

**THE ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN A DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA, 1999 -2004**

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ABSTRACT

Democratization process gathered momentum in the lexicon of the world politics following the contemporary globalization agenda. This process demands from the states the universalization of democracy and/or civil rule as the only alternative by which modern states will organize and run their governments. Thus, it becomes imperative for the African states to embrace the agenda. Nigeria and South Africa which have had long history of dictatorship via the military rule and obnoxious apartheid policy respectively have to key into the democratization process in the 1990s. Nigeria embraced civil rule system in 1999 while that of South Africa was in 1994. The paper examines the following the relationship between type of electoral system and the conduct of elections in Nigeria and South Africa; whether proportional representation system produces more favourable electoral results than majoritarian electoral system in Nigeria and South Africa; and the management of electoral process in both countries. Our findings revealed that while the majoritarian system as practiced in Nigeria accounts for the huge electoral malpractices in the country, proportional representation as obtained in South Africa contributes to the wide acceptance of electoral polls in the country. The paper employed secondary sources for data collection and content analysis for analysis of data.

Introduction

African states are not unaffected by the current democratization wind blowing across the globe. Political transition to engender democracy is the current trend in Africa. Implicit therein is the importance of elections, requiring institutions for its implementation. Elections have been so closely tied to the growth and development of representative democratic government that they are generally held to be the single most important indicator of the presence or absence of democratic government. The quality of the electoral process determines the success or otherwise of democratic transitions. The electoral process in a democratic setting must ensure that the people have the right to choose who would rule them,

and those who aspire to political leadership should be given equal opportunity to solicit the vote of the people without let or hindrance.

Western-type elections, in terms of their origin in Africa are colonial contraptions, which were evolved as part of the institutional transfer of the superstructure of liberal democracy. As such, modern electoral history in Africa is an early twentieth century phenomenon. For example, in Nigeria, the elective principle was introduced in 1922, with the introduction of the Clifford Constitution. Though the franchise was restricted and representation very limited, it was a victory for the nationalist leaders who were agitating for the enthronement of a democratic order in which the people would participate in running their own affairs. Subsequently, the process of political decolonization from 1945 was marked by the extension of the franchise and the scope of representative institutions. Indeed, an electoral procedure was generally used to determine or, at least, to legitimize the form, rate and direction of the decolonization process (Cohen, 1983: 73). 1960s and 1970s were marked by one-party rule and military coups.

The late 1980s and early 1990s in Africa were characterized by a general trend towards plural politics and multi-party electoral competition. The pattern and course of the democratic process differ among African countries, so also do the nature, context and outcome of elections. Nigeria and South Africa are two very important countries in Africa treading the path of democracy. Both countries operate under multi-ethnic and multilingual climate. Both of them also have come out of protracted military rule and apartheid, respectively. In the period, 1999-2004 elections have been conducted twice in Nigeria and South Africa - Nigeria in 1999 and 2003 and South Africa in 1999 and 2004.

Within these periods, the results of South Africa's electoral processes were more satisfactory due to the adequacies in the performance of the institutions responsible for the conduct of elections. Therefore, the country had a more stable democratic transition. Nigeria's electoral processes had been problematic, accounting for her political troubles in democratization. The contrasting nature of these politics could offer much in a comparative study. In this paper therefore the major task rests squarely on the examination of the relationship between types of electoral systems and the degree of acceptability of election results; to compare critically the Nigerian electoral processes and those of South Africa. In this process, the performance

of the institutions involved in the conduct of elections in both countries will be assessed; and to establish the conditions necessary to promote healthy and free electoral competition.

Understanding the Electoral Processes in a Democratic Transition

In providing the necessary background for the discourse, Nnoli (1986) dwells extensively on the electoral system and according to him, each electoral system has to deal with six types of issues. These are: the qualification for franchise which deals with how individuals come to acquire the citizenship of the state and right to vote. This dimension of the electoral system has shown extreme variation over the recent past giving rise to such classification as restricted and unrestricted franchise, property based franchise, adult-male suffrage and universal adult suffrage; the weighting of influence which relates to the comparative influence of one vote compared to each other. This dimension of the electoral system has also been the subject of very rapid change, with the current practice of one man one vote representing its highest final refinement; the standardization of the voting procedures and the protection of the freedom to choose involve eliminating the various abuses of the system. These abuses which tend to negate the freedom of the electors to express their preferences include, intimidation of opponents, simplifying the voting days and periods; the territorial levels of choice has to do with the nature and size of constituencies and their relative sizes; the stages of electoral choice such as ward, clan, local government and national levels; and the procedures of calculation and determination of results of election.

Adejumobi, (2000) posits that the constitutive and regulative mechanisms necessary to promote healthy and free electoral competition comprise; the establishment of a competent and independent electoral body to administer the conduct of free and fair elections; the existence of an impartial judiciary to interpret electoral laws and adjudicate on electoral matters, a viable press and a non partisan police force. Buttressing this submission, Jinadu (1995) and Kurfi (1979) outlined some salient conditions. These range from electoral laws, organization of political parties to counting of votes and declaration of election results. While Lijphart (1994:1), demonstrates that, electoral system is the most fundamental element of representative democracy because, it moulds the structure of representative democracy, Nehlen (1995: ix), on his own part maintained that electoral system contributes substantially to the legitimacy and efficiency of political system.

Commenting on the Nigeria's situation, Sartori (1994: ix) opines that Nigeria in the first, second, and aborted third republics adopted majoritarian democracy or first-past-the post system, a system based on simple majority. This implies that it simply awards a seat to the candidate who obtains the highest number of votes. One major defect of this system common in most of the literature is the disproportionality of votes to mandates in the legislature. Supporting this view, Nwankwo (2006:191), indicates that, the current specific configuration of the institution of election within the broad rubric of Nigerian presidentialism and multi-nationalism account for why the system is constantly in state of crisis. In other words, the design of the system for the election of public office-holders affects democratic governability in Nigeria. He gave example of the system in installing minority governments in some states of the federation in the second republic that led to certain instability because of impeachment proceedings or threats of same by opposition party dominated Assemblies.

On the side of South Africa, Maphai (2000:68) observes that South Africa operates proportional representative system. In this system, candidates are elected based on the total percentage of votes cast for their party. This system has the merit of greatly diversifying representation in the parliament. Through this, the integration of the minorities into the national political life is enhanced. Shievely (1997:185), shares similar view when he argues that electoral participation is likely to be higher under proportional representation than under first-past-the post system. Voters, according to him, who are in the minority in their district, may feel that there is no sense in voting since their candidates cannot win any seat.

On the management of electoral process in Nigeria and South Africa, a diachronic survey of literature stipulates the following perspective. For instance, Adejumobi (2000:245), in a general demonstration underscores four major patterns of democratic transition in Africa. First, there are countries where civil society was quite vociferous and organized, took the initiative for political reforms, engaged the state in a fierce political battle and stamped its will on the course of the transition. In this regard, the new political actors ensured that electoral laws were overhauled, to allow for free and fair electoral competition and the institutional infrastructure of elections, namely, the electoral body, the judiciary, the press and the police were insulated from or made less pliant to the ruling regime. In some cases, the opposite forces secured the tacit allegiance, sympathy or support of some of those institutions. The result was that the opposition was able to oust the incumbent regimes from

power through elections. Examples can be found in Benin Republic, Zambia, Malawi, Congo and Cape Verde.

In the second category are countries where civil society took the initiative for political reforms. This was however, scuttled or hijacked by the ruling regime. The consequence was that the existing obnoxious electoral laws were either left untouched or were not significantly altered, while the paternal control of the regime over the electoral process remained rife. Elections were either not held or if held, produced the same old result in those countries. Examples are Togo, Kenya and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo).

The third pattern is where the state took the initiative for political reforms promoting a form of "guided democracy" in which it consciously managed, regulated and manipulated the electoral process in order to impose its interest and will on it. Little was achieved in terms of producing meaningful results through elections. This was the case in Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Cameroon and Algeria,

Finally, are political transitions which dissolved into severe political conflicts and civil war. Examples are Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and Somalia.

Commenting on the Nigerian experiences as affected by electoral process, many scholars of democratization process have identified ugly features that seem to mar smooth electoral process in the country. Among such features include, various forms of electoral malpractices. Glaring among them are, high jacking of ballot papers, bribing of the electoral personnel and purchase of the conscience of the voters, thuggery and all manners of electoral violence. These views are held by scholars like Kurfi (1979), Ogunsanwo and Adamu (1979), Izuka (1983), Ake (1993), among others. Identifying another ugly feature that appears to frustrate free and fair electoral process in Nigeria, especially in the first and second republics, Joseph (1991), captured ethnicity and ethnic prejudice as a strong determining factor. According to him, ethnicity is responsible for the failure of the state to maintain its integrity in relation to the multifarious groups and organizations in civil society. He went further to state that, one of the many hurdles that Nigeria had to overcome in an attempt to return to civil rule, and then to have such a new system entrenched, was the arrest of competitive politics on sectional identities. Buttressing this phenomenon, Balogun (1983:158), opines that the subversion of the Nigerian true democracy by the politics of party patronage and ethnic chauvinism has considerably eroded the basis for the emergence of genuinely representative government

within our present political framework. It is a paradox indeed that the ideals of democratic government seem farther from our grasp than ever.

On the part of South Africa, many scholars show the nature of the democratization process. Instances abound in works like Murray (1996). In the view of this scholar, “analysts have focused their attention on the most visible aspects of the political transition, namely, non-racial elections; the government of national unity, a fragile coalition which brought together (temporary as it turned out) the dominant African National Congress (ANC) and its junior partner, the National Party; and the continuing strife in kwazulu/Natal pitting ANC supporters against chief Gatsha Buthelezi’s Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)”.

Given the cultural diversities or more accurately, cleavages in South African society, almost any period of South African history says Heard (1974), reflects the famous social triadic movements of “thesis-antithesis-synthesis”, that is, action, interaction and reaction. This applies not only to the relationship between groups, but also to that between various facets of public life, such as politics and economics.

The above situation perhaps, informed the demonstration of Titi and Kemi (2003:10), who argued that the South African electoral process has gone one step further in ensuring that elections are generally peaceful, and this has been achieved through the setting up of conflict management structures such as consultative forums, conflict management committees and party liaison committees by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) during elections.

Though, ethnic politics overtly or covertly, reared its head in the South Africa’s democratization process, its influence on the national election was insignificant. This was affirmed by Maphai (2000) who observed that, although voting patterns have been largely along ethnic lines, in the sense that the National Party remained the channel of white hopes, while the Liberation Movement continued to represent mainly the African constituency, the composition of the government of National Unity confirms a similar trend towards ethnic accommodation. One of the two deputy presidents was white (De Klerk). The speaker and deputy of parliament were both Indians”. He went further to state that, although voting patterns have been partly ethnic, the main parties have gone out of their way to shed their ethnic basis. It is also evident from the National election lists, which are compiled democratically, that the ANC and the National party supporters were quite willing to rate people from other ethnic groups to the top.

Fundamentally, the views of the scholars appear very relevant to the subject matter. However, their deficiencies centred on their failure to bring out clearly the relationship between types of electoral system and the mechanism to adopt for arriving at a free and fair election. It is hoped, therefore, that this study will remedy the lacuna.

Theorizing Democratic Transition:

Democratic transition in Africa today is a response to the global demand, especially after the signing of the Uruguay agreement in the 1990s. Since the agreement came into being, globalization and its facets like democracy was declared to be the in-thing and the order by which the modern state must organize their government. Thus, countries in the developing world, especially African and Latin American states were compelled to embrace the democratization process.

Theorizing on democratization process, Joseph Richard, an acclaimed democratization theorist provided an insight on the theory that will likely guide the democratization process in developing world. According to him, “most of the political systems emerging from the transition from authoritarian rule, with the ending of the cold war, were likely to be hybrid entities: part-free and part-un-free”. He proceeds further to show that most of African states that are embracing the democratization wave today would likely be semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian in nature.

Larry Diamond, has developed a typology of contemporary political systems that distinguishes pseudo-democracies from electoral democracies and liberal democracies. According to him, many African countries, because they have not created electoral system that function efficiently and fairly cannot be considered electoral democracies as is the case with many of their Latin American counterparts. Liberal democracies, he argued, as cited in Joseph (2000:106), “fully guarantee all the rights and liberties of a democratic order, while their core institutions function according to constitutional stipulations. No corporate group, such as the military, is able to exercise a monopoly veto over the operations of these institutions, whether overtly or covertly” In the view of Richard Joseph, modern political scientists have developed two senses or rules that guide the democratization process. These are, the two-turnover and the “only game in town” rules. In the latter are found the analytical categories that give explicit explanation to the democratization question. The “only game in town” rule Richard Joseph posits, is derived from the writings of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan

who contend that democratization is enshrined only when democracy becomes the only game in town. By this they mean that political actors abide by the rules and norms of democratic procedures, and only seek to resolve their differences by constitutional means.

The engagement of the theory in the Nigerian and South African context would mean that the political gladiators from the two countries would not resort to political thuggery and other forms of electoral malpractices against their opponents. Even cultural diversities or more accurately cleavages would not resort to violent conflict to resolve their political disputes. Equally, political actors would find it difficult under such scenario to beckon on the military and/or ethnic militia to intervene to snatch power from their adversaries.

Typology of electoral system and poll in Nigerian and South Africa

On the path to democratization process, the constitutions of the two counties provided for the nature of their electoral processes. For instance, in Nigerians, the 1999 Constitution recognized the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as the sole body responsible for the conduct of electoral polls into the national and state seats which comprise the presidential election, National Assembly polls and the election of the State Governors, as well as the State Assemblies.

Similarly, the Constitution of Republic of South Africa recognized the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) as the body entrusted with the responsibility of conducting election into all the levels of the government. In terms of the electoral system as affects the two countries, the known common ones inter alia: Proportional Representation (PR); majoritarian/plurality or first-past-the-post system and mixed system.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

This system is widely practiced in South Africa. The South African National Assembly consists of 400 members elected by proportional representation for a period of five years. Two hundred members are elected from national party lists; the other 200 are elected from party lists in each of the nine provinces. The National Assembly chooses the president of South Africa after each election.

However, the discernability of the system can be captured: candidates are usually elected based on the total percentage of votes cast for their party. The basic element of proportional

representation is a systematic effort to match representation with the amount of popular electoral support in terms of the percentage of votes scored by various parties and groups. For instance, if party “A” got 36% of the votes cast in the election, it would get roughly 36% of the seats in the legislative body. If it got 30 of the votes, it would get roughly 30% of the seats. The main models of proportional representation include, party list, single transferable vote and single non-transferable vote.

Party List: in party list, voters choose from among party lists, and seats are awarded in proportion to the vote received by each party.

Single-transferable Vote (STV): it employs a ballot that allows the voter to rank the competing candidates in order of preference. When the ballots are counted, any candidate receiving the necessary “Drop quota” $\frac{\text{total votes}+1}{\text{total seats}+1}$ of first preference votes is awarded a seat. In the electoral calculations, votes received by a winning candidate in excess of the quota are transferred to other candidates according to the second preference marked on the ballot. Any candidate who then achieves the necessary quota is also awarded a seat. This process is repeated, with subsequent surplus votes also being transferred, until all the remaining seats have been allocated.

Single Non-transferable Vote (SNV): voters cast their votes and, as under plurality rules, candidates with the most votes are elected. However, voters can only select one candidate in multi-member constituencies.

The engagement of the proportional representation electoral system in South Africa in 1999 and 2004 demonstrate as follows:

Regional Seats: Regional seats are allocated among the nine South African provinces in proportion to their performance in the election. These seats were distributed in the following manner:

Table 1: Regional Seats

Province	1999	2004
Eastern cape	27	28
Free state	14	13
Gauteng	46	45
Kwazulu-Natal	38	37
Limpopo	20	21

Mpumalanga	14	14
Northern cape	4	4
North west	17	17
Western cape	20	21
Total	200	200

National Assembly seats: Seats in the National Assembly are allocated by means of a two-stage procedure that combines two methods of proportional representation. In the first stage, the seats in each province are apportioned according to the largest remainder method. In each region, a quota of votes per seat is determined by dividing the total number of votes cast in the region by the number of regional seats, plus one. The result plus one, disregarding fractions, becomes the quota of votes per seat for the region. To determine how many seats each party will receive in the region, its total number of votes is divided by the quota of votes per seat. This will produce a whole number, which is the number of seats initially allocated to the party and a surplus or remainder. Once this calculation is performed for all parties, the sum or aggregate number of allocated seats is obtained. If this total is smaller than the number of regional seats, unallocated seats are awarded to the parties according to the descending order of their remainders. The seat distributions from all provinces are aggregated at the national level, to obtain the number of regional list seats allocated to each party.

The second stage begins with the proportional distribution of all 400 seats in the National Assembly. To that end, a quota of votes per seat is determined by dividing the total number of votes cast across the nation by the number of seats in the National Assembly, plus one. The result plus one, disregarding fractions, becomes the quota of votes per seat. To determine the number of seats each party will receive, its total number of votes is divided by the quota of votes per seat. This will produce a whole number, which is the number of seats initially allocated to the party, and a surplus or remainder. Once this calculation is performed for all parties, the sum or aggregate number of allocated seats is obtained. If this total is smaller than the number of seats in the National Assembly, unallocated seats are awarded to the parties according to the descending order of their remainders, up to a maximum of five seats. Any remaining seats are awarded to the parties following the descending order of their average number of votes per allocated seats.

The regional list seats won by a party are then subtracted from the total number of seats allocated to that party's list, and the remaining seats are filled by the candidates on the

national list in the order determined before the election. In the event a party does not present a national list, the seats allocated to it at the national level are filled from its regional lists. The largest remainder method of PR is also used to elect members of the nine provincial legislatures.

Allocation of National Assembly Seats in the 1999 General Election in South Africa

A quota of votes per seat was calculated in each province to allocate the regional seats. In Gauteng Province, which was assigned 46 seats, the sixteen parties contesting the election received a total of 3,708,318 votes. Therefore, the quota of votes per seat in the province was computed in the following manner: $\frac{3,708,318}{47} + 1 = 78,901$. Each party was then assigned an initial number of seats, equal to the integer division of its vote in the region by the quota of votes per seat as shown below for the top seven parties:

ANC :	$\frac{2,527,676}{78,901}$	= 32 : Remainder 2,844
DP :	$\frac{655,883}{78,901}$	= 8 : Remainder 24,675
NNP :	$\frac{142,749}{78,901}$	= 1: Remainder 63,848
IFP:	$\frac{131,296}{78,901}$	= 1 : Remainder 52,395
UDM :	$\frac{79,627}{78,901}$	= 1 : Remainder 726
ACDP :	$\frac{43,359}{78,901}$	= 0 : Remainder 43,359
VF/FF:	$\frac{40,782}{78,901}$	= 0 : Remainder 40,782

The remaining twelve parties, whose regional vote totals ranged from a low of 1,146 to a high of 31,386, won no seat at this stage, their remainders were equal to their respective number of votes.

At this point, the allocation of seats in Gauteng Province stood as follows:

Table 2: Gauteng Province

List	Seats
ANC	32
DP	8
NNP	1
IFP	1
UDM	1
Total	43

However, three of the forty-six seats remained to be allocated. The largest remainders were then determined by sorting them in descending order, with the top six shown below:

Table 3: Six Top Seats

NNP	63,848
IFP	52,395
ACDP	43,359
VF/FF	40,782
FA	31,386
PAC	25,412

(Remainders for the other ten parties ranged from a high of 24, 675 to a low of 726).

Since the NNP, the IFP and the ACDP had the three largest remainders, one seat was allocated to each of these parties. This operation completed the allocation of regional seats in Gauteng Province in the following manner:

Table 4: Final seats allocation in Gauteng Province

List	Seats
ANC	32
DP	8
NNP	2
IFP	2
UDM	1
ACDP	1
Total	46

The aforementioned procedure was repeated in each province. The seat distributions from all provinces were then aggregated at the national level which produced the following allocation of regional list seats:

Table 5: Regional List Seats Allocation

List	Seats
ANC	139
DP	20
IFP	18
NNP	13
UDM	5
ACDP	3
UCDP	1
MF	1
Total	200

To distribute the national list seats, the total number of votes cast across the nation was divided by the number of seats in the National Assembly, plus one. The result plus one produced the quota of votes per seat: $\frac{15,977}{401} + 1 = 39,844$

Then, the nationwide vote total obtained by each party was divided by the quota of votes per seat as shown below:

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \text{ANC : } 10,601,330 \quad = \quad 266 \text{ : Remainder } 2,826 \\
 \quad \quad \quad \underline{\quad 39,844 \quad} \\
 \text{DP: } \quad 1,527,337 \quad = \quad 38 \text{ : Remainder } 13,265 \\
 \quad \quad \quad \underline{\quad 39,844 \quad} \\
 \text{IFP : } \quad 1,371,477 \quad = \quad 34 \text{ : Remainder } 16,781 \\
 \quad \quad \quad \underline{\quad 39,844 \quad} \\
 \text{NNP : } \quad 1,098,215 \quad = \quad 27 \text{ : Remainder } 22,427 \\
 \quad \quad \quad \underline{\quad 39,844 \quad} \\
 \text{UDM : } \quad 546,790 \quad = \quad 13 \text{ : Remainder } 28,818 \\
 \quad \quad \quad \underline{\quad 39,844 \quad} \\
 \text{ACDP : } \quad 228,975 \quad = \quad 5 \text{ : Remainder } 29,755 \\
 \quad \quad \quad \underline{\quad 39,844 \quad} \\
 \text{VF/FF : } \quad 127,217 \quad = \quad 3 \text{ : Remainder } 7,685 \\
 \quad \quad \quad \underline{\quad 39,844 \quad}
 \end{array}$$

	39,844		
UCDP:	<u>125,280</u>	=	3 : Remainder 5,748
	39,844		
PAC :	<u>113,125</u>	=	2 : Remainder 33,437
	39,844		
FA :	<u>86,704</u>	=	2 : Remainder 7,016
	39,844		
MF :	<u>48,227</u>	=	1 : Remainder 8,433
	39,844		
AEB :	<u>46,292</u>	=	1 : Remainder 6,448
	39,844		
AZAPO:	<u>27,257</u>	=	0 : Remainder 27,257
	39,844		
AITUP :	<u>10,611</u>	=	0: Remainder 10,611
	39,844		
GPGP :	<u>9,193</u>	=	0: Remainder 9,193
	39,844		
SOPA:	<u>9,062</u>	=	0: Remainder 9,062
	39.844		

At this point, the allocation of National Assembly seats stood as follows:

Table 6: National Assembly seats

List	Seats
ANC	266
DP	38
IFP	34
NNP	27
UDM	13
ACDP	5
VF/FF	3
UCDP	3
PAC	2
FA	2
MF	1
AEB	1
Total	395

However, five of the 400 seats remained to be allocated. The five largest remainders were then determined by sorting them in descending order, as shown below:

Table 7: Five Largest Remainders

List	Remainder
PAC	33,437
ACDP	29,755
UDM	28,818
AZAPO	27,257
NNP	22,427

(Remainders for the other eleven parties ranged from a high of 16,781 to a low of 2,826).

Since the PAC, the ACDP, the UDM, the AZAPO and the NNP had the five largest remainders, one seat was allocated to each of these parties. This operation completed the allocation of seats at the National level in the following manner:

Table 8: National List Seats

S/Nigerians	Party	Seats
1	ANC	266
2	DP	38
3	IFP	34
4	NNP	28
5	UDM	14
6	ACDP	6
7	VF/FF	3
8	UCDP	3
9	PAC	3
10	FA	2
11	MF	1
12	AEB	1
13	AZAPO	1
14	AITUP	0
15	GPGP	0
16	SOPA	0
Total		400

At this point, the seats won by each party at the regional level were deducted from its nationwide seat allocation. For example, the 139 regional list seats won by the ANC were subtracted from its nationwide allocation of 266 seats, so the party was awarded 127 seats at the national level. All the VF/FF, PAC, FA, AEB, and AZAPO seats were awarded at the national level, since none of these parties won regional seats. At the national level, the definitive allocation of National Assembly, that is, regional and national list seats in the 1999 elections was as follows:

Table 9: Regional and National List Seats

List	Regional Seats	National Seats
ANC	139	127
DP	20	18
IFP	18	16
NNP	13	15
UDM	5	9
ACDP	6	3
UCDP	1	2
MF	1	0
VF/FF	0	3
PAC	0	3
FA	0	2
AEB	0	1
AZAPO	0	1
Total	200	200

The overall result of the 1999 National Assembly election was as shown bellow.

Table 10: Overall Result of the 1999 National Assembly Election

S/N	Party	Votes	Seats	%
1	ANC	10,601,330	266	66.4
2	DP	1,527,337	38	9.6
3	IFP	1,371,477	34	8.6
4	NNP	1,098,215	28	6.9
5	UDM	546,790	14	3.4
6	ACDP	228,975	6	1.4
7	VF/FF	127,217	3	0.8
8	UCDP	125,280	3	0.8
9	PAC	113,125	3	0.7
10	FA	86,704	2	0.5

11	MF	48,277	1	0.3
12	AEB	46,292	1	0.3
13	AZAPO	27,257	1	0.2
14	AITUP	10,611	0	0.1
15	GPGP	9,193	0	0.1
16	SOPA	9,062	0	0.1
Total		15,977,142	400	100

Table 11: Summary of National Assembly Seat Distribution Among Parties

S/Nigerians	Party	Seats	%
1	ANC	266	66.5
2	DP	38	9.5
3	IFP	34	8.5
4	NNP	28	7.0
5	UDM	14	3.5
6	ACDP	6	1.5
7	VF/FF	3	0.75
8	UCDP	3	0.75
9	PAC	3	0.75
10	FA	2	0.5
11	MF	1	0.25
12	AEB	1	0.25
13	AZAPO	1	0.25
TOTAL		400	100

Table 12: Differences in National Assembly Seat Distribution Among Parties

S/N	Party	%of votes won	% of seat allocation	Difference	Remarks
1	ANC	66.4	66.5	0.1	More
2	DP	9.6	9.5	0.1	Less
3	IFP	8.6	8.5	0.1	Less
4	NNP	6.9	7.0	0.1	More
5	UDM	3.4	3.5	0.1	More
6	ACDP	1.4	1.5	0.1	More
7	VF/FF	0.8	0.75	0.05	Less
8	UCDP	0.8	0.75	0.05	Less
9	PAC	0.7	0.75	0.05	More
10	FA	0.5	0.5	0	-
11	MF	0.3	0.25	0.05	Less
12	AEB	0.3	0.25	0.05	Less
13	AZAPO	0.2	0.25	0.05	More
14	AITUP	0.1	0	0.1	Less

15	GPGP	0.1	0	0.1	Less
16	SOPA	0.1	0	0.1	Less

MAJORITARIAN/PLURALITY OR FIRST-PAST-THE-POST SYSTEM

In this system, whoever among the contestants in an election that scores the highest number of votes is declared elected. Main models include: Alternative Vote and Two-Round Vote (TRV).

Alternative vote or instant Run-off: In this system, voters indicate an order of preference among candidates. If no candidate obtains a majority outright, the last-place candidate is removed, and the associated second-choice vote is added to the totals of the remaining candidates. This process is repeated until a candidate secures a majority.

Two-Round Vote: A run-off election is held between the two top vote getters in order to ensure that the winner obtains a majority of votes cast.

Nigeria operates absolute majority system at the executive level (presidential and gubernatorial polls) and plurality or first-past-the-post system at the legislative level. In the absolute majority system, candidates are elected with a majority, that is, more than 50% of votes cast while in the first-past-the-post-system, the candidate that obtains more votes than any other candidate is elected, even if that person only won a minority of votes cast. For instance, if candidates A, B, C, scored 15, 001, 15,000, 14,500 respectively, A is declared the winner. Here, he beats his nearest opponent by a single vote in spite of the fact that B and C collectively scored 29,500 votes. In a sense, A could be said to have been elected on minority votes and thus governs with minority support.

This system is disproportional in its distribution of seats, since it tends to strengthen the dominant parties and hurts small ones. This is because, a small party with its votes spread out all evenly geographically, will have only a small number of votes in each district and may not have enough in any one district to achieve a plurality and win there. Thus, a particular party could win all the seats in a constituency since its candidates are likely to score the same number of votes. This is the case, for instance, in 2003 National Assembly Election in which PDP won almost all the seats as shown below.

2003 National Assembly Election Results

In the presidential system of government in Nigeria, the people directly elect the head of state or president who is also the head of government. They equally directly elect members of the National Assembly. The National Assembly has two chambers: the upper chamber (Senate) and the lower chamber (House of Representatives). The Senate has 109 members, elected for a four year term in 36 three-seat constituencies (corresponding to the country's states) and one seat in a single-seat constituency, the Federal Capital Abuja. The House of Representatives has 360 members, elected for a four-year term in single-seat constituencies. On April 12, 2003, elections took place to choose members of the Senate and also members of the House of Representatives.

Table 13: Result of Senate Election

S/N	Name of party	Senate districts won	Votes scored	%
1	AD	6	2,828,082	7.24
2	ANPP	27	8,091,783	20.73
3	APGA	0	429,073	1.09
4	APLP	0	14,004	0.03
5	ARP	0	9,138	0.02
6	BNPP	0	6,782	0.01
7	CPN	0	7,296	0.01
8	DA	0	6,476	0.01
9	GPN	0	4,722	0.01
10	JP	0	28,887	0.07
11	LDPN	0	5,419	0.01
12	MDJ	0	6,468	0.01
13	MMN	0	3,393	0.01
14	NAC	0	4,392	0.01
15	NAP	0	7,620	0.01
16	NCP	0	148,157	0.37
17	ND	0	14,527	0.37
18	NDP	0	459,462	1.17
19	NMMN	0	3,914	0.01
20	NNPP	0	11,533	0.02
21	NPC	0	12,224	0.03
22	NRP	0	13,227	0.03
23	PAC	0	140,854	0.36
24	PDP	76	25,585,538	65.55

25	PMP	0	50,765	0.13
26	PRP	0	204,929	0.52
27	PSD	0	10,482	0.02
28	PSP	0	117,295	0.30
29	UDP	0	13,960	0.03
30	UNPP	0	789,705	2.02
	Total	109	39,030,107	

Registered votes: 60,823,022

Table 14: Result of House of Representatives

S/N	Name of party	Federal constituencies won	Total Votes Scored	%
1	AD	34	2,711,972	9.28
2	ANPP	96	8,021,531	27.44
3	APGA	2	397,147	1.36
4	APLP	0	12,936	0.04
5	ARP	0	8,746	0.03
6	BNPP	0	5,703	0.02
7	CPN	0	6,738	0.02
8	DA	0	6,096	0.02
9	GPN	0	4,257	0.01
10	JP	0	27,751	0.09
11	LDPN	0	4,966	0.02
12	MDJ	0	11,175	0.04
13	MMN	0	2,816	0.01
14	NAC	0	4,430	0.02
15	NAP	0	6,531	0.02
16	NCP	0	140,401	0.48
17	ND	0	21,854	0.07
18	NDP	1	561,161	1.92
19	NMMN	0	3,154	0.01
20	NNPP	0	8,779	0.03
21	NPC	0	10,687	0.04
22	NRP	0	13,500	0.05
23	PAC	0	137,328	0.47
24	PDP	223	15,927,807	54.49
25	PMP	0	29,100	0.10
26	PRP	1	222,938	0.76
27	PSD	0	10,889	0.04
28	PSP	0	96,550	0.33

29	UDP	0	12,695	0.04
30	UNPP	2	803,432	2.75
	Vacant	1		
	Total	360	29,233,070	

Table 15: Summary of Senate seat distribution among parties

Name of Party	Seats won	% of total seats
AD	6	5.51
ANPP	27	24.77
PDP	76	69.72
Total	109	100

Table 16: Summary of Party Distribution of House of Representatives Seats

Name of Party	Seats won	% of Total Seats
AD	34	9.44
ANPP	96	26.66
APGA	2	0.55
NDP	1	0.27
PDP	223	61.94
PRP	1	0.27
UNPP	2	0.55
Vacant	1	
Total	360	

Turnout 49.2%

Source: http://www.inecnigeria.com/2003_election/results/htm.

Table 17: Election into senate

S/N	Party	% of votes won	% of seat allocation	Difference	Remarks
1	AD	7.24	5.51	1.73	Less
2	ANPP	20.73	24.77	4.04	More
3	APGA	1.09	0	1.09	Less
4	APLP	0.03	0	0.03	Less
5	ARP	0.02	0	0.02	Less

6	BNPP	0.01	0	0.01	Less
7	CPN	0.01	0	0.01	Less
8	DA	0.01	0	0.01	Less
9	GPN	0.01	0	0.01	Less
10	JP	0.07	0	0.01	Less
11	LDPN	0.01	0	0.01	Less
12	MDJ	0.01	0	0.01	Less
13	MMN	0.01	0	0.01	Less
14	NAC	0.01	0	0.01	Less
15	NAP	0.01	0	0.01	Less
16	NCP	0.37	0	0.37	Less
17	ND	0.37	0	0.37	Less
18	NDP	1.17	0	1.17	Less
19	NMMN	0.01	0	0.01	Less
20	NNPP	0.02	0	0.02	Less
21	NPC	0.03	0	0.03	Less
22	NRP	0.03	0	0.03	Less
23	PAC	0.36	0	0.36	Less
24	PDP	65.55	69.72	4.17	More
25	PMP	0.13	0	0.13	Less
26	PRP	0.52	0	0.52	Less
27	PSD	0.02	0	0.02	Less
28	PSP	0.30	0	0.03	Less
29	UDP	0.03	0	0.03	Less
30	UNPP	2.02	0	2.02	Less

Table 18: Election into House of Representative

S/N	Party	% of votes won	% of seat allocation	Difference	Remarks
1	AD	9.28	9.44	0.16	More
2.	ANPP	27.44	26.66	0.78	Less

3	APGA	1.36	0.55	0.81	Less
4	APLP	0.04	0	0.04	Less
5	ARP	0.03	0	0.03	Less
6	BNPP	0.02	0	0.02	Less
7	CPN	0.02	0	0.02	Less
8	DA	0.02	0	0.02	Less
9	GPN	0.01	0	0.01	Less
10	JP	0.09	0	0.09	Less
11	LDPN	0.02	0	0.02	Less
12	MDJ	0.04	0	0.04	Less
13	MMN	0.01	0	0.01	Less
14	NAC	0.02	0	0.02	Less
15	NAP	0.02	0	0.02	Less
16	NCP	0.48	0	0.48	Less
17	ND	0.07	0	0.07	Less
18	NDP	1.92	0.27	1.65	Less
19	NMMN	0.01	0	0.01	Less
20	NNPP	0.03	0	0.03	Less
21	NPC	0.04	0	0.04	Less
22	NRP	0.05	0	0.05	Less
23	PAC	0.47	0	0.47	Less
24	PDP	54.49	61.94	7.45	More
25	PMP	0.10	0	0.10	Less
26	PRP	0.76	0.27	0.49	Less
27	PSD	0.04	0	0.04	Less
28	PSP	0.33	0	0.33	Less
29	UDP	0.04	0	0.04	Less
30	UNPP	2.75	0.35	2.2	Less

In the election into the Senate, the bigger parties namely, PDP and ANPP were allocated proportionately more seats than the percentage of votes, which their candidates score, entitled

them to. The difference in their favour was as much as 4%. In contrast, the smaller parties were allocated no seat at all even when they scored as much as 2.02% of the votes. This was the case for UNPP. In the case of the AD, it was allocated 1.73% less number of seats than it was entitled to, given the percentage of votes, which were scored by its candidates.

Discussion and Analysis

From the tables above, especially tables 12 and 18 the difference between the seats allocated to the dominant party and other parties in South Africa is less than 1 percent. This implies that all the major parties that took part in the election had fair representation. In Nigeria, the situation was entirely different. This is because; the dominant party was allocated almost all the seats even when it was clear that it had no majority votes. This feature seems to inform the opinion of the adherent of proportional representation when in their criticism of the majoritarian system infer that majoritarian system is disproportional in its distribution of seats, because it tends to strengthen the dominant parties and hurts the small ones.

In the Nigerian experience, especially from 1999 – 2004, the incessant legislative conflict in the National Assembly could be attributed to the demerit of the first-past-the-post system. This gives credence to the findings of Mbah (2014). According to him, based on the capitalist democracy in Nigeria, every member of the National Assembly uses the state power to secure their economic interests and thus make legislative conflict inevitable.

The management of electoral process in Nigeria and South Africa, 1999 – 2004

The renewed process of transition to civilian rule in Nigeria and South Africa, dated back to 1998 and 1993. This was marked with the creation of electoral bodies – INEC in Nigeria and IEC in South Africa in 1998 and 1993 respectively. These bodies as already established in this paper are responsible for the management of elections in the two countries.

In the Nigeria's experience, the path to civilian rule progressed in August 1998. At the Local Government elections, which was designed to be a litmus test for the new emerging political parties, the PDP gained control of about 60% of local councils. INEC ruled that only the PDP, APP and AD had received the requisite number of votes at the local elections to be allowed to contest the elections at state and federal levels in January and February 1999.

Nevertheless, from opinion survey, 1999 election was relatively smooth, in the sense that it was relatively free of political violence. The major problems associated with the 1999 elections were attributable to the absence of transitional structures, as Nigeria only launched into elections barely 11 months after the death of General Abacha.

However, with the inception of the Fourth Republic, instances abound in violent confrontation between the national factions in the Alliance for Democracy (AD). Also, clashes between supporters of Governor Bisi Akande and Deputy Governor Iyiola Omisore in Osun state, senator Modu Sherriff and Governor Malla Kachalla in the APP – controlled Borno state, senator Olusola Saraki and Governor Mohammed Lawal in Kwara state, Governor Sam Egwu and the then senate president, Pius Anyim, in Ebonyi State, Governor Chimaroke Nnamani and Senator Jim Nwobodo in Enugu state, Governor Kure and Prof. Jerry Gana in Niger state, Governor Mbadinuju and chief Emeka Offor in Anambra state amongst others. These political confrontations resulted, in some cases in the violent killings of numerous persons as shown on table below.

Table 19: Some examples of victims of politically-motivated killings and attempted assaults in Nigeria between 1999 - 2003

S/N	Victims of political conflicts	Date killed or attacked	Remarks
1	Mr. Sunday Ugwu	September 9, 1999	This was a case of mistaken identity as the victim was the elder brother of Hon. Nwabueze Ugwu, the target who is a member of Enugu State House of Assembly.
2	Chukwudozie Nwachukwu	January 10, 2000	This victim and the next one (in serial no. 3) were brutally murdered by Bakassi Boys in Abia State.
3	Okechukwu Maduekwe	January 10, 2000	Same as the preceding narration
4	James Ibori	February 4, 2001	Delta state Governor escaped death at the hands of assassins by the whiskers. The crisis leading to the attack was intra-party.
5	Momoh Lawal	March 5, 2001	A victim of inter-party conflict between ANPP and PDP in the Okene LGA of Kogi state.
6	An unidentified person killed.	August 24, 2001	A result of Protest by Market Women and Youths against the Continued Interference in the Internal Affairs of Ebonyi State by Senator Anyim Pius Anyim.
7	Odunayo Olagbaju	December 21, 2001	The victim was a member of the Osun state of House of Assembly and was killed by an unknown assailant

8	Bola Ige	December 23, 2001	The victim was the late Minister of Justice whose assassination is still a riddle that the police have not unravelled till date.
9	Three students reportedly lost their lives.	March 7, 2002	This incident occurred after a PDP Rally held at Efurum, Wari, the headquarters of the Petroleum Training Institute.
10	Janet Olapade	August 13, 2002	A prominent PDP leader clubbed to death by assailants, mainly youths, for preventing them from pasting the poster of a chairmanship candidate on her house.
11	Ahmed Pategi	August 15, 2002	The victim was the Kwara state chairman of the PDP who was murdered along with his police orderly when his car was ambushed on his way to Abuja.
12	Victor Nwankwo	August 29, 2002	The victim was the younger brother of Dr. Arthur Nwankwo, the founder of the Eastern Mandate Union (EMU). A high profile politician.
13	Bannabas Igwe and his wife Abigail	September 1, 2002	Both of them were lawyers, with the husband also serving as the chairman of the Nigerian Bar Association of Onitsha Branch.
14	John Nunu	September 26, 2002	The victim was the treasurer of Akossa LGA.
15	Alhaji Isyaku Mohammed	September, 2002	The victim was until his death, the National vice-chairman of the United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP) for the North-West
16	Dele Arojo	November 25, 2002	The victim was the PDP'S gubernatorial aspirant for Lagos state.
17	Unspecified number of people died from gunshot wounds in Ibadan.	January 13, 2003	This was intra-party clash at the Oyo state secretariat of the ANPP.
18	Adamu Wasiri	January 18, 2003	Gangs from the rival ANPP attacked campaign convoy of the PDP gubernatorial candidate Adamu Wasiri at the Gulani-Bularafa-Dokini area of Yobe state.
19	A soldier and three youths were killed in clash over PDF primary elections in Warri.	January, 2003	The cause was the rivalry between factions within the PDP.
20	One person killed in Owo, Ondo state.	February, 2003	It was caused by factional fighting in the Alliance for Democracy (AD) party.
21	Eight people killed in Benue state.	February 18, 2003	A security man attached to the residence of Paul Unongo, the ANPP candidate in Benue state, was killed by unknown persons. When news of the death got to ANPP supporters, believing that the victim was killed by PDP supporters, the former went on a rampage

			mission, which eventually led to the death of seven more persons.
22	Assassination attempt	February 23, 2003	An Attempt on the life of the Speaker, Borno State House of Assembly Mallam Inuwa Kabo, in Maidugiri by three gunmen. The incident led to the killing of a security man on duty on the fateful day
23	Ogbonnaya Uche	February 2003	He was one of the senatorial candidates of the ANPP in Imo state. Speculations were rife that he was eliminated because of his huge popularity and the high probability of winning the election into senate.
24	Theodore A. Agwatu	February, 2003	The victim was a principal secretary to the Imo state Governor.
25	Eight people died in political clashes.	February, 2003	ANPP and PDP thugs engaged themselves in a battle for supremacy in Jato-Aka, Kwande LGA.
26	Mrs. Emily Omope (a.k.a Mrs. Thatcher)	March 3, 2003	She died on this day from the acid poured on her in December 2002. she belonged to the Alliance for Democracy party
27	Marshal Harry	March 5,2003	The victim who started as a PDP stalwart decamped to the ANPP where he also became a leading member. He was the South-South coordinator of the presidential campaign of the ANPP.
28	20 houses burnt to ashes in Tunger Dan-Nupe, Bunza LGA, Kebbi state.	March 12, 2003	70 people were arrested. The fracas was between ANPP and PDP supporters of the respective gubernatorial candidates of the two parties.
29	One person killed and several others wounded, including two commissioners in Obubra, Cross River State.	March 20, 2003	The incident occurred when the Governor of the state was on a campaign tour of the area, which is a stronghold of his former Deputy, now a gubernatorial candidate of the rival political party-ANPP.
30	Moshood Gidado and Ibrahim Razak.	March 21, 2003	One of the killings took place at the Idi-Ape family quarters of the Kwara state Governor, Alhaji Mohammed Lawal. The first of the two victims was the Governor's cousin properties were also destroyed with several hundreds injured. This was as a result of inter-party conflict.
31	One person killed	March 24. 2003	The unidentified victim was killed in Ogaminana in Adavi LGA of Kogi state in an inter-party clash.

Source: Yaqub (2003:298-302)

The political landscape is increasingly being heated up by politicians, especially those contesting for political offices, some of whom were very desperate to win at all costs. Political conflict which had rocked the machinery of government had since metamorphosed into political violence affecting virtually all parts of the country and politicians of various political parties. Political violence which initially took the form of inter and intra party skirmishes, personality clashes, harassment and intimidation of opponents, ambush, burning of political party offices and the vandalism of campaign materials by thugs of opposing political parties had now degenerated to assassination of both high profile politicians and average party activists and even supporters (Godowoli, 2003:102).

The 2003 elections were fraught with hitches. There were so many cases of fraud, corrupt practices, such as vote buying and electoral bribery, rigging and violent acts during the election. The Transition Monitoring Group (TMG, 2003), noted in its report, that the electoral process was undermined by the shoddy conduct of the voters' registration exercise which resulted in many prospective voters being disenfranchised. The electoral process was also undermined by the conduct of the primaries of many of the political parties, especially the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), where the president and all the Governors of the 36 states used their power of incumbency to get tickets for the second terms. As a result, cynicism and apathy developed with people believing that whether they voted or not, stood for elections or not, it would not make any difference. Many people believed that there was no election in 2003. What happened was selection instead. The PDP under Obasanjo won the presidential elections with 61.94% of the total votes cast. At the state level, PDP won 28 of the 36 governorships (as shown in table 20 below).

Table 20: The Presidential Elections Results in 2003 in Nigeria

Party	Candidates	Total votes scored	%
ANPP	President: Buhari Muhammadu, Vice: Okadigbo Chuba William Malachy	12,710,022	32.19%
APGA	President: Ojukwu Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, Vice: Bayero Sani Ibrahim	1,297,445	3.29%
APLP	President: Okereke Osita Emmanuel, Vice: Abdullahi Tukuru Alhaji	26,921	0.07%
ARP	President: Yahaya G.K. Ezemue Ndu, Vice: Hajia Amau Aliyu Mohammed	11,565	0.03%
BNPP	President: Nnaji Ifeanyichukwu Goodwill, Vice: Suleiman Mohammed Awwai	5,987	0.02%
DA	President: Ferreira Anthonia Aboyemi Jorge, Vice: Eboigbe Ehi	6,727	0.02%
JP	President: Christopher Ogeneboorie Okotie, Vice: Habib Mairo Naturiya (Mrs)	119,547	0.03%
DPN	President: Christopher Pere Ajuwa, Vice: Mohammed Nasir	4,473	0.01%
MDJ	President: Yusuf Muhammadu Dikko, Vice: Melford Obiene Okilo	21,403	0.05%
MMN	President: Mojisola Adekunle Obasanjo (Mrs), Vice: Mohammed Ibrahim	3,757	0.01%
NAC	President: Agoro Olapade Roland Aremo, Vice: Aminu Garbati Abubakar	5,756	0.01%
NAP	President: Tunji Braithwaite, Vice: Hajia Maimunatu Lata Tombai	6,932	0.02%
NCP	President: Ganiyu Fawehinmi, Vice: Jerome Tala Gopye	161,333	0.41%
NDP	President: Ike Omar Sanda Nwachukwu, Vice: Habu Fari Aliyu	132,997	0.34%
NNPP	President: Kalu Idika Kalu, Vice: Jawi Abdul Rahmanpaga	23,827	0.06%
PAC	President: Sarah N. Jibril, Vice: Elemosho Babatunde Jajudeen	157,560	0.40%
PDP	President: Olusegun Obasanjo, Vice: Atiku Abubakar	24,456,140	61.94%
PMP	President: Nwankwo Auwucha Arthur, Vice: Batubo Benett Raymond	57,720	0.15%
PRP	President: Musa Abdukadir Balarabe, Vice: Okafor Ernest Ngozi	100,765	0.26%
UNPP	President: Nwobodo Jim Ifeanyichukwu, Vice: Goni Mohammed	169,609	0.43%
	TOTAL	39,480,486	100.00%
	Rejected Votes	2,522,134	
	Valid Votes and Rejected Votes	41,022,620	

Table 21: Summary of Results of Gubernatorial Elections

S/NO	State	Votes	Party	Winner
1	Abia	540,983	PDP	Orji Uzor Kalu
2	Edo	969,747	PDP	Lucky Igbinedion
3	Rivers	2,098,692	PDP	Peter Odili
4	Osun	478,492	PDP	Olagunsoye Oyiniola
5	Bayelsa	698,661	PDP	Dieprieve Alamiyeseigha
6	Ebonyi	768,674	PDP	Sam Egwu
7	Enugu	1,131,292	PDP	Chimaroke Nnamani
8	Oyo	636,730	PDP	Rasheed Ladoja
9	Ekiti	229,906	PDP	Ayo Fayose
10	Kwara	322,242	PDP	Bukola Saraki
11	Niger	561,935	PDP	Abdulkadir kure
12	Ogun	497,355	PDP	Gbenga Daniel
13	Ondo	611,926	PDP	Segun Agagu
14	Imo	695,149	PDP	Achike Udenwa
15	Katsina	892,340	PDP	Umaru Musa Yar'adua
16	Jigawa	816,385	ANPP	Ibrahim Turaki
17	Lagos	911,613	AD	Bola Tinubu
18	Anambra	452,820	PDP	Chris Ngige
19	Kaduna	1,196,688	PDP	Mohammed Markafi
20	Kogi	459,942	PDP	Ibrahim Idris
21	Kebbi	502,833	ANPP	Adamu Aliero
22	Yobe	369,906	ANPP	Bukar Ibrahim
23	Akwa Ibom	1,028,722	PDP	Victor Attah
24	Bauchi	1,198,130	PDP	Adamu Mu'azu
25	Taraba	784,013	PDP	Jolly Nyame
26	Kano	1,082,457	ANPP	Ibrahim Shekarau
27	Sokoto	665,545	ANPP	Attahiru D. Bafarawa
28	Benue	681,717	PDP	George Akume
29	Delta	1,038,607	PDP	James Ibori
30	Gombe	494,562	PDP	Danjuma Goje
31	Nassarawa	505,893	PDP	Abdulahi Adamu
32	Adamawa	375,000	PDP	Bori Haruna
33	Borno	581,880	ANPP	Alii Modu Sheriff
34	Cross River	1,193,290	PDP	Donald Duke
35	Plateau	364,903	PDP	Joshua Dariye
36	Zamfara	829,954	ANPP	Yerima Sanni

Source: Adapted from *Guardian*, Sunday, April 6, 2003, *Nigerian Tribune*, April 23, 2003.

On the part of South Africa, it is to be stressed that South Africa had several elections in pre-apartheid period. Those elections were, however, based on discriminatory process, because, the black population was not allowed to participate. In 1994, elections were held on non-discriminatory basis in South Africa.

Political intolerance and undemocratic behaviour are not uncommon in South Africa. The worst expression of this intolerance was the violence in Kwazulu-Natal where differences of opinion were all too frequently settled by murder. According to Wilmot and Caliguire (1996: 64), “over 60 percent of South Africans would prefer not to allow a member of the political party they most opposed, to engage in political activities, ranging from staging a public protest to holding a meeting in their neighbourhood. But these waned with signing of a peace pledge to observe the electoral code of conduct during elections”.

The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of South Africa was first constituted in December 1993 and given less than five months to organize the country's first non-racial election. Besides political and security threats to its members, the commission faced daunting logistical challenges rooted in the apartheid legacy of fragmented and uneven local administrative infrastructure (Alence, 2004: 7),

No attempt was made to register voters. Anyone with official identification who turned up at a polling station was allowed to participate. IEC officials marked voters' fingers with indelible ink in order to prevent fraud. Following intensive consultation with the parties, the IEC announced results which were accepted as substantially free and fair by all participants. The ANC won the election with 62.6% of the votes cast.

Preparations for the 1999 elections focused on tightening administrative procedures. Most importantly by compiling the country's first common voters' roll. The IEC devoted extra effort to reducing the unusually steep obstacles to the participation of specific segments of the population. One such segment consists of youthful would-be first voters, who, in order to register, must often apply for an identity document first. Another group consists of the rural poor, who have to travel longer distances to access electoral facilities. Practical measures to reduce these obstacles have included the establishment of more registration and voting stations in rural areas and improved co-ordination with the Department of Home Affairs

regarding applications for identity documents. According to Rod Alence, nearly 90 percent of registered voters went to the polls in June 1999.

Other factors that helped in the smooth conduct of the 1999 elections in South Africa were the conflict management structures, such as consultative forums, conflict management committees and party liaison committees. In addition to these structures, the IEC and other collaborating non-governmental organizations working in the areas of democracy and good governance trained mediators and domestic monitors to assist in the electoral process and also the signing of peace pledge to observe the electoral code of conduct during the elections in Kwazulu-Natal and Cape Town which they all observed. This helped to reduce speculation of the possibility of pre-election violence.

South Africa's third democratic elections amply demonstrated the increasing familiarity of officials and electorates with voting procedures. This familiarity has resulted in elections being conducted efficiently and with minimal controversy regarding procedural issues. The ease with which voting now takes place is evident in a reduction in the average amount of time electors take to cast their ballots. For example, according to an exit poll conducted on behalf of the IEC, over 80 percent of voters spent 30 minutes or less queuing to vote. In 1999, voters spent substantially more time queuing. Only 53 percent of people spent 30 minutes or less in queuing. The reduction in the time taken to cast a ballot did not result, however, in a significant increase in spoilt ballots suggesting that electors are at ease with the new tempo. The reduced queuing time is partly attributable to virtually every polling station opening on time, fully equipped and with the correct material including the requisite ballots and an adequate complement of staff. The increased tempo with which voting took place is attributable primarily to election officials being further up the learning curve in terms of managing polling stations and to a simplification of voting procedures (O'Donovan, 2004). Many local and provincial election officials have been involved in all the national and local elections that have taken place under the auspices of the IEC. This continuity ensures that they are ever better able to manage the resources allocated to them.

An added boom to election management was the near universal coverage of voting stations by at least one of the cellular phone service providers. The EEC'S call centre fulfilled an important function both during the period of registration and election day. According to Kotze, (2004: 3), during the registration weekend in January 2004, the total number of calls

on the Saturday was 60,701 and on Sunday, 59, 950. In the first two hours on election day, the call centre received about 20,000 calls, mainly inquiries about where to vote.

A feature of the 2004 election was the sophisticated presentation of the results in electronic form, both on the IEC'S system and in combination with the South Africa Broadcasting Corporation's own internet system. SABC'S reporters and commentators could use a vast database of the incoming results and compare them with the results of previous elections in 1994 and 1999. The IEC'S system was also available to the individual political parties with their own workstations at the IEC'S results operation centre. The use of cellular phone service also ensured that the IEC no longer had to rely on sophisticated (and power-dependent) satellite uplinks to get results to the "command centre" in Pretoria. Cell phones dramatically improved the level of communication required for the rapid reporting of results at station level. The election was generally regarded as free and fair. The ANC also won a landslide victory (69.68%) in the general election held on April 14, 2004.

The foregoing provides an insight into the peaceful conduct of elections in South Africa. This shows that: first, post-apartheid elections in South Africa since 1994 have been peaceful, free and fair. There were no reported cases of EEC officials, the security agencies or the judiciary being involved in electoral malpractices. There were also no reported incidents of malpractices in connection with counting of votes and declaration of election results. Second, the elections produced a procedurally legitimate regime or leader in South Africa, a leader that would enjoy inter and intra-ethnic loyalty. Third, political stability and discouragement of military incursion into politics have become institutionalised. Finally, it can be observed that, conversely, Nigeria's elections were problematic and conflict-ridden while those of South Africa were peaceful. Therefore, the management of electoral process in South Africa is less fraudulent than that of Nigeria.

Conclusion

This study has demonstrated the transition mechanism adopted in Nigerians and South Africa in the bid for their democratization process. From the available data presented and analysed, certain remarkable experiences were identified. For instance, on the relationship between the type of electoral system and the nature of the election in both countries, it was observed that

simple plurality system which Nigeria operates account for the contentious nature of election results, while the proportional representation is responsible for more acceptability of election results in South Africa.

Equally, on the management of the electoral process in the two counties, the problematic nature of the Nigeria's elections was clearly shown in this paper. The South African experience when compared with that of Nigeria presents a sharp contrast. So many reasons were adduced to be responsible for these distinctions. For instance, while in South Africa, there were involvement of conflict management committees, consultative forums, and party liason committees to mention but three in the electoral process, such cannot be said of Nigeria, especially between 1999 and 2003.

From this, it becomes crystally clear that Nigerian has a lesson to learn from South Africa. Among such lessons include, the use of national identity card as a compliment to the voting card. The essence is to eliminate under-aged and non-nationals from voting. Secondly, Nigeria's' electoral body should emulate the use of the internet as in South Africa to facilitate the analysis and report of election results. Thirdly, the president should not appoint the chairman of INEC. The procedure should be as in South Africa, where the post is advertised to the public, interested candidates apply and are interviewed by the Electoral Task Term (ETT). Thereafter, the best candidate is chosen to lead the commission. This is to guarantee the independent status of the electoral body with a view to preventing unnecessary executive influence and interference.

Above all, civil rule and/or democracy appear to have gathered momentum in today's world politics. As such the global aura now is democratic consolidation. On this premise, the Nigerian and South African states must have to key into this demand. The leeway to achieve democratic consolidation as indicated in the theoretical perspective of this study centred on the two-turnover and the "only game in town" rules. While the two-turnover rule emphasizes on the ability of the defeated incumbent government to accept defeat and handover peace fully to the opponent, the "only game in town" emphasizes on constitutionalism as mode of life in the state.

From the democratization experiences of Nigeria and South Africa, it can be sufficiently established that Nigeria, on the side of the two - turnover rule is on the lead. This is because, a ruling party PDP was defeated in the 2015 election by an opposition party and there was a

peaceful transition from PDP to the party. In South, Africa, ANC has remained a ruling party since 1994 to date.

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