

**EMANCIPATORY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ZIMBABWE'S FOREIGN
POLICY UNDER ROBERT MUGABE 1980-C2017: A REASSESSMENT**

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ABSTRACT

The demise and capitulation of Robert Mugabe as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe allows us to reflect on Zimbabwe's foreign policy and relations under his stewardship. To this end therefore, this article charts and provides a historical perspective of Zimbabwe's foreign policy from 1980 up to c2017. Succinctly, the paper argues that Zimbabwe's foreign policy was one anchored upon straddling the ideals of liberation, emancipation, pan-Africanism and cosyng up to the West whilst at the same time enunciating non-alignment. However, when relations with Britain and the West went sour, Mugabe pragmatically, in a bid to save his regime from internal forces and pressures began to pursue a foreign policy which was informed by emancipation of the African continent by advocating for the world anchored on justice, equality and fairness.

Key Words: Emancipation International Relations, Foreign Policy, Mugabe, SADC, Zimbabwe

Introduction

Zimbabwe gained independence on the 18th of April 1980 against the backdrop of the Cold War and a bipolar world divided into two hostile blocs. Within a decade of attaining independence, the regional, international, security and global landscape changed. Birthed during the height of the Cold War and brought into the international system of bipolarity where the world was divided into two competing blocs-East and West, Zimbabwe adopted a cautious foreign policy which was largely informed by nonalignment. However, in less than a decade, a cataclysmic event would occur that would necessitate a recalibration of Zimbabwe's foreign policy and foreign relations-the collapse of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only brought the end of the Cold War, to borrow from Francis Fukuyama (1992), this was an event of epic proportions as it marked 'the end of history'.

The political, security and military situation in Southern Africa was complex and volatile. Destabilisation, inter-state conflict, proxy wars and client-patron relations between the two superpowers and African States were all too common. Independence was attained whilst the Cold War between the two superpowers, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was at its peak in Africa. Southern Africa was engulfed by violent conflict as a bitter and savage civil war pitting the proxies of the two superpowers was raging in Mozambique-Zimbabwe's eastern neighbour. Angola was also on the throes of a vicious and violent war which had entangled the Cubans, South Africans, Americans, Soviet Union, Namibians and South Africans in a theatre of war. South Africa, a major lifeline and a trading partner of Zimbabwe was under the hardline and hawkish apartheid regime which believed that she was encircled by hostile countries which desired to spread the socialist and Marxist ideology. In response, the securocrats of Pretoria had come up with the Total Strategy and policy of destabilizing Southern Africa. Zimbabwe's foreign policy and international relations in as far as the Southern African region was concerned, became dominated by security concerns. Foreign relations considerations became securitised as the major preoccupation of the newly independent state was to secure its borders, ensure its survival as a State, secure the survival and security of the political elite and the regime and at the same time provide support for liberation movements in Namibia, South Africa and support the Mozambican government which was under siege from the rebels.

The end of the Cold War also witnessed shifts and turns in Zimbabwe's foreign policy. The country had to recalibrate her foreign policy, relations and broad international relations in recognition of the new realities of global politics and international relations. The unipolar moment meant that the Soviet bloc was no longer a crucial factor in the matrix of global politics, the USSR was no more as it had met its demise, the world was to be reorganized and reordered according to Western liberalism. Furthermore, imposition of structural adjustment programmes, the role of the global financial organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), the Washington Consensus, Namibian independence, the collapse of apartheid and South Africa's independence, the Rome Accord of 1992 which put an end to the Mozambican civil war meant that Harare had to rethink its foreign policy.

However, internal developments and the country's domestic policy had a significant influence on Zimbabwe's foreign policy. Zimbabwe's foreign policy posture noticeably changed from 1997 into the early 2000s. In 1997 the country began to experience economic hardships as the Zimbabwean dollar collapsed due to a lack of fiscal prudence, and the unbudgeted gratuities paid out to the veterans of the war of liberation. In the same year a spat developed between the British Labour government and Zimbabwe over the question of land and compensation for white commercial farmers. From the year 2000 relations with Britain became toxic, spiteful and relations with the West became strained. At the heart of the schism was the land question, governance issues and human rights. Relations with the West were hostile, antagonistic and difficult and Zimbabwe became increasingly isolated by the West and its allies. She sought to survive and navigate the treacherous waters of international relations by seeking new alliances.

Harare's threat perception was dominated by a siege mentality as she posited that the West led by Britain, the European Union and the United States of America were actively working towards regime change. Harare's reaction was to turn her attention towards China and the Far East in what is referred to as 'the Look East Policy', she also courted Iran, Venezuela, and Libya and assumed a more Pan-African in the international forums such as the United Nations General Assembly. The land question and the need for land reform began to shape and dominate Zimbabwe's international relations and foreign policy; it was framed as part of African liberation and a continuation of the unfinished business of African liberation. Internationally, her relations with China and Russia enabled Zimbabwe to survive censure, punitive action from the United Nations Security Council which wanted stronger and sterner measures taken against the country. Russia and China vetoed such propositions and the country's mineral wealth became important in buying the support of China. Regionally, SADC united behind Harare despite dissenting voices from the Zambian leader Levy Mwanawasa and Ian Khama who chastised the country for its poor human rights record. South Africa as the regional hegemon was solidly behind Zimbabwe and bailed her out with loans and prevented Britain from taking any military action against the country. At the same time, Zimbabwe also resorted to the diplomacy of the liberation movements as she actively canvassed the region for support from liberation movements who were to prove pivotal in SADC. She also engaged aggressively with the African Union in a bid to

gain support against what she viewed as Western interference and a regime change agenda. For Zimbabwe, this was not her struggle only but the struggle of Africa and the Africans in the diaspora.

The main contention of this paper is Emancipatory International Relations theory, which provides an insight and explanation with regards to understanding Zimbabwe's foreign policy and relations under Robert Mugabe. Succinctly, the theory suggests that the principal claims of studying international relations are to transform the political communities we live in (Linklater, 1998). Therefore, thus the overriding interest in international relations lies in the potential for individuals, nations, groups and peoples being liberated from structures and conditions which hinder them from achieving radical freedom, whether the freedom conceived from world systems, sovereignty and power politics (Spegele, 2000). In light of this, one notes that not only was Mugabe a rational actor whose foreign policy mingled idealism with pragmatism and realism but fundamentally he was more concerned with emancipation and reordering the international and regional landscape of international relations.

The paper begins with an overview and context which informed Zimbabwean foreign policy in the first decade of independence. Zimbabwe's foreign policy was driven by a desire to see Africa achieve independence hence her support for liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia as they fought for their liberation from apartheid South Africa. Following the liberation of the two countries, Zimbabwe shifted her focus towards the continent at large where she was a proponent of pan-Africanism. The paper concludes with an assessment of the evolution of Zimbabwe's foreign policy over both time and space.

Zimbabwe's Foreign Policy Objectives

Zimbabwe's foreign policy objectives are informed by the following principles; a belief in 'self-determination and support for liberation movements; adherence to the principle of national sovereignty; respect for territorial integrity of all countries; promotion of the principle of equality among nations; belief in non-discrimination, whether based on colour, creed, religion or other forms; and the promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states' (Patel and Chan, 2006). One gleans that emancipation was central to

Zimbabwe's foreign policy objectives, for example the emancipation of South Africa from apartheid, emancipation of Southern Africa from the axis of superpowers, emancipation of Africa from violent conflict, the emancipation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from foreign domination and invasion as well as the emancipation of international multilateral organisations from being captured and being appendages of the Western powers.

Zimbabwe's Diplomacy during the Cold War

A general overview of Zimbabwe's foreign policy in the early 1980s is necessary in order to discuss how the developments during the decade affected and shape its foreign relations. Zimbabwe was primarily concerned with security, economic development, Pan Africanism and nonalignment. Southern Africa was experiencing violent conflict and destabilisation, Angola was waging and experiencing a violent conflict which had at its genesis the proxy war between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. South Africa was still under the apartheid regime which was hawkish and pursued the policy of sowing chaos and destabilization of the region.

Zimbabwe's first task in foreign relations and in locating herself in the global security configuration was to pursue cordial relations with both camps, to have warm relations with the Western capitalist states such as Britain and the United States of America whilst also warming up to the Socialist states such as China, Cuba, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In a major speech at the United Nations in August 1980, Mugabe, then Prime Minister, expounded on the five key principles of Zimbabwe's foreign policy: 1) 'national sovereignty and equality among nations'; 2) 'attainment of a socialist, egalitarian and democratic society'; 3) 'right of all peoples to self-determination and independence'; 4) 'non-racialism at home and abroad'; and 5) 'positive nonalignment and peaceful co-existence among nations' (Patel and Chan, 2006). Positive non-alignment was a strategic and pragmatic policy which balanced idealism and realism emerged as Zimbabwe pursued a policy of non-alignment. Her policy was one of 'quiet diplomacy' mingled with advocacy diplomacy and peace diplomacy whilst also being an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Though adopting a Socialist ideology and she had chosen a socialist

path towards development, she did not want to be constrained in her foreign relations by being beholden to one bloc. She maintained cordial relations with the Socialist East and Capitalist West.

Zimbabwe's immediate foreign policy goals were focused on her immediate neighbourhood-Southern Africa. She was keen to maintain and build cordial relations with the governments of neighbouring states particularly in light of the support that these had rendered in the struggle for liberation and independence. It is observable then that she cultivated cordial relations with members of the Frontline States, Southern African Development Cooperation Community (SADCC) and had especially cordial relations with former liberation movements which were now in power such as The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola(MPLA) in Angola and The Mozambique Liberation Front(FRELIMO) in Mozambique. She also had relations with non-state actors such as liberation movements which were fighting for independence such as South West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia and African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa; this was in solidarity with their cause for national liberation and keeping in line with one of the country's major foreign policy objective of supporting liberation movements. The new Zimbabwean Government was aware that it had to work and cooperate closely with apartheid South Africa despite its destabilisation of the region and its abhorrence for liberation movements across the region. This was a pragmatic move as economically South Africa was still the biggest economy in the region; secondly from a military and security perspective, South Africa was stronger than the newly independent state. Though the African National Congress (ANC), a liberation movement was allowed to operate in Zimbabwe and had an office in Harare but was not allowed to have military bases in the country.

Zimbabwe's foreign policy had a moralistic tinge as issues of social justice, political and racial justice featured prominently in her foreign policy. Zimbabwe was a keen supporter of the Namibian peace process, she was eager to see her attain independence. With respect to the South African case, she provided succor to the ANC but was mindful of the military might and the collateral damage that this would bring to her doorstep. In light of this, she was not prepared to offer ANC training camps or to allow it to operate from Zimbabwean soil as she was acutely aware of the destabilisation that the hawkish Pretoria establishment would visit upon Harare.

Keeping South Africa out of Zimbabwe's territory was important so as to ensure territorial sovereignty and integrity. One of her most pressing needs was to prevent the encroachment by apartheid South Africa into Zimbabwe at the same time ensuring that she did not come close to war with her more powerful Southern neighbour. Relations with Pretoria were informed by tension, fear, dependency as well as a desire to be free of the clutches and tentacles brought by an economic dependency on South Africa.

In the early years of independence, Zimbabwe's foreign policy was concerned with the twin issues of security of her borders and territory as well as economic. Like any state, the newly independent nation was aware that security, survival, self-preservation was paramount. Her first task was to survive in a hostile regional and international environment where her southern neighbour apartheid South Africa lurked ominously actively destabilizing Zimbabwe. South Africa was militarily stronger than Zimbabwe, had better military technology and hardware as compared to Zimbabwe. It was clear to the Zimbabwean strategists that avoiding military confrontation with apartheid South Africa was a key ingredient in Zimbabwe's foreign policy and relations. However, as a member of the Frontline States which were committed to the liberation of Southern Africa from the colonial yoke, Zimbabwe had to navigate between cooperation with apartheid South Africa as well as cooperating with the South African liberation movements at the same time. Zimbabwe needed South Africa for trade, she cooperated with South Africa to fight the dissidents of Super ZAPU and in this regard, South African intelligence was critical in fighting against the internal security threat that was posed by Super ZAPU dissidents. Cooperation and conflict informed relations with apartheid South Africa and this was mainly informed by security considerations.

Not only was South Africa involved in Mozambique, but she was also involved in Angola as well as on the border of the then-South West Africa (present-day Namibia) and in carrying out cross-border raids into Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS). The hawkish South African regime and its securocrats appeared to have serious reach and *carte blanche* in their operations in Southern Africa as they tried to neutralise the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC) uMkhonto weSizwe (MK). The security environment in Southern Africa was dominated by fears of destabilisation and the need to survive the caprices and machinations of Pretoria.

However, one notes that foreign policy and relations with South Africa were fluid never static. South Africa was militarily strong and her army though spread in the West fighting in Angola and in the East in Mozambique, it was a battle hardened military with capabilities which none of the independent Southern African states could match. Zimbabwe co-operated with South Africa on security matters, both countries exchanged intelligence on security matters particularly relating to the activities of MK. Zimbabwe continued to trade with South Africa. This illustrates the quagmire and dilemma that Zimbabwe found herself facing. Her foreign policy entailed supporting liberation movements yet openly offering sanctuary and a safe haven also meant that she risked exposing herself to clandestine security operations by South Africa which would destabilize the country internally. She has seen what had happened to the Boleswa countries when South African security agents carried out raids and assaults in those countries. The mandarins and technocrats at the Ministry knew that a delicate balancing of idealism and realism was important as the country navigated the uncertain, treacherous and stormy waters of international relations.

Defending her territorial sovereignty and ensuring national security was a major preoccupation of independent Zimbabwe. Apartheid South Africa posed a serious security threat to Zimbabwe as she actively pursued a policy of Total Destruction which destabilized the region through staging both covert and overt military attacks (Chimanikire, 1990). Pretoria's strategy centred on fermenting, stoking and agitating violence, insurrections as well as sponsoring rogue groups in Southern Africa. Insecurity and peacelens were the order of the day. Pretoria trained, sponsored and provided logistics, intelligence and military advisers to Renamo in Mozambique, UNITA in Angola and Super ZAPU in Zimbabwe. As part of its efforts to destabilize Zimbabwe, South Africa sponsored dissidents known as Super ZAPU which sought to overthrow the Zimbabwean government (ibid). The hawkish apartheid regime of South Africa actively pursued a destabilizing mission against Zimbabwe; the country therefore faced an existential threat posed by South Africa which brooked no qualms in staging and executing attacks against African National Congress (ANC) and uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) cadres on Zimbabwean soil. South African security apparatus such as Bureau of State Security (BOSS), military intelligence and covert teams carried out assassinations and targetted killings against ANC and MK members,

sabotaged and blew-up Airforce of Zimbabwe's planes at Thornhill airbase, Gweru, sabotaged and blew up the armoury and weapons at Inkomo Barracks in Harare (Cowell, 1983; Chimanikire, 1990). In the years after independence, South Africa was a security threat to Zimbabwe, she had a bigger army and greater military capabilities compared to the new fledging country of Zimbabwe. Militarily, South Africa was stronger than Zimbabwe, had superior arms, weapons technology. Her air force, navy and various land troops had battle experience and fought in Namibia, Angola and Mozambique.

Zimbabwe was committed to the liberation of Africa and in Southern Africa, Namibia and South Africa was still under the yoke of colonialism and apartheid. South Africa's ANC was allowed to have offices in Harare but not to have military or training bases in the country. A dichotomy is noticeable as Harare was avowedly committed to the liberation of southern Africa but realised that she was a small, weak state in the region which could not go head to head or head to toe with the might of South African military. Her relations with the ANC and PAC meant that she put herself in harm's way as South African intelligence and military would make covert incursions and infiltrate Zimbabwe to neutralise enemies of the state. Apartheid was a despicable form of government which the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe was vehemently opposed to. In this respect Zimbabwe's foreign policy was informed by the emancipation of her regional neighbours from the yoke of colonial domination. Booth (1991:322) underscores that, 'integral to emancipation is the idea of reciprocity of rights ...the belief that I am not truly free until everyone is free...since my freedom depends on your freedom, emancipation entails the breaking down of barriers of oppression'. Zimbabwe felt not free as long as her neighbours were still suffering from colonialism and this threatened Zimbabwe stability and security. The stance and commitment towards the liberation of Southern Africa and the fall of colonialism in both countries made Zimbabwe a target of the South African apartheid establishment.

Economic independence was another factor which was important for Zimbabwe. Southern Africa as a region was dependent upon apartheid South Africa. Zimbabwe was not an exception, the country was acutely aware that she needed to break her dependency on South Africa otherwise she would be tacitly supporting and condoning apartheid. Chimanikire (1990:8) posits that, 'at the center of the region, both geographically and politically, Zimbabwe was the biggest threat to

South Africa hegemon. Robert Mugabe's joint policies of socialism and reconciliation raised the threat of a prosperous multiracial Zimbabwe which challenged South Africa's apartheid policy'. This would create a contradiction in policy as the policy of apartheid was abhorred by Mugabe and the region at large. However, Mugabe did co-operate with Pretoria on security issues where he felt that Zimbabwe's stability and security was at stake. He even continued trading with South Africa.

In Mozambique, Zimbabwe's eastern neighbour, a civil war involving proxies was also raging, and disconcerting for Zimbabwe was the involvement of her Southern neighbour-Apartheid South Africa which was actively involved in the conflict. South Africa actively sponsored, trained and provided logistical support and intelligence to RENAMO in its fight against FRELIMO. The Mozambican conflict was threatening not only the territorial integrity of Zimbabwe but had the potential to disrupt her economy as the Beira Corridor was of key strategic value to Zimbabwe's access to the sea and in importing and transportation of fuel into the country.

Security was a major concern in the first decade of Zimbabwe's foreign policy. During the early years of independence the Ministry of Defence and the seurocrats were central in helping shape and formulate foreign policy through the cluster's input on security issues. Zimbabwe's proactive foreign policy in Mozambique was because of the realization that the war in Mozambique affected Zimbabwe's security, stability and economic prosperity. The civil war posed a serious threat to Zimbabwe's national security, stability, safety of Zimbabwean citizens in the eastern border, the spread of small arms and weapons into Zimbabwe coupled with the security situation in Matabeleland during the Gukurahundi meant that Zimbabwe had to step up its efforts in protecting its territory against Mozambican bandits and South African covert operations. Booth (1991) categorizes emancipation as security; hence emancipation and security are two sides of the same coin. Acharya (2000) postulates that, security concerns of States and regions focus not so much on protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity from external threats, but on the preservation of regimes security and political stability from internal threats. As such emancipating Mozambique from resurgence attacks served as offering security in

Zimbabwe's stability as the spillover of the civil war in Mozambique had the potential to ignite instability in Zimbabwe.

Its input on how to deal with the Renamo threat during the Mozambican civil war meant that military and a strong defence helped strengthen Zimbabwe's foreign policy with regards to Mozambique. The Mozambican situation was a bitter civil war was being waged between Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) which was resulting in an influx of Mozambican refugees into the eastern border of Zimbabwe; bandits would escape into Zimbabwe and cause insecurity in the eastern parts of Zimbabwe. The Cold War context was a huge factor in the Mozambican civil war and this in turn had a profound impact and influence on Zimbabwe's foreign policy in Africa and Southern Africa.

Zimbabwe demonstrated that she was willing to use military force to protect her geostrategic interests. Zimbabwe's strategic vital national interests were informed by geopolitics. Rule (1988) postulates that, 'Zimbabwe aim was largely to keep open its vital trade routes to the sea and by doing so it hoped to loosen South Africa's economic stranglehold on the continent's southern region'. Zimbabwe's geographical location as a landlocked country contributed against its ambition to counter the continued Zimbabwe's dependence on South Africa. The former president Mugabe was keen not to leave South Africa as 'Metropolitan State within the Southern African region. Zimbabwe pursued relations with Mozambique as it provided a greater conduit for Zimbabwe's overseas trade. It can be argued that, the immediate pursuit of Zimbabwe-Mozambique relations was crystallised upon economic interests to establish trade networks and use Mozambique as an alternative Zimbabwe's 'Transit State'. This is in light of realization that, in terms of geographical proximity the ports of Maputo and Beira are far nearer than all South African Ports combined. Schwartz (2014) writes that, the Ports of Beira and Maputo formed part of Zimbabwe 'vital national interests', this contributed to Mugabe's administration in the 1980s to commit Zimbabwean resources by investing in the rehabilitation of Mozambique Ports facilities, road and rail way system connecting Harare to the Ports of Maputo and Beira. 'Apart from genuine solidarity and gratitude for Mozambique's sacrifice to the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe has vital interests in seeing a functioning infrastructure in Mozambique' Schwartz, 2014). Zimbabwe participated in tripartite projects in a bid to protect and encourage

the business sector to have an easy of doing business through using Mozambican ports as an alternative trade network.

In 1986 Zimbabwe participated in the registration of the Beira Corridor Group Ltd (BCG) in Harare which represented the business sector in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Botswana, Secondly, the International Beira Group registered in Oslo which represented the international business interests and thirdly, the Beiracor Ltd which was registered in Beira as a coordinating group (Lewis, 1987). Zimbabwe was frustrated by South Africa's destabilization policy which instigated sabotage, cut lines of communication and access to the South African ports. Establishing cordial relations with Mozambique was crucial in emancipation of Zimbabwe from South African dependence. The former president Mugabe was quoted as saying: 'South Africa set out to destroy systematically destroys our communication routes to the sea and ensure our continued dependence on their ports and railway' (Schwartz, 2014). One notes that, Zimbabwe's commitment to the respect of the principle of sovereignty of State made her not to directly attack South Africa rather chose subtle means of fighting the Apartheid destabilization policy by starving South Africa's revenue collected from transit routes. As such, one suggests that, Zimbabwe's cordial relations with Mozambique in the 1980s can largely be gleaned from economic diplomacy perspective.

Zimbabwe had strategic interests to protect as the Feruka pipeline was pivotal in supplying oil to Zimbabwe as well as the strategic position of the Beira corridor. Zimbabwe sought to protect and secure the railway and pipeline which supplied fuel to the country as well as the port of Beira which was vital in accessing the sea and exporting goods such as coal. These had to be secured and defended as access to oil particularly the Feruka pipeline was central to her economy and lessened her dependence on apartheid South Africa, but crucially still was the disruption of trade as the Beira corridor was constantly under attack by RENAMO. The threats posed by RENAMO influenced Zimbabwe to send its troops to protect the Beira Corridor in 1982. Mugabe viewed RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhlakama as an imperial puppet sponsored by South Africa and other Western powers to destabilise Southern African region. Furthermore, RENAMO's insurgency not only did it pose security challenges to Mozambique; it posed national security threats to Zimbabwe's territorial integrity in the Eastern Region of Zimbabwe. The then Minister of State

Security Emmerson Mnangagwa was quoted as saying, ‘RENAMO has left the interior of Mozambique and (rebels) are basing themselves along the border, destroying crops and cattle in Zimbabwe’ (Baum, 1988). As if this was not enough, ‘RENAMO made repeated incursions into Manicaland province, Chiredzi and Mwenenzi district in Zimbabwe in search for food’ (The Patriot, 2015) Thus, Zimbabwe’s military presence in Mozambique was influenced by the need to neutralize an imminent national security threat posed by RENAMO.

Zimbabwe also employed a range of diplomatic initiatives in a bid to resolve and transform the Mozambican conflict. She attempted alternative conflict resolution mechanisms such as mediation and negotiation in order to bring both FRELIMO and RENAMO to the negotiating table. This shows that not only was she willing to use the military to bring about an end to the conflict but she was willing to give negotiations and talks a chance. This demonstrates that one of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy goals was peace and stability in the region particularly in her backyard and neighbourhood. RENAMO’s military activities were causing insecurity to Zimbabwe’s citizens in the eastern border province and on the Beira corridor (The Patriot, 2015). Mugabe was concerned about the situation in Mozambique, he was concerned about the internal developments in the country and how this was impacting negatively on the region and Zimbabwe in particular. We argue that Mugabe’s foreign policy became enveloped in in the emancipation of Mozambique particularly emancipation of where her vital interest in Maputo and Beira laid upon. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy espoused support for liberation movements and bearing in mind the role that FRELIMO played in the liberation of Zimbabwe as well as the close ties and relations between Zanu PF and FRELIMO, intervening in Mozambique was part of the pan – African and liberation movements solidarity in action.

She mediated in the Mozambican civil war although she hardly gets credit for the role that she played in bringing it to an end. Her closeness to FRELIMO made her a less than acceptable broker to both RENAMO and its apartheid South Africa handlers who were afraid of being encircled by hostile socialist-leaning governments. Zimbabwe’s participation in brokering the mediation talks was largely influenced by the need to protect its national economic interests in Mozambique. A peaceful Mozambique was seen as important for the future prosperity of Zimbabwe and Southern Africa as a whole. Zimbabwe was increasingly overburdened by the

influx of Mozambican refugees which strained its economy at the same time financing a costly military presence in Mozambique. Thus Zimbabwe sharply shifted to a foreign policy which favoured regional peace, security and stability.

The desire to wean herself from South African dependence and ensuring that she did not console South Africa's Metropolitan status in the region, Zimbabwe advocated for regionalism in which Southern Africa Coordination Conference (SADCC) and Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) became a vital interests in Zimbabwe's foreign policy. Mugabe rallied the like-minded countries which were affected by their geographical location as land locked countries to use SADCC as a strategy to open up new trade networks. In this respect, SADCC offered new alternative trade routes to six landlocked Southern African countries which include Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho Zambia and Swaziland to those offered by Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique and later Namibia. In 1991, Simba Makoni who was the SADCC Executive Secretary described SADCC's move to reduce economic dependence both on South Africa and internationally as the organisation's first objective. Zimbabwe was successful in this regard as these countries were bound by the mutual interests in the abhorrence of apartheid. Zimbabwe was a fervent supporter of African independence, pan-Africanism and a critic of apartheid; this made her a target for destabilisation by South Africa.

Zimbabwe's diplomatic standing was boosted as she a major diplomatic hub in Africa and the region. In the first decade of independence, Zimbabwe hosted a number of high profile international summits. In 1986 she hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in 1991 the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). Zimbabwe sought to play an active role in the international stage. This was ambitious for a small, landlocked country which had just achieved independence. Hosting global events and forums is one way that a country seeks to boost its standing internationally and a way of projecting power as well as prestige. In 1986, Harare hosted the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) summit further boosting her credentials as a country committed to racial and political equality on the globe, the summit was dominated by the South African question and demands that apartheid falls now. The summit was attended by the likes of Fidel Castro of Cuba, SamoraMachel of Mozambique, Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya who was critical of the West and hardly friends of the West and espoused Socialist ideas

The End of the Cold War, Mugabeism and Zimbabwe's Foreign Policy

The end of the Cold War marked what is often regarded as the unipolar moment and with the triumph of Western liberalism, imposition of structural adjustment programmes and the Washington Consensus and South Africa's independence resulted in Zimbabwe's foreign policy underwent shift. The end of apartheid in South Africa created a foreign policy dilemma for Zimbabwe. During apartheid, Zimbabwe's foreign policy towards South Africa was informed by both a moral opposition towards the system and a strong belief in the ideology of Pan-Africanism. Zimbabwe was a staunch and vehement opponent of apartheid; she was a committed member of the Frontline States and called for unconditional South African independence. With the end of the Cold War and a change in leadership in apartheid South Africa, it was clear that the winds of change were blowing as the ANC was unbanned and Nelson Mandela released from prison in February 1990. South Africa's attainment of independence in 1994 meant that Zimbabwe had to rethink her foreign policy towards South Africa. Apartheid was no longer a factor in determining foreign policy. Zimbabwe-South Africa relations became informed by personal relations between Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe was frosty and tension filled. Nelson Mandela was charismatic and well-respected and seemed to be upstaging Robert Mugabe, Kagwanja (2009:24) records that 'Mandela and Mugabe exchanged personal insults', an indication of the uneasy nature of the two's relationship.

South Africa's independence created tension as this meant that a big and powerful state with economic and military might was now at her doorstep. Independent South Africa was economically stable and had a strong, modern and well-equipped army. She possessed both hard power and soft power, qualities which were essential in making her an influential and powerful state in the region. Prior to 1994, Zimbabwe had been the region's '...economic and political powerhouse.' (Kagwanja, 2009), South Africa's independence threatened Zimbabwe's position and status thus complicating relations. South Africa's rise and influence was viewed with suspicion and trepidation by Zimbabwe. Rupiya (2002, 2003) views the period from 1994-1999 as one of tension and frustration, this was in light of South Africa's perceived hegemonic ambitions. Zimbabwe was suspicious of South Africa and jealous of her position as she was eclipsing her as the 'go-to' state. Harare was both jealous and suspicious of Pretoria's

intentions, Habib (2003, 2008) asserts that South Africa's regional aspirations were hegemonic as she sought to dominate the region. Harare's analysis of Pretoria's foreign policy and her economic muscle suggested that her neighbor was seeking to establish hegemony this created tension and misperception in the relationship (Rupiya, 2002). One may posit that during this period, Zimbabwe's pre-occupation was to compete and counter South Africa's hegemonic aspirations and regional influence. Mindful of her relative economic weakness in relation to South Africa, Zimbabwe was determined not to become an extension or a province of South Africa. For instance she did not join the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) as she regarded joining the union as a surrender of her sovereignty and proof of South Africa's hegemonic interests (Rupiya; 2002). The period 2000-2002 introduced another dynamic and dimension to relations. According to Rupiya (2003) relations were characterised by unilateralism, dependence and containment

Relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa under Mugabe were complex, dichotomous, filled with seeming contradictions such as regional competition for regional power and influence yet there is mutual co-operation on a number of levels and issues. Competition and rivalry is the staple of international relations as states are always in seeking to project their power and influence (Keohane, 1986). Despite being eclipsed by South Africa in the region as the regional hegemon, Zimbabwe's foreign policy planners attempted to use South Africa's rise to their advantage as South Africa has done Zimbabwe's bidding such as at the United Nations Security Council where South Africa 'shielded' Zimbabwe from United Nations sanctions. Mugabe was able to use South Africa's position, clout and influence within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to ensure his regime's survival. In other words, Zimbabwe was able to manage South Africa despite losing out on the race for influence in the region.

Economics were a major determining factor in relations between the Zimbabwe and South Africa. South Africa is Zimbabwe's biggest trade partner; South African companies had business interests in Zimbabwe ranging from banking, farming, mining, retail and telecommunication. Economics also determined Harare's co-operation with Pretoria and one strategy was to foster ties between the two liberation movements-ZANU PF and the African National Congress (ANC). Economic realities and isolation from the international community became crucial in re-

shaping Zimbabwe-South Africa relations. According to Rupiya (2002) South Africa underwrote and guaranteed loans and credit lines to Zimbabwe following the withdrawal of credit lines by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Pretoria's usefulness to Harare was also evident when the Mbeki government 'announced an economic 'rescue package' for the Mugabe regime of close to a billion rand' (McKinle, 2009: 89). South Africa's position as a pivotal state saved the Mugabe regime from collapsing yet also helped Pretoria's state corporations find business opportunities in Zimbabwe. Mugabe's pragmatism was evident in his relations with South Africa.

The peaceful transformation and resolution of conflict was one of the pillars of Zimbabwe's foreign policy. Issues of peace and security on the African continent were important to the Mugabe regime. Zimbabwe attempted niche diplomacy especially in the area of alternative dispute resolution as she encouraged diplomacy through mediation, negotiation and Track One diplomacy in conflict countries. For example, the Zimbabwean President Canaan Banana was mandated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as an eminent person to help mediate and broker peace in Liberia during the civil war. Zimbabwe was attempting to demonstrate her credentials as a player on the continent as well as attempting to establish herself as a continental power committed to peace and security. She was also attempting niche diplomacy particularly in the area of peace and conflict resolution. However, niche diplomacy appears to have fallen out of favour with the regime as few attempts and efforts were made towards mediating in other conflicts on the continent.

Zimbabwe and Britain had tense, strained and frosty relations during the Mugabe-era. Mugabe placed emphasis on the 'Look East Policy', self-reliance and inward looking policies as opposed to engagement with the West particularly Britain and the United States of America (USA). One would not be far off the mark to term Mugabe's relations with Britain as toxic, antagonistic as seen in his 'Blair keep your Britain, I keep my Zimbabwe' comment as well as saying 'the Blair I know is a bliar' (Battersby and Grice, 2002). The land question antagonised his former erstwhile allies and soon forged a strategic alliance with Russia, China as well as Libya and Iran.

Matters appear to have come to a head when Zimbabwe embarked on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) as well as Claire Short's letter which angered Mugabe. From the year 2000, Zimbabwe's foreign policy under Mugabe was framed around the existential threats posed by the West, Britain and her ally the United States of America. Her foreign policy therefore was driven by what SabeloGatsheni-Ndlovu (2009) terms 'Mugabeism' a doctrine which informed Zimbabwe's foreign policy till his capitulation. In foreign policy, Mugabeism was a loose doctrine which was adopted by the regime which identified and mapped Zimbabwe's enemies who were regarded as a threat to the country's sovereignty, as they sought to effect regime change and to reverse the gains of the revolution. A cornerstone of Mugabeism was embarking on land reform, as well as rallying African states to band together. Mugabeism espoused a form of Pan-Africanism and Mugabeism was visible at international forums such as the United Nations General Assembly where his fiery speeches often lambasted the West.

On the international scene, Zimbabwe advocated for the reform of global multilateral institutions. The USA under President George W Bush and Donald Trump was increasingly adopting unilateralism and in the process undermining multilateralism thus leading to accusations those global multilateral institutions served the interests of the powerful countries. Mugabe advocated for the reform and reconfiguration of the global governance architecture of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the World Bank as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order for them to serve the development of the smaller, weak and poor developing countries as well as for these countries to have control and locus of control over their destiny. This resonates with the Emancipatory International Relations theory, which holds the view that 'for the theory to count as emancipation, there needs to be a particular group which has been subjected to suffering but stands a chance to gain a condition of freedom if decisive change is adopted (Spegele, 2000). In view of this, Zimbabwe represents a group of the Global South States which have been subjected into suffering and inequality by the group of the Global North States, hence leading a global campaign for the reform of the world order and emancipates States from the Global South from oppression.

At the United Nations Mugabe's call for the reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through his UN General Assembly speeches acted as an agenda setting and rallied other

States to call for the reform of the UNSC. Archaya posits that the real debate about international relations should be about strategies and agendas that promote a transformation of the world order'. Mugabe was adamant in demanding for an overhaul in international governance, not only of the United Nations and its organs but of international financial institutions such as The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He was steadfast in his calls for the UNSC to be reformed and reconstituted. Emancipatory International Relations Theory concerns itself with liberation and advances robust claims to liberate a group, States, from evil conditions and structures which precedes the liberating act such as delivering from human selfishness by world leaders, state systems and international capitalism (Spegele, 2000). It stands to reason that, Mugabe saw his stance in advocating radical change of the world systems both politically and economically and international institutions as liberation, as part of challenging the core-periphery division that had been brought forth by colonialism and western white monopoly capital. He was steadfast in his condemnation of the unitary actions of the West and favoured multilateralism as opposed to unilateralism and dominance by the West in global issues. He viewed the UN as undemocratic, unreformed and serving the interests of the big countries. He regarded the UNSC as part of the west's political and military hegemony, an extension of western government's foreign policy arm particularly the United States of America. He described it as a 'marauding superpower' whose unitary actions leave a trail of destruction as she tries to export her version of liberal democracy

Conclusion

The paper has demonstrated that Mugabe's foreign policy was complex and did not fit into the ambit of convention or theory. At times it was idealist and pragmatist combined, but its overarching and deepseated philosophy was pan African and emancipatory. The complexity in the former President Mugabe's foreign policy enabled this paper to locate Mugabe's foreign policy within the prism of Emancipatory International Relations Theory, which largely looks at international relations as influenced by emancipatory and liberation politics. In this respect, despite being mixed with pragmatism and realism Zimbabwe's foreign policy influenced by a plethora of emancipatory factors; succinctly, the former president advocated for majority rule within the southern African region by ensuring that Apartheid in South Africa was abolished and

radical freedom for majority rule attained and liberation of Namibia. Security concerns also informed Zimbabwe's emancipatory foreign policy, for instance it was influenced by the need to protect and secure its national interests against the forces of destabilization which itself through RENAMO insurgent moves in Mozambique resulting in threatening Zimbabwe's interest in the Beira Corridor.

The paper has further demonstrated that, economic independence was the overriding concern of Zimbabwe's foreign policy in the 1980s as Zimbabwe embarked on a relentless campaign against weaning Southern African Countries from being economically dependent on Apartheid South Africa. At the international level, Zimbabwe continued to carry a liberation and emancipatory message, for instance Mugabe challenged the global organisations and financial institutions to desist from imperialism and rallied the countries in the Global South to demand for reform and re ordering of the international system based on the principles of fairness, equality and justice.

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