

Managing Nigerian Economy for Global Relevance: Lessons from Brazil, China, India and South Africa

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ABSTRACT

The need for moving Nigerian economy for global relevance is increasingly becoming an issue. On the other hand, Brazil, China, India and South Africa-BCIS are emerging as significant force in the global economy. Their shares in world exports increased from 0.86% to 1.155% for Brazil, 3.87% to 8.09% for China, and 0.66% to 1.01% for India. That of Nigeria marginally increased from 0.33% to 0.39% within the same period. While manufactured products form bulk of the exports of BCIS, primary products have consistently dominated that of Nigeria. The paper analysed how Nigeria has fared at the global plane by drawing inferences from BCIS. The study employed secondary data sourced from World Bank, etc. The study submitted that functional infrastructures, functional legal framework, among others, as key ingredients that should be in place if the dream of Nigeria becoming a country with global relevance is to be realised.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The need for moving the Nigerian economy to attain global relevance is increasingly becoming an issue of concern in recent times among Nigerians. This is one of the goals of the ‘Vision 2020’, which is to list Nigerian among the 20 top economies of the world come year 2020 (Central Bank of Nigeria-CBN, 2006)ⁱ. On the other hand, the economies of Brazil, China, India and South Africa- BCIS (the countries are arranged in alphabetical order not necessarily their economic strength) are emerging as significant force to be reckoned with in the global economy platform. For instance, the annual export growths of BCIS between 2004 and 2005 were 32%, 35.4%, 30% and 26.5%, respectively. Their (BCIS) real per capita income growth between 2003 and 2004 were 3.3%, 9.9%, 8.7% and 4.3%, in that order. In addition, between

2000 and 2006, their share in the world exports increased (except for South Africa) from 0.86% to 1.155% for Brazil, 3.87% to 8.09% for China, and 0.66% to 1.01% for India. While that of Nigeria marginally increased from 0.33% to 0.39% within the same period (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development -UNCTAD, 2009ⁱⁱ; World Trade Organization-WTO, 2009ⁱⁱⁱ).

With respect to export composition, while the manufactured products formed the bulk of the exports of BCIS, in Nigeria primary products have consistently dominated the exports base - accounting for over 90% with less than 2% for the manufactured products (Aigbokhan, Alabi, and Ailemen, 2007^{iv}; Osabuohien, 2007^v). The contention here is that: due to difference in the elasticities (both demand and supply) of manufactured and primary products, as well as the difference in their linkage effects with other sectors, this situation, among other factors, has not made Nigeria to benefit from the global economy satisfactorily.

The choice of BCIS is based on the fact that they are becoming “new drivers of the global economy vehicle” and their emergence as growth poles in their respective regions. China and India are dominant players in Asia, Brazil in North America and South Africa in Africa. More so, in 2003 during the Cancun session of the WTO, an influential group of developing countries known as the “G-20” emerged, with BCIS playing the front burner role. The G-20 forcefully demanded the need to ‘dismantle’ trade distortions and protectionist agricultural policies of the European Community, the US and other industrialized countries (WTO, 2005^{vi}).

The performance of a country at the global stage refers to as the degree to which such a country benefits from trade with other countries of the world. It could also be mirrored by the level at which the attendant costs of engaging in trade relationships with other parts of the world is minimized. The performance of the country on the global stage could determine the global competitiveness of the country. This, on the other hand, could influence the benefits accruable from world trade to that country. In assessing the performance of a country within a global context, there are some indicators that could be used. They include: terms of trade, export performance and its share of GDP, as well as export as a percentage of total world value, among others. The factors that could determine the level of performance of a country at the global scene

include: *inter alia*, nature of socio-political climate, level of infrastructural development, the extent of political and economic freedom as reflected by the quality of institutional arrangements (Fosu, 2003^{vii}; Rodrik, 2008^{viii}). The above factors can be performance inducing or reducing, depending on how the managers of such an economy maintain both economic and political institutions via policies at a given point in time.

It is against the above background that this study examines how Nigeria has fared at the global plane by drawing inferences from BCIS with a view to evaluating their successes and suggests how the managers of the Nigerian economy can align policies that would make the country benefit better from the global arena. This was achieved by analysing relevant secondary data sourced from UNCTAD (2009^{ix}) and World Bank (2010^x). The study is structured in sections. The section following this introduction is the theoretical background, section III presents the emergence of BCIS on the global economic stage and possible lessons for the managers of Nigerian economy, while the last concludes.

2.0 Theoretical Background

Nayyar (2008^{xi}) examined the possible influence of China, India, Brazil and South Africa in terms of regards to rapid growth both on developed countries and developing countries. The author using the channel of international trade, investment, finance and migration observed that the impact of BCIS on world economy could be complementary or competitive and, on balance, positive or negative.

It would be expedient to give a little hint on the historical development of trade. The early forms of economies engaged in local exchange within a small community until trade expanded beyond the community level to the region, longer distances and eventually to global stage. At each stage of trade development, economies were characterized by elements of increasing specialization, division of labour, and technological changes (North, 1994^{xii}; Goldin and Reinert, 2006^{xiii}). At initial stage specialization was elementary where self-reliance is one of the key features of most individuals and as a result, limited trade existed within social networks

of informalities (North, 1991^{xiv}). In that form of trade, the transaction costs associated were low as individuals were familiar with one another.

With expansion of trade and exchange, the possibility for conflicts became very crucial. The main reason is that as market size increased, the level of transaction costs also increased remarkably as a result of complexities involved. Thus, efforts need to be employed to enforce rules (contracts) and orders for effective trade. In fact, this is one of the many reasons for establishing World Trade Organization (WTO) with the following rules: non-discrimination among members; reciprocity; general prohibition of quotas; fair competition; and binding tariffs. All of the rules are essentially targeted at enhancing trade facilitation among member countries.

The growth of long distance trade usually poses two distinct transaction cost issues. One is the problem of agency which becomes a bottleneck to trade as the size and volume of trade expands. The other challenge has to do with contract negotiation and enforcement. Negotiation and enforcement with other parts of the world involve the development of standardized weights and measures, units of account, a medium of exchange, enclaves of foreign merchants, and so on (Williamson, 2000^{xv}). The expansion of the market entails more specialized process which involved economies of scale.

The stages seem to merge one into another in a smooth form of evolution into cooperation. Essential in this evolution is whether information costs and economies of scale together with the development of improved enforcement of contracts would encourage more complicated forms of exchange. It would also involve whether organizations have the incentive to acquire knowledge and information that will induce them to evolve in more socially productive directions. Specific innovations and particular institutional instruments evolved from interaction between two fundamental economic forces: the economies of scale associated with a growing volume of trade, and the development of improved mechanisms to enforce contracts at lower costs. In this formulation, nations with open immigration policy would, *ceteris paribus*, attract more business people vis-à-vis trade.

The above can be linked to the economic performance issue on global stage to BCIS using arrivals of visitors in thousand ('000) as a measure of tourism indicator. The figure was 4,794 for Brazil; China, 41,761; India, 3,457; while South Africa had 6,678 in 2004 (UNCTAD, 2009^{xvi}). The figure for Nigeria in the same year was just 924, which was less than one third of the least in BCIS. Thus, it could be inferred that China had more open immigration policy within the group, which is distantly followed by South Africa, Brazil and India, in that order. This could also be linked to the attractiveness of the economy to foreign investment prospects, given that tourists, among other reasons, prospect for business opportunities. The value for Nigeria clearly indicates that the nation has not been very attractive to tourists in which might have resulted from a strict immigration policy-an indication of maligned institutional structure, *ceteris paribus*.

3.0 The Emergence of BCIS on Global Stage and some Lessons for Nigeria

The emergence of BCIS at the global stage has some historical undertone, which has been traced by Nayyar (2008^{xvii}). The focus of this very study therefore is not to repeat same but to assess the implications and how it relates to other developing countries' performance at the global stage especially Nigeria-the most populous African country. Nayyar (2008) noted that the rapid growth in China supports economic growth elsewhere in the world with regards to market for exports. India and Brazil have the potential to provide similar support, but South Africa does not exhibit such a potential yet.

In sum, rapid growth in these emerging economies-BCIS would have the possibility of changing the balance of world economic power. This fact can be derived from the relevance of their population (cum labour force) and GDP where they account for about 41% of world population in 2006 and about 8.6% of world's GDP (see Table 1.0). Thus, Nigeria like other developing countries can partner more with BCIS than the developed countries given some similarities in their economies as characterized by abundant labour. For example, Fugazza and Vanzetti (2008^{xviii}) have shown that trade-weighted applied tariffs levied by developed and developing countries on merchandise exports differ. In their study, it was found that developed

countries impose tariffs of 2.1% on imports from other developed countries, and 3.9% on imports from developing countries.

Table 1.0 BCIS and Nigeria’s Share of World Population and GDP (%)

Country /Year	Share of Population (%) in the World			Share of GDP in the World (%)				
	2000	2004	2006	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
Brazil	2.84	2.86	2.87	1.90	1.41	1.38	1.46	1.80
China	17.08	17.35	17.47	3.41	3.98	4.00	4.17	4.46
India	20.37	19.92	19.69	1.47	1.55	1.61	1.67	1.80
South Africa	0.74	0.74	0.73	0.42	0.34	0.45	0.52	0.54
Nigeria	2.04	2.14	2.20	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.26
BCIS Total	41.04	40.88	40.76	7.19	7.28	7.44	7.82	8.59

Source: Computed by the author from UNCTAD (2006^{xix}; 2009^{xx})

Henley et al, (2008^{xxi}), using a sub-set of firms from the sample of 1,216 foreign-owned firms participating in the United Nations Industrial Development Organization-UNIDO Africa Foreign Investor Survey of 2005, observed that the about 55% Chinese firms in Africa are located in Madagascar and Nigeria, comprising 30% and 25%, respectively. Chinese firms were observed to be most widely dispersed among the BCIS, with the sample nearly equally distributed between East and West Africa. In addition, the value of FDI has grown steadily in China, reaching about \$80 billion in 2005, which made China the number one destination for foreign investors (Dollar, 2008^{xxii}). On the other hand, about 67% of Indian firms in Africa are located in East Africa, while 20 % are located in Nigeria. With regards to South African firms, it was observed that 46 % are in Mozambique, 18 % in Malawi, 8 % in West Africa (with Nigeria

as major recipient), and the rest in East Africa. Moreover, the BCIS’ share of world’s total inward flow of FDI increased from 6.2% in 2000 which almost doubled to 11.5% 2006 (Nayyar, 2008^{xxiii}).

The annual growth of their export between 2004 and 2005 was about 32% for Brazil, 35.4% China; 30 India and 26.5% for South Africa. It was 29.5% for Nigeria. The real per capita growth rate between 2003 and 2004 were 4.9%; 10.1%; 7.1%; 4.5% and the value from 2004 to 2005 were 3.3%; 9.9%; 8.7% and 4.3% for Brazil, China, India and South Africa, respectively. The figures for Nigeria within the two periods were 5.3% and 4.9% (UNCTAD, 2006; 2009). This implies that the growth of Nigeria is closely following the same trend with the BCIS. This could mean that there is the possibility of trickle-down effect on Nigeria’s economy from the BCIS.

In furtherance, economic growth witnessed in China and India, has the ability to exert influence on the world’s prosperity. However, Nayyar (2008^{xxiv}) hinted that the influence could yield either positive or negative results. To him, the influence could be positive if, as the old engine of growth slows down, BCIS emerge as new engines that would drive the growth process. This could have a positive impact on developing countries it will improve their terms of trade, provide appropriate technologies, and create new sources of finance for development. This is very crucial especially the current economic melt-down that is biting hard on the economies of the West (Reinhart, 2009^{xxv}). Thus, for the developing countries, the BCIS may be able to drive significant impact through various trade arrangements (like *bilateralism*). Through such cooperation among them, there could be considerable potentials for influencing multilateral trade relations, which could create policy space for developing countries like Nigeria.

Table 2.0 BCIS and Nigeria’s Share of World Exports (2000-2006)

Country						
/Year	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Brazil	0.86	0.93	0.97	1.05	1.13	1.15
China	3.87	5.03	5.82	6.47	7.30	8.09

India	0.66	0.78	0.78	0.84	0.95	1.01
South Africa	0.47	0.46	0.49	0.50	0.49	0.44
Nigeria	0.33	0.29	0.32	0.34	0.41	0.39
BCIS Total	3.56	3.88	5.85	7.20	8.06	8.86

Source: Same as in Table 1.0

Table 2.0 shows BCIS' share of world's export. It is apparent from the table that the contribution of the BCIS to total world export has improved commendably over the years. For example, between 2000 and 2006, the value more than doubled: increased from 3.56% in 2000 to 8.86% in 2006. This indicates that the global relevance of BCIS is increasing. For Nigeria the value marginally increased from 0.33% to 0.39 % within the same period. The argument can be taken further that the composition of a country's export is very germane not just the value. To address this issue, this study went further to present the composition of both exports and imports. This is presented in Table 3.0.

Table 3.0 Export and Import Composition of BCIS and Nigeria in % (2000 & 2005)

Country		All Food Items	Agric. Raw Materials	Fuels	Ores and Metals	Manufactured product
/Year						
Brazil						
2000	Export	23.20	4.80	1.60	10.10	57.60
	Import	6.80	2.00	15.10	3.10	73.10
2005	Export	26.20	4.00	6.10	10.20	53.10
	Import	4.60	1.50	18.80	3.90	71.20
China						
2000	Export	5.40	1.10	3.20	1.80	88.20
	Import	4.00	4.70	9.20	5.90	75.50
2005	Export	3.20	0.50	2.30	1.80	91.90

	Import	3.30	3.60	9.70	8.40	74.70
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India						
2000	Export	12.90	1.20	4.30	2.90	76.50
	Import	4.40	3.20	34.70	4.70	42.90
2005	Export	8.90	1.50	11.50	7.20	69.80
	Import	3.10	1.90	33.70	4.70	48.40
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South Africa						
2000	Export	7.40	3.30	8.80	9.30	46.30
	Import	4.70	1.50	14.30	2.60	67.70
2005	Export	8.50	2.70	10.40	22.30	55.50
	Import	4.50	1.10	14.30	2.60	68.90
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Nigeria						
2000	Export	0.10	0.00	99.60	0.00	0.20
	Import	19.90	0.90	1.70	2.40	75.00
2005	Export	0.00	0.00	97.90	0.00	2.10
	Import	15.50	0.60	16.00	1.60	66.30

Source: Same as in Table 1.0

The examination of a country's exports composition is important given the fact that there is a difference between the demand and supply elasticities of primary products (such as mineral products, agricultural raw materials) and other secondary commodities (such as manufactured products). From Table 3.0, it could be observed that the composition of manufactured products occupies the bulk of the BCIS's export, which means that they have the advantage of benefiting remarkably at the global stage. The scene for Nigeria holds almost the exact opposite: where export of primary products takes over her export content, leaving very little for manufactured products. For instance, Nigeria exported as much as 99.6% and 97.9% of fuels in 2000 and 2005, respectively, while she exported less than 1% of manufactured products in 2000. Contrarily, Nigeria imported as much as 75% and 66.3% of manufactured products in 2000 and 2005. The above paints an awful picture compared to BCIS where China exported about 91.9% of manufactured products and only less than 1% raw materials in 2005. Similar trend like that of China is observed for Brazil, India and South Africa.

The lesson for the managers of the Nigerian economy to learn from above is that for Nigeria to perform satisfactorily at the global stage, she needs to diversify her export composition. This could be done by making the manufacturing sector to perform better which would improve the component of manufactured products at global plane. Given the fact that both the demand and supply of manufactured products are more elastic than primary commodities increase in the export of manufactured products would make the country adjust better to shocks at the world market. This supports some earlier empirical findings that a country that exports primarily primary products would not gain much from the global economy (Osabuohen, 2007). Thus, if Nigeria is able to improve the level of her manufactured exports via technological advancement, managerial skill, power generation and infrastructures; she could gain more from the BCIS economic relationship. This would improve her performance at the global stage.

To meaningfully achieve satisfactory performance at the global stage, in addition to infrastructural development, power generation, and the likes, in Nigeria, it would be expedient to highlight that functional institutional arrangement is required. This is because when there is the prevalence of weak institutional framework, there is tendency for entrepreneurs to become rent-seekers instead of producers (Kolstad, 2007^{xxvi}). Therefore, it could be inferred that resource-curse syndrome can only occur in an economy where weak institutions persist.

Dollar (2008^{xxvii}) had revealed that the quality of Chinese infrastructure: good roads, reliable power, functional ports, and tremendous cell phone coverage throughout the country, among other things, worked through a policy of cost recovery built on an effective institutional mechanism. For example, it takes about 7 days to get a mainline telephone connection in China, compared to 34 days or more in African countries. In the power sector, Chinese government set its reform course with the 1985 State Council Decree that diversified the sources of financing for the power sector and implemented debt-repayment electricity price for new power plants. There may be tendency for an apprehension that as BCIS become principal players at the global stage, that they may pursue their respective national interests and not necessarily the common good of developing countries partners like Nigeria. However, when negotiations between them are made

with experts from both parties and agreements that are binding put in place, there might not be predilection for a country to undo the other partner.

To analyse the role of governance management on the economies of BCIS and possible lessons for Nigeria, this paper presents some reflections in Tables 4 and 5.

Table 4.0 Simple and Weighted Average Tariff of BCIS and Nigeria (2000-2005)

Country /Year	2000		2002		2003		2004		2005	
	Simple	weighted								
Brazil	16.3	14.7	14.4	11.9	14	11.5	14	11.1	13	10.1
China	15.8	13.1	14.7	12.4	10.6	6.4	9.8	5.6	9.2	5.3
India	31.3	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	28.1	n.a	15.3	n.a
South Africa	7.9	5.9	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	8.1	6.5	8	6.2
Nigeria	25.3	18.2	26.7	15.7	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	11.4	9.3

Source: UNCTAD (2006^{xxviii}); World Bank (2010^{xxix}).

Table 4 shows the average tariffs across the countries, which reflects the nature of their trade policies as usually stipulated by economic managers. The simple tariff structure in recent times is becoming moderate compared to its value of 31.3% for India in 2000 which moved down to 15.3% in 2005. The reduction is similar in others-Brazil China, except South Africa that has maintained a low value. The value for Nigeria also witnessed the downward trend. However, it should be noted that the non-tariff barrier to trade is very alarming in Nigeria, just like some other SSA African countries. Ackah and Morrissey (2007^{xxx}) have counselled policy makers in developing countries, especially SSA that trade liberalization alone would be a sub-optimal policy option. Thus, such trade policy should be accompanied by complementary policies like healthy institutional platform for such policies.

To this end, the paper presents governance and institutional indicators for the countries in Table 5.0. The governance/institutional indicators as computed by Kaufmann, Kraay and

Mastruzzi (2009^{xxxii}) for the World Bank show the level of institutions across different countries of the world. The value usually ranges from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best). A look at Table 5.0 shows that all the governance/institutional indicators presented – control of corruption, regulatory quality, government effectiveness and rule of law, voice and accountability, and political stability– reveal that Nigeria has not performed satisfactorily. This is quite poor compared to the values of the BCIS presented.

Just it has been noted that one of the reasons for the delays in clearing goods and the resultant high cost can be traced to high level of corruption in Nigeria (Emenyonu, 2007^{xxxiii}). This is in essence a good indication of weak institutional framework in Nigeria. For example, World Economic Forum (2006^{xxxiiii}) reported that despite the tremendous oil wealth and competitive potential of Nigeria, she recorded a steep fall in its competitiveness. Nigeria ranked 101st in the world, moving down 18 places from the previous year in the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) rankings for 2006-07. More so, it fell to the rank of 112 in the basic requirements sub-index, which highlights the fundamentals for achieving sustained growth such as strong institutions, adequate infrastructure, a supportive macroeconomic environment, and good health and education facilities.

In addition, Transparency International (2006^{xxxv}) indicated that Nigeria ranked 142nd (with 7 others) out of 163 countries on the list of 2006 corruption perception index. The figure was by far worse than any of the BCIS. The implication is that if the country aspires to perform favourably at the global stage, she needs to painstakingly seek ways of reducing the embarrassing rate of corruption. One of such means suggested by this study is an institutional arrangement whereby public office holders as well as leaders in the private sector be made accountable to the people they are supposed to serve. The functional legal framework that would reduce undue delay in handling of court cases as well as the long awaited constitutional reform and passage of right to information bill by the national assembly, would all be helpful in this direction.

Table 5: Some Economic Management\ Governance Indicators

Country / Year	Control of Corruption		Regulatory Quality		Government Effectiveness		Rule of Law		Voice and accountability		Political stability	
	2005	2006	2005	2006	2005	2006	2005	2006	2005	2006	2005	2006
Brazil	-0.29	-0.33	0.04	0.00	-0.08	-0.11	-0.43	-0.48	0.44	0.37	-0.11	-0.09
China	-0.68	-0.53	-0.28	-0.18	-0.09	-0.01	-0.43	-0.39	-1.46	-1.66	-0.26	-0.37
India	-0.37	-0.33	-0.24	-0.15	-0.12	-0.04	-0.86	-0.82	0.40	0.35	-0.79	-0.84
South Africa	0.56	0.56	0.51	0.68	0.83	0.78	0.55	0.52	0.74	0.60	-0.06	-0.07
Nigeria	-1.23	-1.29	-0.91	-0.89	-0.91	-0.96	-1.39	-1.27	-0.78	-0.79	-1.73	-1.99

Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009); World Trade Indicator (2008; 2010).

4.0 Conclusion

To say that effective management of an economy through framework such as contract enforcement is needed for any country to achieve satisfactory economic performance at the global economy is almost stating the obvious. On this note, the present study took an analytical adventure on how a developing country like Nigeria could strengthen domestic economic and political environments in order to attain better economic performance at the global stage. This was assessed with the emergence of Brazil, China, India, and South Africa-BCIS as new drivers of the global economic vehicle. The emergence of BCIS as important force to be reckoned with, despite their sizable population and labour force, is due to their impressive performance in recent times using some trade and macroeconomic performance indicators. Thus, economic cooperation among the BCIS could lead to some measure of influence in multilateral trade relations that would be beneficial to developing countries like Nigeria.

Since, Nigeria has close economic ties with BCIS; it could benefit from the global stage with the emergence of BCIS. The study articulated that for Nigeria to improve the level of her performance at the global stage, functional institutional arrangement is required. This should be complemented by infrastructural development, power generation; efficient road facilities, which would reduce both transaction and production costs and as a result improve the competitiveness

of the country's export. More so, the reduction of the wave of corruption via institutional mechanisms whereby office holders both at the public and private domains are made answerable to the people whose interest they represent was suggested. In addition, a functional legal framework and the long awaited constitutional reform, as well as reduction of the level of non-tariff barriers such as delay in clearing goods at the ports, were equally emphasized as means of improving Nigeria's performance at the global stage.

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