegal diversion of local governments' statutory allocations in Kwara State whereas 16.7% (30) respondents indicated that the joint account policy is responsible for the illegal diversion of the local governments' statutory allocations in Kwara State.

Analysis of findings

Classification Table^a

Item	Predicated		Percentage Correct
	Healthcare services delivery		
Observed	No	Yes	
Joint account and joint project No	19	31	38.0
Yes	15	96	86.5
Overall percentage			71.4

a. the cut values is .005

Hypothesis 3

There is no significant relationship between the Joint Account /Joint project and local government healthcare services delivery.

Table 6.3.7 Variable in the Equation 245

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% CI for EXP (B)	
							LOWER	UPPER
Step1 ^a Joint Account	1.044	.433	.8204	1	.016	.839	1.216	6.628
Constant	-569	.387	2.168	1	.141	.566	-	-

a. variable entered on step 1: Joint Account

The table 5.44 showed that the contributions of each independent variable to the model and its statistical significance. Joint account and joint project positively related to healthcare services delivery in Kwara State. The result showed that there is a significant relationship between the two variables as shown in the table where sig (0.16). Consequently, the null hypothesis stated that there is no significant relationship between the Joint Account /Joint project and local government healthcare services delivery. The result of the Binomial Logistic regression test indicates 1.004 Beta value at the associated significant level of 0.16 which is greater than the conventional significance level of 0.05, with Cox & Snell R Square value of .070 indicating that about 0.070% of variation in the 1999 constitution will be accounted for the failure the selected local governments to deliver healthcare services.

Decision: Hypothesis 3 is accepted and therefore there is no significant relationship between the Joint Account /Joint project and local government healthcare services delivery.

Going by the section 162 and forth schedule of the 1999 Constitution, the local governments are not be given financial autonomy, do you agree with this notion?

Respondent A: a Former Chairman of Asa Local Government responded that ‘the politics behind the joint account allocation is not the way people perceived it, ‘that is the constitution did not empower state to spend and keep the federal allocation to the local governments but the perception of the people is that the state government shared out of the local governments’ allocation. In his own opinion, the state government disbursed the amount allotted the local government by the federal government but the issue is that there may be an informal way of retrieving the state share of the federal allocation from the local governments due to the fact that the chairmen of the local government are the surrogates of the state government. In his second response, the respondent explained further on other allocations like Paris club, excess crude oil and World Bank assistance projects to the local governments. In his comments, he agreed that the state government disbursed little amount to the local governments and even directed local governments on what to do with money, since there is no constitutional responsibility on how to share statutory allocation from the federal government it means that the misconstrued by the state government to control the affairs of the local governments. The third response on Internally Generated Revenue and other allocation to the local governments, he said that the local governments in Kwara State are weak in this regard simply because the allocations from the federation account used to be enough to take care of the staff of the local governments in the various localities of the state.

Respondent B: a staff of the Local Government of Ilorin West local Government revenue officer who is currently attached to a cottage hospital in Ilorin West Local Government, responded that the incapacity of the local governments to access federal allocation on the bases of first line charge affect the maximum healthcare services delivery in the various local healthcare centers in the state. She explicated further that the recent policy of Kwara State government to take over internal revenue means of the local governments advanced the inability of the healthcare centres to perform to the expectation of the populace.

Respondent C: a Director of the Local Government Service Commission responded that ‘the civil servants are to be seen not to be heard’ in view of the slogan, he could not give the accurate answer to the question.

Analysis of the respondents' views on section 162 of the Nigerian constitution and its effect on the healthcare system in the local communities of Kwara State.

As Onah (2007) observed, the amount of financial resources available to a level of government in a federation determines the degree of power it wields in its relationship with other tiers (s). State Joint Local Government Account, therefore, provides the framework where local government funds are channeled to the coffers of Kwara State Government. This is in line with the submission of Okpata (2005) that the ‘Joint Account’ gives the state government ‘the leeway for financial manipulations of the local governments’. It should be noted that the failure of the constitution to prescribe an elaborate, explicit and standard procedure for administration of State Joint Local Government Account was exploited by the state government to manipulate the Joint Account in a manner that impeded the financial autonomy of local government Councils. It is in the line of section 162 (5) which explains that the amount standing to the credit of local government councils in the federation account shall also be allocated to the states for the benefit of their local government councils on such terms and in such manner, as may be prescribed by the national assembly.

However, section 162 (6) also confirmed that the autonomy of local governments is not guaranteed by stating that each state shall maintain a special account into which shall be paid all allocations to the local government council of the state from the government of the state. Section 162 (7) indicated that the amount standing to the credit of local government councils of a state shall be distributed among the local government councils of that state on each term and in such manner as may be prescribed by the house of assembly of the state. Sequel to the content of the constitution and the views of the scholars, the analysis of the opinions of the respondent is supported by the Nigerian government. A cursory look at the response of the respondent A, it is obvious that there is element of political influence in his discussion, he said that the constitution did not have problem as regard to the joint account between Kwara State and local governments

would be empirical. This study embraces both the observational method and Random sampling and helps to provide the following recommendations:

- i. There should be autonomy for the local governments in Kwara State to generate revenue internally without the intervention of the state according to the forth-schedule of the 1999 constitution but the reverse is the case as most of the local governments in Kwara State relies much on external sources of revenue. This resulted in the inability to stand economically independent not to talk about how to improve the welfare of people. The study hereby recommends that the constitution should devise a mechanism to check the activities of the local governments as regard revenue utilization and empower them to access the external revenue generated without the full participation of the state government in order to promote healthcare services delivery at the local health centre in the local communities of Kwara State.
- ii. There is a need to strengthen the functions of Auditor General for the local government to publish the activities of the local government as regard their expenditure and revenue monthly or yearly to enable the inhabitants of the local governments to have first-class knowledge about the financial capability of the local governments. If accountability is enhanced, there is every possibility that local healthcare services will be delivered at the local governments.
- iii. The study also suggests that the residual function of the state chose or to appoint the local government executives should be removed and to be handled by the federal government through the exclusive legislative lists, this will promote the democratic situation of the local government. Take for instance, after the expiration of the administration of the past elected local government chairmen in Kwara State, the state going by the residual power appointed caretakers twice which was an undemocratic process of governing. The caretakers were appointed by the Godfather who happens to be an apparatus of the state and it is expected for him to be accountable to the state government instead of the people. In view of this, the answer to the question of the people in respect of healthcare service delivery would not be answered.
- iv. In addition to the above, the constitution should recommend that there is continuity in the local governments the way it has been experiencing by other tiers of governments in

order to promote the sustainability of the projects embarked upon by the local government cochairmen, because constant change in government result in frequent change in policy and that is why most of the local health centres are facing damages and non-completion of the buildings.

- v. Nigerian Union of Local Government should be empowered to act as gorilla organization within the government in order to influence the policy programme of the state and local government on healthcare services delivery. The provision for each local government council to establish a Local Government Service Commission for staffing and personnel administration should be made. The commission, which is to be independently set up by each local government council will replace and take over the functions of Local Government Service Commission established by the state government. This will reduce the overbearing influence and excessive control which the state government exerts on local government administration through the existing Local Government Service Commission. In practice, the Commission established by the state government has become a mere extension of the state's apparatus of governance in the local government councils. There should, however, be an institutional mechanism for the Local Government Service Commissions to be established by the local governments to regularly interface with State Civil Service Commission in the areas of manpower training, capacity building, research and development, organizational management and service delivery. This will make local government management to know the staff strength of the healthcare centres in local governments of Kwara State.
- vi. There is need to abolish the ministry of local government and chieftaincy affairs to make local governments to have access to the external revenue directly unlike the current trend where the ministry of local government is established by the state governments to pilot the local government revenue through Joint Account Committee (JACC). The 20% external revenue should be on first line charge to enable local governments to develop strategies on how to maintain healthcare service delivery at the local governments.

- vii. Local government councils should be constitutionally empowered to regularly check the services of the available health staff in the respective local communities for better service delivery. The reasons for this is that most of the nurses and other health officers posted to the rural communities of the local governments are always absent in their workplaces sometimes engaging ambivalent trading.
- viii. To create environments where there would be a room for the services of anti-corruption crusade that will checkmate the activities of the local government chairmen to enable proper accountability and smooth running of the local health system in Kwara State.
- ix. In the final analysis, since they believe that health is wealth and it cannot be compromised, the study suggests that the Nigerian government should find a space in the constitution to consider the issue of health to be on the exclusive as against being on the concurrent legislative lists.
- x. The result of the study shows that there is a need for the management of local government healthcare centers to develop a culture that will transform the attitude of their staff and to regularly sensitize the patients on the importance of local healthcare centres.

Conclusion

Local government system exists in every country with variations in its structures and functions. Some countries operate a single-tier system, where one local government exercises all the powers and performs all the functions, single-tier structural framework, where two or more local government share responsibilities for providing a range of services to the citizens in a defined area (Eneanya, 2012). Local government administration in Nigeria has all it takes to provide the needed developmental apparatus as it affects persons living in the rural areas and the local communities in particular. It is pertinent to state at this juncture, that both the federal and state governments should shed their direct involvement and financial expenditure in favour of local government. Rather the two tiers of government should only allocate funds for the use of local government and leave the latter to run its own programmes with minimal oversight function. The issue of Joint State Local Government Account should be abrogated. All the control measures and mechanisms put in place by both the States and States House of Assembly should be reduced

to allow the local government authorities in Nigeria focus on concrete developmental programmes such as healthcare services delivery devoid of incessant interruption (Oviasuyi, 2010). The people living at the grassroots would heave a sigh of relief if the autonomy of the local governments is restored to them. The participation of the local people in their own governance, the harnessing of the local resources and the resultant betterment of the life of the people living in these local governments would be better assured if their autonomy is restored. Moreover, if the autonomy of these local governments is restored, democracy would similarly thrive at this level of government (Mbuba, 2014).

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