

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOOD GOVERNANCE AND PEACE BUILDING IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of cold war the relationship between good governance and peace building are dominating the international discussion about development and international assistance to Africa. However, governance and peace building are broad concepts, not easy to define, and many related concepts are attached: the issue of democracy and development; popular participation and development; corruption and development; and also the issues of state capacity and development. The end of the Cold War brought to the fore a fresh upsurge of conflicts and domestic tensions that have arrested Africa's development in almost every respect, and jeopardized the unity of the continent. In Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the world has witnessed the near disintegration of African nations. In Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo the international community has watched helplessly as the destruction of property, massacre and even attempted genocide have been inflicted on African people. There are some of the major challenges which Africa as a whole is facing that is bad governance, corruption and conflict. There is need to cure these major diseases and reconstruct and reform Africa so that present generation as well as posterity would be very happy in peaceful, developed, shining, and progressive Africa, but ironically this is still a dream in Africa but the time is not far when we all will see shining Africa free from conflict and insecurity. In conclusion the concept of good governance and peace building derives its relevance in the context of mis-governance which includes malfeasance. The concept of good governance and peace building becomes attractive as a remedy against this state of affairs. African policy makers and the people of Africa have to change the condition of Africa and they gave to strive for achieving a shining and progressive Africa.

Key Words - Relationship, Good Governance, Peace building, Africa

1.0 Introduction

Since the end of cold war the relationship between good governance and peace building are dominating the international discussion about development and international assistance to Africa. However, governance and peace building are broad concepts, not easy to define, and many

related concepts are attached: the issue of democracy and development; popular participation and development; corruption and development; and also the issues of state capacity and development. The late 1980s and 1990s were characterized by concerted struggle for democratization and the clamour for good governance on the African continent (Cohen, 2014). The thirst for freedom and justice, the political fallouts from the structural adjustment programmes and the entrenched autocratic and repressive political systems dominant in the larger part of Africa's post-colonial history provided the incentive and legitimacy for popular democratic struggles in Africa (Copeland, 2012).

Africa is rich in natural resources, but cannot exploit them adequately. This is first and foremost due to good governance problems as well peace building ideals that have resulted in weak institutions, absence of rule of law and rampant corruption (Andre, 2012). Democracy requires more than free elections. Beyond elections, the quest for peace building and good governance in Africa often snags on structural problems, including state fragility, institutional weakness, tribalism, and conflict and ethnic discrimination, vested interests, crime networks, corruption and lack of democratic culture (Clark, 2008). These are all demanding problems that need concerted action. The African Union is in the vanguard on these efforts, with sophisticated kit of political, strategic, legal and institutional tools. The basis of this paper is examining the relationship between good governance and peace building in Africa.

2.0 Theoretical Framework

Conflict Transformation Theory

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in intra-state conflicts, especially in Africa (Lambourne, 2004:21) as a result of poor governance and frustration of the peoples' basic needs (Connolly 2012). This has made many peace scholars to be preoccupied with the quest for understanding the causes and non-violent means of ending conflicts. One such scholar was Johan Galtung (1964). Galtung (1964: 432) is the first peace scholar to envisage two descriptions of peace; negative peace (the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict and war), and positive peace (conditions that are good for management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated

with mature relationships, gentleness, and love) (Boulding,1978: 3). This later led to the emergence of conflict transformation as a field of study and a profession.

As a field of research into what breeds war and how to non-violently end it, Lederach (1995:17) argues that “conflict transformation emerged as a search for an adequate language to explain the peacemaking venture”. It became “a relatively new invention within the broader field of peace and conflict studies” . (Botes, 2003) and “a process that will make up for the inadequacies of mere resolution” (Mitchell, 2002: 1). According to Galtung (1969), effective conflict resolution and rebuilding peace in any conflict society requires engaging all actors of the conflict (victims, perpetrators, society, policy makers) (Staub, 2005:890).

Therefore, it emerged among conflict transformation theorists like Miall (2005:4) that any intervention in any conflict should surpass “reframing of position and the identification of win-win outcomes”. This is because, when violence or war breaks up, many strategies of interveners tend to address antagonisms between top conflicting elites and militant group leaders without addressing the root cause(s) of war; frustrated basic human rights and needs (Sandole,2010:9). The preceding approach in resolution of conflict was referred to as liberal approach which serves the interest of the powerful and in maintaining the status quo in a conflict society. Other than eliminating the root causes of war, the liberal approach was faulted for creating favourable conditions that endorsed a culture of violence.

Auvinen and Kivimaki (1996:3) argue that in any conflict situation, peace building interveners should seek constructive changes rather than satisfy the demands of the warring parties. According Auvinen and Kivimaki (1996:3), there are other casualties that are more fundamental to and involved in a conflict than at the level of conflict. Similarly, Spence (2001:45) argues that conflict transformation should give interveners minds “that are flexible, consultative and collaborative and that operate from a contextual understanding of the root causes of conflict”. In dealing with the effects of war, conflict transformation should seek to “address the underlying structures, agencies and practices within socio-political system that precipitate violence” (Whetho, 2014: 117).

The task of interveners in conflict transformation should transcend beyond issues of conflict to transform relationships between all conflicting/non conflicting parties. In doing so,

peacebuilding interveners will be paying attention to structure of parties and relationships that may/not be embedded in conflict and those that extend beyond the conflict (Miall, 2005: 4). Put vividly, conflict transformation is the “process by which people change situations, relationships or structures so that they become less violent, less conflictual and less unjust” (International Alert, 1998:28). The main aim of conflict transformation is to address violence that runs from a created culture of violence (cultural violence) to socio-political and economic structures that do not meet the basic needs of all (structural violence).

3.0 Relationship between Good Governance and Peace building

The end of the Cold War brought to the fore a fresh upsurge of conflicts and domestic tensions that have arrested Africa’s development in almost every respect, and jeopardized the unity of the continent. In Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the world has witnessed the near disintegration of African nations (Clark, 2008). In Angola, Burundi, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo the international community has watched helplessly as the destruction of property, massacre and even attempted genocide have been inflicted on African people. The quest for tolerance, a culture of peace building and unity has been at the centre of political endeavours in the African continent. Africa has to learn lessons from its past mistakes and follow some developed countries as model for their development (Cohen,2014).

The AU has also advanced peace building and good governance norms in two main areas; rejecting unconstitutional changes in government and acknowledging the need for humanitarian intervention in certain exceptional situations. According to Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act, humanitarian intervention can be authorized by the AU in “grave circumstances” including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Still, many African states, despite substantial progress in the realm of economics and security, continue to face challenges associated with good governance, which ultimately affects the success of peace building measures (De Waal, 2012). For example, the 2011 Foreign Policy “Failed States Index” placed fifteen of the world’s twenty most failed states in sub-Saharan Africa. According to World Bank estimates, Africa also contains the highest number of “fragile” states in the world (Copeland,2012).

Other than South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana—countries commonly noted for having positive investment climates—other African countries including Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia, Namibia, and Botswana have made excellent strides in creating business friendly environments and drawing investors (Cohen, 2013). Furthermore, in the wake of years of internal turmoil, fresh investment opportunities have sprouted in Liberia and South Sudan (MacGinty, 2016). Major international economic institutions have increasingly taken note of Africa’s improved economic status. The International Monetary Fund, for instance, projected the continent would have a 5 percent growth rate in 2011, with a potential for 6 percent growth in 2012. Moreover, in the last five years, half of the “most improved countries” appearing in the World Bank’s “Doing Business” reports were in Africa (Corbin, 2014).

However, generally positive statistics that illustrate nothing less than decade long economic growth in Africa may be obscuring serious internal economic and social disparities within African states, particularly related to income. For one, during the apartheid regime in South Africa, the country ranked among the worst in the world in terms of its wealth gap. However, despite the end of apartheid, economic disparities within the country have shown limited overall improvement. In other African countries that have received large amounts of investment from states like China, India, and Iran, wealth has been slow to move downward from political and economic elites due to governance issues. In some cases, foreign investment has accomplished little other than consolidating the dominance of high-level powerbrokers (Antipode, 2012). Severe economic inequality in some states may have also precluded the Arab Spring from spreading throughout Africa, as many people are too worried about day-to-day subsistence to get involved in protesting. In this regard it can thus be noted that without good governance and peace building are bound to fail.

Youth unemployment remains a serious issue in many countries. Concerns have arisen that Africa could witness a lost generation if additional employment opportunities are not found for Africa’s young population (Rempel, 2013). For example, even if educational institutions are improved and youth have greater access to educational opportunities, lack of meaningful work for graduates could hamper economic growth and prevent countries from reaching their full economic potential (Copeland, 2012). Disenchanted youth can also become prime targets for religious extremists, terrorist groups, or illicit transnational crime networks—all of which have

the power to reverse security and economic progress across the continent. In particular, many experts fear militant Islamists, whether associated with al Shabaab or Boko Haram, could target youth for recruitment in terrorist networks by offering distorted religious worldviews as an answer to economic woes (Cohen, 2012). With little prospects for change on the horizon, this issue is likely to grow worse as time goes by.

The need of hour in Africa is to build and promote a culture of peace and good governance because new conflicts are emerging in African continent, particularly the ethnic animosities between the communities. A culture of tolerance and consensus building is needed to be highlighted by the government and civil society in general (Gordon, 2012). A continent is experiencing a wave of ethnic intolerance virulent and xenophobia and it's essential to forge and inculcate a culture of tolerance among people, especially young people that sustained over the years ahead. Our efforts towards the promotion of African unity will not achieve the intended results unless they are supported by a culture of peace and tolerance. It's crucial to work even more sedulously at promoting inter cultural communication and civic educations, schools, as basis on which to build a culture of peace and cooperation (Connolly, 2012).

There are strong linkages and relations between good governance and peace building as they cannot be separated from one another. There is consensus on this issue that those countries where there is good governance have very less examples of conflict and rivalry. Democracies are always compatible with one another. Any democratic country which really has established good governance agenda will not prefer to go for war, they will try always to be in peace and even if there will be any dispute they will try to solve it amicably (Antipode, 2012). Good governance will create avenues for peace and within peaceful conditions people can think about developmental process.

African Union is trying a lot to establish peace in the conflicting regions of Africa. They have discussed different agendas for reformation and reconstruction of Africa but still there is lot to be achieved. Conflicts must be assessed by scholarly lenses so that the nature of the conflict will transform amicably without any political wrangle and dispute. Kant says, people who feel secure and free, governed by the rule of law and not of men, are much less likely to go to war with each other-either within or across borders- than those who don't (Daly, 2013). This explicably reflects

a relationship between good governance and peace building. There are plenty of examples all around the globe that peace and security being at risk when governance breaks down. There is really need of structural change in Africa, there is also need that rule of law, justice, liberty, equality all dimensions of good governance must be taken into consideration (Connolly, 2012).

Accountability, responsiveness, credibility and transparency are required to control the disease of corruptions which makes Africa as whole weak day by day. Popular participation of the people will give birth to the responsible political institutions in Africa. Therefore, need of the hour in Africa is that a robust and effective civil society is required which could be a check on the fraud people (Clark, 2008). Government is for the welfare for people if any government is not functioning well that must be changed by the free will of the people. People in Africa must stand up against all the maladies and loopholes which are weakening Africa as a whole except few countries. Religious leaders could play an important role in their communities and they can preach principles of peace building and cooperation and will teach people preventive measures of conflicts (Andre, 2012).

Strong judiciary is very important to book all corrupt leaders and those who are misappropriating public funds; it's only possible when there will be power shared between or among the organs of the government. Devolution of power, decentralisation and separation of powers are some of the important measures which Africa must take into consideration (Collete, 2015). The conflict can be minimized and controlled when justice will be done to all communities in African countries. Majority communities must respect the minorities they should not feel insecure. There is dire need for Africa to change in the field of development and good governance. Greater investment is required so that unemployed youth could get job opportunities.

There is need for the government to respect the fundamental rights and special rights of the people. State must work to protect the public interest, but what happens today that state is abusing its power against their own citizens which is totally unlawful act. Democratic society can grow only where people are free to think freely, walk freely, and discuss their social, political and economic issues without any fear (Zack, 2002). People must have the right of expression and criticism to put the government on the right track. Democracy can survive when all minorities will have equal avenues and entitlement to develop themselves without any

meddlesomeness from the side of the government except state can interfere when people are taking laws in their hands, when they are disturbing public order then state could take preventive measures but those preventive measures must be democratic not autocratic (Collier, 2013).

It's because of the bad governance other problems are taking birth, such as poverty, conflict, absence of peace, corruption and underdevelopment. Security and betterment of citizens is the primary function of any state. When state fails in any way in her objectives then it gives way to different challenges and problems (Antipode, 2012). Finally people join together and stand up and show their backlash against government. No doubt ethnic animosities in Africa is the major challenge which African countries are facing there is need that we have to propagate commonalities without discussing our differences in Africa thereby peace and harmony could be maintained among the different ethnic communities (Cohen, 2014). Use of electronic media can be used for sensitisation of harmony and peace in Africa. There are other methods which can be used for instance, educational institutions, peace conferences, religious leaders, political parties, and leaders could definitely change the mindset of the people of Africa (Collier, 2013).

There are some of the major challenges which Africa as a whole is facing that is bad governance, corruption and conflict. There is need to cure these major diseases and reconstruct and reform Africa so that present generation as well as posterity would be very happy in peaceful, developed, shining, and progressive Africa, but ironically this is still a dream in Africa but the time is not far when we all will see shining Africa free from conflict and insecurity (Copeland, 2012).

Good governance and peace building are essential towards meeting the objectives of sustainable and people-centered development, prosperity and peace. In this way, good governance and peace building initiatives can play a crucial role in ensuring people oriented development in Africa, because it demands that all citizens and groups articulate their interests, needs and concerns (Madden, 2014). Africa as a whole has made a tremendous effort to submit itself to the imperatives of good governance by encouraging a wider popular participation in national issues, transparency and responsibility in the administration of public affairs and by gradually involving women more in the major activities of government but there is still a lot to be done (Corbin, 2014).

African governments by taking responsibility for legal system have had greater success in making their public authorities accountable to the rule of law, and they have strengthened transparency and accountability, by supporting independent media and laying down mechanisms for monitoring of elections, to ensure that they are free and fair (Daly, 2013). We see good governance as a process through which people, men and women are empowered to participate fully in decision making at local and national levels. This process will require democratic institutions in the African states to be introduced and enabled to operate fully and effectively.

Civil wars and internal insecurity are the outcomes of long-developing processes of change in the socio-cultural practices and institutional mechanisms that normally place limits on the use of violence. In cases like Somalia, the CAR, Chad, the DRC, Sudan, South Sudan and Equatorial Guinea, the resilience of societies and political entities to shocks exists in a quiet dichotomy from our approach to violent conflict as having a watershed effect on society (De Waal, 2012). In very few instances is the type of violent conflict that we see in Africa of sufficient scale and scope to create the fundamental type of shock that Friedman required to make the politically impossible politically inevitable. There are some watershed historical moments, such as in South Africa and Rwanda in 1994 and Egypt in 2011, but in general African states and regimes in crisis have shown an incredible resilience to change – a reality borne out in the above three cases as well (Lambourne, 2014).

In the DRC, failure to create a professional national army and to find some form of political and socio-economic agreement with non-state armed groups has resulted in the UN bearing the responsibility for increasingly offensive security operations under the gambit of peacekeeping and the protection of civilians (Colleta, 2015). In South Sudan, the government has been particularly adept at using the resources of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) to advance its own internal security agenda. UNMISS has been severely criticised for its failure to prioritise the protection of civilians, but it is bound by a mandate that calls for both statebuilding and the protection of civilians (Gordon, 2014). There is no neutral ground and external actors risk underestimating how security arrangements stabilise existing inequalities. Some authors argue that the benefits of security provision tend to accrue disproportionately towards wealthy and powerful individuals, institutions and states, with the costs of that security (in financial and other terms) borne by the poor, vulnerable and excluded.

In many modern conflict systems in Africa the hybridisation of power has resulted in a diverse array of sources of security, and these dynamics of access and exclusion are being played out at multiple levels. Areas where armed violence is prevalent and entrenched tend to exist in a peripheral relationship with formal systems of political and economic power, but this does not necessarily mean that these zones of formal and informal power are far apart or even physically separated (Andre, 2012). In cases like Mali and Guinea Bissau, hybrid politico-criminal elites can be present in formal political entities while playing an essential role in supporting and extending the shadow state.

There is an assumed positive correlation between security and development, and we know instinctively that insecurity hampers development. Economists such as Paul Collier have proven that poor countries are dangerous: countries with low levels of income and low rates of growth are more prone to violent conflict. Supporting better macroeconomic planning, tax collection and public spending has become part and parcel of international post-conflict interventions in Africa – partly to increase the transparency of government systems to enable more direct aid and partly to restore the capacity of the government to fulfil its service delivery obligations (Collier, 2012).

Africa is currently enjoying unprecedented levels of economic growth. However, the relationship between economic growth and peace is tenuous at best. Michael Ignatieff has emphasised that ‘many failed and failing states are poor and have suffered from the steadily more adverse terms of trade in a globalised economy’ (Daly, 2013). For the economies dependent on natural resources, such as Angola and Nigeria, crippling domestic inequalities continue to drive local politics and the politically and economically predatory states are kept afloat by elite compacts of an increasingly fragile nature. Nigeria has the added problem of struggling to tie an ethnically and religiously fragmented society into an organised state. The inevitable biases, held in check by brutal security crackdowns and violent corrupt patronage networks, create a myriad of spaces for violent opposition (Antipode, 2012). Networks founded upon inequality are themselves producers of inequality.

Out of the top 12 fastest-growing economies in Africa, eight are non-oil producing countries. A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) report attempting to understand what is driving sustained economic growth in some of these countries focused on Burkina Faso, Ethiopia,

Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. One of the major findings was that ‘purposeful policy-making helped’. In Tanzania, a focus on increased taxation since the late 1990s has resulted in an increase in government revenue, allowing higher public spending and keeping inflation in check (Clark, 2008). Rigorous anti-corruption measures and increased transparency of public financial management systems have also meant that these six countries have received more aid and foreign direct investment than their peers. Stable politics, effective public servants and central engagement all seem to be key ingredients.

In all of these cases there were also close alliances between the military forces and the government, and the state was able to exercise its monopoly over coercive force. There were economic costs to these decisions at the time: Rwanda and Uganda maintained large armed forces while Tanzania and Mozambique had generous retirement packages and state appointments for officers (Corbin, 2014). These trade-offs, however, have secured political stability and enabled economic growth in the longer term. But can such growth be sustained and does such growth sustain or contribute to violence reduction? A by-product of economic growth in Uganda and Rwanda has been sizeable labour relocations from agricultural production to the services sector (Connolly, 2012).

This shift is accompanied by physical relocations from rural to urban centres and demographic shifts towards a more influential middle class. This translates into changed political pressures, as was seen in the lead-up to the Ugandan election and the civic mobilisation strategies employed by the opposition. Maintaining political stability through repression, however benign dictatorial regimes may seem, is inherently risky; where President Paul Kagame’s Rwanda may still be occupying some form of grey zone and the extent of violence unleashed in Rwanda in 1994 continues to pressure the population to accept certain civil liberty restrictions, the political stability of Uganda is being seriously challenged by shifting elite groups and interests (Gordon, 2012).

Similarly in Tanzania, natural gas finds are expected to increase current economic growth tremendously. However, these gas finds have also accelerated political tensions in the lead-up to the 2015 election. The rather surprising resurgence of Renamo in Mozambique comes at a time when large coal, oil and gas deposits are being prepared for extraction (Wallestein, 2002). Some

estimates of Mozambican natural gas export potential point to a \$30 billion per year industry. Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama said in November 2012 that he was willing to ‘destroy Mozambique’ if Renamo did not get a bigger slice of the country’s growing wealth (Colleta, 2015).

Sogge also highlights a series of risk multipliers: trade policies, investment and ownership policies, foreign aid and financial policies. It has been found that civil wars generally worsen income distributions, with polarisation commonly peaking about five years after a conflict ends and pre-conflict patterns of income distribution reestablished about ten years after conflict ends (Clark, 2008). As cases like South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola are showing, overcoming conflict is one step but the structural transformation of the economy and spreading the locus of capital within the economy is extremely difficult within a highly unequal capitalist world order. As growth dynamics further diverge across the international system, overcoming inequalities as a source of stability and security within the global financial-security complex is going to be a more explicit interventionist goal, economically driven by the growth of China and India and the collapse of Western capital and geo-strategically driven by access to energy (especially as natural gas competes with the global oil cartels), water and land (Mac Ginty, 2016). Whether there will be shifts in only the loci of inequalities or also in the substance thereof will depend largely on the normative content of such economic growth.

On multiple fronts, relative levels of security and stability have increased across Africa. Formerly devastating wars have subsided in countries including Liberia, Angola, and Sierra Leone, among others. The international community has increasingly prioritized and targeted destabilizing substate groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army, which now face new obstacles to operating with impunity, both within states and across borders (Colleta, 2015). Elsewhere, the international community has worked to counter centralized power grabs in Togo and the Ivory Coast. As a clear sign of progress on the continent, sixteen sub-Saharan countries were projected to have free and fair elections in 2011. Broadly, regional institutions like the AU have taken on new responsibilities in deploying peacekeeping forces to resolve conflicts and facilitate peace building. With UN support, the AU has deployed tens of thousands of troops to Burundi, Comoros, Sudan, and Somalia (Cohen, 2014). The AU has also taken on new responsibilities in terms of conflict prevention by providing a forum for members to mediate and address conflicts,

share best practices on peace building, and engage in regularized dialogue regarding other security challenges facing AU members.

3.1 Gaps hampering Good Governance and Peace building in Africa

Despite the remarkable success the African continent has had over the last fifteen years, major challenges continue to play a role in complicating successful peace building efforts. Among many of the ongoing concerns are the interrelated issues of gaps within the AU and domestic governance challenges (Collier, 2014). While the AU is far more developed an institution than its defunct predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, it faces significant obstacles as it attempts to balance its peace building authority as a three-fold political entity, peacekeeper, and peacemaker. Generally, the organization faces five broad challenges.

- The AU has struggled to develop an effective peace and security architecture because many of its members are still players in some of Africa's most persistent conflicts. Complicating this matter further, several countries with long histories of internal discord like Libya, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea have also enjoyed seats on the influential AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), which relies on consensus for its decision-making.
- It has been difficult for the AU to employ efficacious sticks and carrots to influence the cooperation of its member states and implement decisions. For instance, only about seven to ten countries contribute 80 to 90 percent of troops and cash for AU missions. In many cases, the AU has been almost totally reliant on nonmember states for logistical support and training purposes.
- The AU has yet to clarify an adequate division of labor between itself and the work of the UN Security Council, as well as what a strategic partnership between the two institutions really means. With Chapter VIII of the UN Charter offering little in terms of clarifying the proper role of each organization, confusion has steadily increased over the mandate of the AU as well as its supporting missions.
- The AU also has ongoing internal disputes regarding what values and principles the organization should prioritize. While the organization is expressly opposed to unconstitutional changes to government, questions have arisen if rebellions or coups are actually helpful for human rights and democracy in certain circumstances. The recent

rebellion in Libya, and subsequent UN Security Council authorized humanitarian intervention, is a case in point.

- Affecting the AU on virtually every level are persistent and increasingly problematic resource gaps. For one, there has been far too little high-level sustained engagement and leadership from AU member states in terms of promoting what the AU can and should do. Similarly, the institution's bureaucracy has far too many political appointments, remains poorly staffed and resourced, and lacks a capacity for institutional memory. AU military forces also routinely lack niche technologies, capabilities, and intelligence and are only capable of operating independently during small operations. The AU also lacks a substantive core of civilian specialists, such as a cadre of trained police, to help carry out its operations. Finally, the AU's infrastructural capacity, in terms of resource hubs and logistical systems to support and maintain its operations, remains deficient.

3.2 Domestic Governance and Peace building Challenges

Transnational crime and corruption remain a persistent problem for many African states. Both raise start-up costs while creating opaque, inconsistent, and incomplete regulatory environments for business. Trafficking in narcotics, in particular, has the power to breed corruption, facilitate illicit capital flight, and reverse transparency-building reforms (Daly, 2013). Guinea-Bissau's military, for instance, is reportedly overwhelmed by the influence of drug kingpins and traffickers. Other forms of transnational crime such as human smuggling and arms trafficking can facilitate recruitment for violent antigovernment groups, creating a vicious spiral of instability and conflict both within states and across borders (Gordon, 2013).

Foreign aid has repeatedly been weighted heavily towards post-conflict situations rather than the prevention of conflicts. Aid has also repeatedly been slow to trickle down from centralized government sponsored efforts to community- or civil society-based action. Unfortunately, in many peacebuilding efforts, NGOs have been perceived as backseat contributors rather than primary partners (Zack, 2002). Moreover, while many have cited the rapid emergence of social media as helpful toward democratization and transparency efforts on the continent, governments have employed new tactics to counteract the power of social media and mitigate manifestations of open dissent.

On the broadest of levels, many peace building efforts have been too narrow, focusing only on elections rather than sustainable and comprehensive efforts to empower actors within civil society. Commonly, this includes too much focus on institution building and forgetting the “people factor” as countries move along the long and difficult road of democratization (Rempel, 2013). Democracy advocates, whether states or major international institutions, can also underestimate risks commonly associated with the birth of new democracies. Among many dangers, this includes election related instability, conflicts bred from democratic transitions, patronage politics, and the exclusion of minority populations from political institutions. Despite successful elections in Malawi, for example, the ruling regime has shown increasing signs of corruption and nepotism (Cohen, 2014). The collapse of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s authoritarian regime in Libya has also generated fresh security and economic concerns from countries in the Sahel region, including Mali and Niger.

4.0 Conclusion

In conclusion, the concept of good governance and peace building derives its relevance in the context of mis-governance which includes malfeasance. In many countries, the democratic form of government has proved to be ineffective for checking swindling of public funds for private gains by the elected leaders as well as permanent-bureaucrats. Misuse of power, fraud, chicanery and embezzlement of funds are systematically perpetrated by the leaders of government and their unions. Mis-governance is found all around the world, especially in developing countries, in rampant degree. The concept of good governance and peace building becomes attractive as a remedy against this state of affairs. African policy makers and the people of Africa have to change the condition of Africa and they have to strive for achieving a shining and progressive Africa.

The peaceful, prosperous and developed Africa could be achieved once all the stakeholders are ready to go for a change. And for changing Africa one needs to have good governance mechanism which could play a role of stabilising the entire African region. The challenges and constraints which the African continent is facing could be managed and transformed by establishing the good governance mechanism in true sense in Africa. A dream of peaceful,

progressive and developed Africa is not far from us, one day it has to become true but we all have to be well prepared and strive for this goal.

Recommendations

In order to have effective and comprehensive governance and peace building efforts, African countries should;

- Expand conflict prevention efforts and update early warning mechanisms. Foreign aid should be recalibrated to include a focus on conflict prevention rather than merely conflict mitigation or managing post-conflict situations. Although this could encounter major bureaucratic and political obstacles in some countries, it is important that peacebuilding not be conducted on a stop and go basis, but rather used to prevent conflicts from happening at all. As a result, the regimes of aging leaders in Angola, and Cameroon should be cautiously observed.
- Contingency planning—assuming worst case scenarios—should also be a priority. Moreover, whereas formerly troop and tank movements in Africa and elsewhere could be observed weeks or even months in advance, the growth of terrorist and religious extremist groups has radically reduced early-warning time to days or even hours. Worse, debilitating cyber attacks can also be launched from unassuming Internet cafes with almost no advanced warning. Such developments necessitate recognizing that new pressures are affecting early warning mechanisms as well as taking measures to adapt. This includes supporting the multilateral exchange of intelligence and information—especially through the African Union—about militant groups operating and recruiting in Africa, among other measures.
- Promote regional integration. African regional organizations like the AU should pursue further regional integration in pursuit of practical economic and security goals. AU members should also provide expanded high-level and committed political support to the PSC and the rest of the AU bureaucracy to encourage institutional development. External players like the United Nations should also, where possible, provide the AU with specialized logistical, technical, and intelligence support to assist in carrying out governance and peacebuilding operations across the continent. African economic regional

organizations like the South African Development Community should also pursue further institutional development and continue to facilitate the movement of goods and other legitimate commercial activity across borders.

- Encourage sustainable democratization. Efforts to promote democracy should not be considered ends in themselves, and the promotion of democracy cannot simply terminate after elections have taken place. Efforts to promote democracy in Africa need to emphasize building strong civil society groups, accountable NGOs, and transparent governmental institutions. As instability is common among new democracies, democratic transitions should be approached and observed carefully.
- Balance expectations. Both the international community and African countries should be mindful that fundamental, groundbreaking reform will not happen overnight. This may be particularly true in terms of the development of the AU's internal bureaucracy and normative decision making. While targeted reform and aid should certainly be actively pursued, stakeholders should be reasonable in the timeframes they expect sustainable and worthwhile reform to occur.
- Plan partnerships. Partnerships among different public and private entities are essential to promote economic growth as well as support civil society groups in Africa. Bridges, for instance, should be expanded between businesses and intergovernmental organizations as well as among states. The latter, although commonly overlooked, may prove useful in pooling resources as government budgets face cuts across the world. As an example, the United States, France, and Morocco played a positive collective role in and governance and peace building efforts in Guinea. Partnerships can also offer fresh pathways for boosting policy innovation, accountability, and transparency among various actors engaging in peace building.
- Reward and promote private sector success. More efforts should be taken to showcase private sector success in countries as well as promote achievements in corporate social responsibility. This could help encourage expanded investment in Africa, while encouraging new private sector actors to observe ethical standards when conducting business on the continent. Business standards put forth by the International Labor Organization and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative should both be readily

applied as economic growth expands and development work expands. Although Africa's burgeoning economic growth is cause for praise, it should be recognized that development that generates extreme income disparities, corruption, and high levels of youth unemployment is not sustainable in the long term.

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