

YOUTH AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN KWARA STATE, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This study examined the Youth Political Participation in Nigeria, focusing on Kwara State as a case study within the period of 2011 and 2015. The study adopted quantitative method of research based on the three variables of voting behaviour, party membership/attachment and protests or demonstration in the last two years. However, this area of study is just developing in this part of the world. The life cycle-factors and generational effects are considered to be responsible for the low level of participation in advanced democracies, apart from those two, the period effect of colonialism, incessant military intervention in politics and a relative subjective political culture and poor political socialization are responsible for the low level of youth political participation in Nigeria. A well structured, closed and open-ended questionnaire was administered on 350 respondents in six (6) local government of the state, two per senatorial districts in the state selected through a combination of simple random and quota sampling techniques. The questionnaires were administered to people between the age brackets of 18-35. Since there is no generally acceptable definition of who is a youth, this study however decided to adopt the definition of who is a youth according to the 2009 Nigeria's National Youth Policy who defines youth using the age bracket 18-35. Data gathered were analyzed using percentile, bar charts, tables and logistic regression model. Findings revealed that Kwara youth are likely to engage in conventional mode of participation than unconventional mode of participations with variations. Voting in general election is the prefer pattern of conventional participation. Furthermore, apart from age, local government of residence, years of residing in the local government, level of education, marital status, and occupation have a significant influence on youth political participation in Kwara State.

Keywords: Youth, Political Participation, Election

Introduction

The incessant military incursion into politics in Nigeria affected the political culture and political socialization of Nigeria people. Even, the democratization process that started in 1999 has not been able to remedy this problem. Most Nigerians believe that the Nigeria political scene is not

conducive for citizens' participation. Hence, the politics is left for those they consider too rigid to withstand the political environment of Nigeria which is characterized by electoral violence, political assassinations, Godfatherism, corruption, rigging etc. The failure of the political class to address numerous challenges facing the country also contributed to decline in popular support for democracy, election rigging, increase in political corruption and general disaffection about the Nigeria state are the common excuses for political alienation among Nigerians particularly the youth. To a larger percentage of Nigeria citizens, democratic rule has not yet provide social welfares, economic development, and guarantee of fundamental human right and for this, they see no reason to participate in civil engagement.

The process of political recruitment in all political parties in Nigeria is also questionable; this is unconnected with the process of political parties finance in Nigeria. Political parties in Nigeria are being financed by the powerful political elites who dictate who get what, when and how. Unlike what is obtainable in most developed democracies where parties are been financed by dues paid by all members on a regular basis. Although, all political parties in Nigeria have a youth wing, but in most cases the youth leaders are people older than the age bracket in used for this study. The youth have long represented an important constituency for electoral mobilization in Nigeria. Today, as the country faces a growing temporary increase of youth that is disproportionately burdened by un- / under employment, capturing the votes of this demographic is becoming more important than ever before. Yet, despite their numerical strength, importance and the historical relevance of generational identities within the country, very little is really known about the political participation of Nigeria youth.

The effect of undemocratic political change on citizen's political participation in general and that of youth in particular is even more glaring in Nigeria. Since the end of the military regime and subsequent democratization process that followed from 1999, there are various studies to examine the political participation and involvement of citizen in the democratization process and decision making in Nigeria. The study of political involvement of youth in Kwara state and by extension in Nigeria is just evolving. The major area of studies has been on youth involvement in electoral violence and political thugs. The political participation of youth base on the three

variables of voter's turnout, political attachment and protest is very scarce. The scarcity can however be attributed to the unstable civil rule occasioned by the frequent military coup in the body polity that had affected the political socialization of Nigerians.

The relevance of youth to the total political and developmental process of societal transformation cannot be over emphasized. The Department of Political Science and Social Affairs of the United Nations, while examining challenges and contributions of the youth towards the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), observed that:

Youth are making a difference as activist, as leaders in community development and political aspiration, and by their record level of volunteerism. In many parts of the world, they may be perceived as apathetic or disengaged, but this is largely inaccurate. World - wide, youth are by-passing traditional form of political participation (e.g.voting) through their activism and volunteering
(Youth and Millennium Development 2005:6).

However, the prevailing conditions in much of the developing nations, especially Nigeria, have seriously extenuated the potentials of the youth as agents of social change. These challenges range from the economic and social to the cultural. The treacherous triangle of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment in which the bulk of Nigerian youths are currently trapped, has severely challenged their sensibility and has in the long run given rise to what sociologists term attitudes of fatalism, resignation and acceptance of the situation (Uhunmwangho and Oghator, 2013: 246). The persistence of these social problems has created an environment where youth are cheaply available for manipulation by self-seeking politicians. Poverty, illiteracy and unemployment are interrelated conditions that generate human needs and therefore constitute a state of deprivation (ibid). As Togbolo observed, they take advantage of the poverty-stricken nature of the country to exploit the people; politicians are fond of using the youth restive nature as a political strategy to have their way” (Togbolo, 2006:8). The growing culture of violence among youth organizations like the Bakassi Boys, the Movement for the Actualization of a Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Egbesu Boys, the Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC) etc

are clear indications of the systematic militarization of our democratic environment (Uhunmwangho and Oghator, 2013: 246).

Youth Political Participation----- An Exposition

From the time of ancient city-states of Greece, the role of citizen participation in a democracy have been the subject of intense debate (Behrouzi, 2006:1 Held 2006). For some, models of direct democracy, as practiced in the Greek cities, were seen as the ideal and for others, a more restrictive model was preferred in which citizen participation was deemed less important than the need for a strong state which could enforce the law (Held, 2006).

At one extreme, minimalist or procedural theories of democracy argue that citizen involvement in politics should be limited to electoral participation i.e. voting (Schumpeter, 1943: 269). After choosing their representatives, citizens should then leave them to their job of decision-making without further interference; hence elections would therefore act as the sole guard against corrupt or bad leadership. During the 1960s and 1970s this approach came under heavy criticism by (Pateman 1970:5) who stressed the need for an active citizenry both at and between elections to legitimize democratic decision-making (Pateman, 1970:5). Unlike minimalist conceptions of democracy, which see ordinary citizens as unable to participate effectively in politics, advocates of participatory democracy stress the benefits of such involvement for both the participants and democratic accountability (Pateman 1970:5).

Indeed, theories of participatory democracy also assume that citizens desire to participate, this is a notion which has been questioned most recently by (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005), who argue that most citizens would prefer not to participate actively in politics. Instead many would opt for a 'stealth' democracy in which elected representatives make decisions on their behalf, leaving them free to pursue other activities. In a time of falling levels of formal political engagement in established democracies, this theory appears to correspond better with reality than participatory democracy (ibid).

Thus, although Hibbing and Theiss Morse, (2005) offer an interesting argument against the unrealistic demands of a participatory society, they do not convincingly challenge the underpinning reasons for encouraging active political participation (Gamson, 2003: 783-784). Though, less political participation can refer to less support for democratic norms and duties, disengagement and/or disaffection towards the political system (Norris, 1999; Franklin, 2004). Large abstention, on the other hand, can indicate apathy, alienation and disaffection of citizens (Anduiza, 2002:643-673).

Studies of political participation in advanced democracies have long found that age acts as an important factor in explaining the likelihood of an individual being politically involved. Thus, being young or very old is most associated with a lower likelihood of turning out to vote or joining a political party (Henn, et al, 2002: 167, Sloam 2007: 548, Fieldhouse et al, 2007:797). In recent decades the gap between young voters and older has apparently widened in many advanced democracies, (Fieldhouse, Tranmer, Russell. 2007:800). Additionally, studies of political party membership have found youth membership to have decreased sharply over the last few decades in various countries including Canada (O'Neil, 2007: 23, Cross and Young 2008:354), Belgium (Hooghe, Stolle and Stouthuysen, 2004:195) and in Britain (Henn, Weinstein and Wring, 2002: 167). In contrast, however, studies have suggested a greater propensity for young people to participate in informal forms of political involvement such as demonstrating and volunteering than older generations (Roker, Player and Coleman, 1999: 185-198, Quintelier 2007: 165). That age matters for political participation is therefore indisputable, however it has proven much more complex to reach consensus on the roots to these patterns.

Traditional explanations for lower turnout and party membership amongst young people focus on **life-cycle factors** (Norris 2003:1). These dictate that young people face a number of so-called start-up problems such as finding employment, housing and starting a family which mean that they have less time and interest in becoming involved in politics than older cohorts (Norris 2003:1, Quintelier, 2007:165). They may also be more mobile than older people and this prevents them from becoming integrated in a particular community. (Shea and Green, 2007) have also stressed the feelings of powerlessness which shortages of money and being at the bottom of the

job market can engender. The argument follows that as young people age and these initial problems are resolved, then they will be more likely to participate (Norris 2003:1).

This is because the resources available to them in terms of money, education, time and interest will be greater. This explanation can therefore be used to account for a curvilinear pattern in voter turnout and party membership where participation peaks in middle age (Norris 2003:1).

In response, some observers have stressed that there are also important **generational factors** at stake (Lyons and Alexander 2000:1014, Blais et al. 2004: 250, Henn Weinstein and Wring, 2002: 167). This dictates that socio-demographic and political changes over time influence participation of generations or cohorts differently. The important changes in socio-demographics across advanced democracies have meant that the boundary between where youth ends and adulthood begins has become blurred. Traditionally, adulthood coincided with leaving education, commencement of employment and starting of a family. (Quintelier 2007:165). By employing a broad framework such as exit, voice and loyalty, Robertson, (2009) combined the findings from each of these approaches in order to reach a greater understanding of youth political participation in Poland and Romania. More precisely, (Robertson, 2009) seek to use the framework to identify possible trade-offs between the different forms of participation and to compare this with existing study in established democracies.

Robertson's interpretation of exit, voice and loyalty and how these apply to the question of youth political involvement is as follows; **Exit** refers to the choice made by a young person to not only abstain from involvement in the traditional forms of political participation, voting and party membership, but to also opt out of informal forms such as volunteering and contentious politics (Robertson, 2009) **Voice** refers to the choice made by a young person, to become involved in political actions which have as their aim changing current policy or public opinion, this is most likely to take the form of involvement in informal modes of participation, and in particular in protest activities, but could also be evident in the choice to participate in elections (ibid). **Loyalty** refers to the choice made by a young person to engage in traditional forms of political participation, particularly by becoming a member of a political party. If the exit, voice, loyalty

framework is applied to the recent findings of studies of youth participation in established democracies, we find that although party membership and voter turnout has been seen to decrease, this does not necessarily mean that young people are exiting political life altogether.

Kwara State: Geography and Historiography

Kwara state was created in May 27, 1967 as one of the twelve states carved out of the then existing four regions. The state was first named Western -Central state before it was changed to Kwara states and can be consider as the cultural confluence of north and south, because of the ethnic diversity of the state. Kwara State has since 1976 reduced considerably in size as a result of further state creation exercises in Nigeria. On 13 February 1976, the Idah/Dekina part of the state was carved out and merged with a part of the then Benue/Plateau State to form Benue State. Again, On 27 August 1991, five local government areas, namely Oyi, Yagba, Okene, Okehi and Kogi were also excised to form part of the new Kogi State while a sixth, Borgu Local Government Area, was merged with Niger State (Kwara State Government, 2014: 20). The state at present consist of sixteen local governments of Asa, Baruten, Edu, Ekiti, Ifelodun, Ilorin East, Ilorin West, Ilorin South, Irepodun, Isin, Kaima, Moro, Offa, Oke Ero, Oyun and Pategi.

According to 2006 census, Kwara State's population stood at 2,365,353 and ranked 30th of 36 states (NPC, 2006). In the midst of the political activities toward the return to party politics in 1979, a political personality that was so much determined the trends and influence the politics of the State emerged (Saka, 2010: 10-22). That figure was late Abubakar Olusola Saraki a trained medical doctor practicing, having made his money from medical practice Dr. Saraki assiduously used his wealth to cultivate goodwill through philanthropist service to the people of the state. This was later to translate to political gain for the emerging politician in the former Kwara state (Saka, 2010: 10-22).

From 1979-1983, Dr. Olusola Saraki possibly only operated as a financier or benefactor to Alhaji Adamu Attah the first civilian Governor of Kwara State (Ayoade, 2008:85). The relationship turned sour and he withdrew the support, Chief Cornelius Adebayo who was in the Unity Party of Nigeria although he was in the National Party of Nigeria. Chief Cornelius Adebayo went ahead to win the gubernatorial election in Kwara in 1983. Dr Olusola Saraki was clearly the

deciding factor in the election as he had proved that whichever candidate he backed could win the election irrespective of party affiliation (Ayoade, 2008:85).

He performed the same feat in 1999 when he backed Commodore Mohammed Lawal (rtd) for the governorship of Kwara State and he won the election. At that time, both Lawal and Saraki belonged to the All Nigeria Peoples Party. (Ibid) But the relationship between Lawal and Saraki turned sour. Saraki decamped to the Peoples Democratic Party and sponsored his son, Dr. Bukola Saraki for the governorship of Kwara State against Mohammed Lawal. His son, Dr. Bukola Saraki defeated Mohammed Lawal. Once again, Dr. Olusola Saraki shifted support for candidate and political party and his candidate won the election. It thus appears, therefore, that the relationship between the benefactor and the beneficiary is smooth at last. (Ayoade, 2008:86).

Again the relationship between the senior Saraki and his biological son became sour as the choice of who succeed Dr. Bukola Saraki, as Kwara State governor created political tension and face-off between them towards the 2011 elections, the senior Saraki i.e the father and his biological son, Sen. Bukola Saraki engaged in the battle for the control of the political structure of the state. Having completed his mandatory two terms as Kwara State Governor, The junior Saraki backed his finance commissioner to succeed him Alhaji Abdulfatah Ahmed while, the senior Saraki, supported her daughter, Sen. Gbemi Saraki. The face-off led the Saraki senior to cross carpet to the Allied Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN). The candidate of the junior Saraki later won the election and thus, ever since, Bukola Saraki dethroned his father as the decider of Kwara politics. However, some sections of the public are of the opinion that the face-off between the father and the son is not serious, but had been rehearsed and planned.

The patron client relation is also evidenced in Kwara state. The patron client relationship headed, by the late Dr Olusola Saraki dynasty with enormous power and prestige, determined the outcome of political and electoral contest in the state. Political violence became glaring as the youth were mobilized by different political groups, parties, and leaders as agents of violence to be unleashed on perceive and real political opponents. This was the case in Kwara State in this present republic. In the state, youth groups were mobilized and utilized as agent of violence in the face-off between late Dr. Olusola Saraki, the Waziri of Ilorin and acclaimed godfather of

Kwara politics, and his then political godson, the late Rear Admiral Muhammad Lawal (rtd), and the then governor of the state. Youth violence masterminded by these political rivals manifested in all the stages of the electoral campaign towards the conduct of the 2003 general elections (Saka, 2010:10-22).

Aside the use of the youth as political thug, godfatherism limits political participation in some sort. First, the political godfather has a complete grip of the political party structure thereby personalized the selections of party officials and candidates for electoral contest. This lack of internal democracy in the political party system in Nigeria scheme out participant who may feels the political contest in Nigeria is too messy to get engaged. Second, the political godfather sees electoral contest as a form of investment in which there must be profit. In order to achieve electoral victory, that will guarantee access to the state resources, the electoral process is always been manipulated through various fraudulent means, particularly ballot slashing , unleashing violence during election period to scare people off to cast ballots and rigged themselves to power. The attendant violence during balloting have been the reasons where turn-out is always low, coming out to cast a ballots is seen as if one is attempting a suicide by family and friends. Furthermore, the process of political finance is dominated by a few urban elites who bankroll the party political structure at the local, states and the central level. The political finances are considered as a business venture in which there must be a return.

The godfather has become a scary phenomenon in Nigerian politics. It started as a benign political accretion of the position of either political notables or dreaded political rascals who are recalcitrant to the deterrence of the legal regime (Ayoade, 2008:85). For political notables, the attraction is that their credibility can sway political support such that they can determine the electoral fortune of candidates (ibid). The influence of some of those notables is only significant within the parties where they operate. Where such parties are dominant, their influence equally radiate the electoral landscape of the entire political constituency and their support can secure electoral victory (Ayoade, 2008:85).

After the demise of the former Governor, Rear Admiral Muhammad Lawal (rtd), the opposition to the Saraki dynasty influence on the state was minimally low. Thereby, the general election of

2007 in Kwara state was generally peaceful due to the weakness opposition. Hypothetically, we can say that the stronger the candidate(s) of opposition political party/parties, the higher the possibilities of electoral violence in Nigeria. Ever since the 2003 political upheaval in the state, the subsequent elections have been relatively peaceful with only pocketful of violence that normally characterized the Nigeria political scene.

Although, the choice of who succeeds Dr. Bukola Saraki as Kwara State governor created political tension in the state towards the 2011 elections, has the senior Saraki i.e. the Father and his biological Son, Sen. Bukola Saraki engaged in the battle for the control of the political structure of the state, having completed his mandatory two terms as Kwara State Governor. However, as we move closer towards the 2015 general elections, there have been reports of rising wave of violence in the state has witnessed attacks on party members and supporters in an orgy many see as avoidable violence in the state, that has allegedly lead to the death of a supporter of a political party in the state (Punch, February, 16, 2015).

Electoral violence mostly occurs in the conduct of an electoral contest before, during, and after elections. Most often they are directed at altering, influencing, or changing, by force, the voting pattern or manipulating the electoral results in favor of a particular candidate or political party (Ugoh, 2004). More importantly, political and electoral violence are orchestrated and sponsored by godfathers to ensure electoral successes of their political godsons and protégés using army of unemployed youth recruited, armed, and maintained by the godfather.

Methodology

The study engaged and used both primary and secondary sources of data. The required primary data were collected directly from the sample under study (Kwara youths of 18-35year bracket) through the use of a well structured questionnaire. The secondary data, on the other hand, were gathered from government gazettes, bulletin, magazines, journals, newspapers, articles, and relevant textbooks, materials from internet, term papers and archival documents on the subject area. . Therefore, the population for the study was choosing from the youth who reside in Kwara State at the time of carrying out this field work. Simple random sampling technique was used to select respondents for the administration of the questionnaire. The questionnaire contained both

closed and open-ended questions and was divided into two main sections. Each of the sections addressed a specific segment of the study. The first section of the questionnaire solicited information on the socioeconomic status or personal background of the respondents, such as age, sex, educational attainment, marital status, occupational status, state of origin, local government of residence in Kwara State and religion.

Table 4.1: Percentage of Questionnaire Distributed/Returned

Local Govt. Area	Copies of questionnaire administered	Copies of questionnaire returned	Percentages % of returned questionnaires
Ilorin South	75	72	96
Ilorin West	75	68	90.6
Irepodun	50	47	94
Moro	50	42	84
Offa	50	42	84
Kaiama	50	47	94
Total	350	318	90.857


Sources: Researchers' Finding, 2015

The second section dwells on the electoral behaviour, party membership/ partisanship attachment, membership of volunteer organisation, membership of religion group, access to sources of information such as radio, television and the internet. A total number of 350 questionnaires were administered in six (6) out of the existing sixteen (16) local governments in the state, two local governments, representing each senatorial district of the state. 75 each in the two local governments in Kwara central i.e. Ilorin west and Ilorin South Local Governments, this is not unconnected with the fact that Kwara central is the most populous of the three senatorial districts in the state. For balanced samples representation, 50 questionnaires were administered in other four local governments of Offa and Irepodun in Kwara South and Kaiama and Moro Local Governments of Kwara North senatorial district.

Table 4.2: Distribution of Respondents by Age Group

Age group (years)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
18-23	131	41.2
24-29	127	39.9
30-35	60	18.9
Total	318	100.0

Sources: Researchers' Finding, 2015



Result Findings

Table 4.3.1: Voters' Registration

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	239	75.2
No	79	24.8
Total	318	100.0

Sources: Researchers Finding, 2015

Table 4.3.1 above shows that, 239 (75.2%) of the respondents registered as voters, while 79 (24.8%) of the respondents did not register. This implies that, the youth are highly anxious to participate in the political process between 2011 and 2015.

Note that the voters' registration that was conducted for the 2011 general election was used for the printing of the permanent voters card (PVC) for the 2015 general election. Although, supplementary registration was carried out in some wards for two days towards the 2015 general election, as shown in figure 4 below, out of the 239 respondents who registered as voters, 123 (51.5%) registered to elect the right leader, 71 (29.7%) did it to exercise civic right, 18 (7.5%) did it to enjoy benefits of having a voter's card other than voting, 5 (2.1%) respondents were mandated to do so, while 22 (9.2%) of the respondents registered because of all the reason earlier stated. Figure 4, below is the bar chart of the respondents reasons for registering for voter card

Table 4.3.3: Frequency Distribution of People That Voted in 2011

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	179	56.3
No	139	43.7
Total	318	100.0

Sources: Researchers Findings, 2015

The above table shows that, 179 (56.3%) of the respondents voted during the 2011 elections, while 139 (43.7%) of the respondents did not vote. This shows a significant involvement in the electoral process of 2011. Figure 6 below shows that, out of the 179 respondents who voted in 2011, 104 (58.1%) voted to elect the credible leaders, 49 (27.4%) did it to exercise civic right, 18 (10%) did it to ensure democratic stability, while 8 (4.5%) of the respondents voted because they were offered money. Figure 6 below is the bar chart of the respondents' reasons for voting in 2011

Table 4.3.5: Plan to Vote in 2015


Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	229	72.0
No	89	28.0
Total	318	100.0

Sources: Researchers finding

The table 4.3.5 above shows that, 229 (72%) of the respondents plan to vote in the 2015 elections, while 89 (28%) of the respondents do not want to vote. There is a sharp increase of respondents who voted in 2011 and those that intend to vote in 2015. While 56.3% of the respondents voted in 2011 general election. 72% planned to cast ballot in the 2015 general elections.

Figure 10 below shows that, out of the 229 respondents who wanted to vote in 2015, 105 (45.9%) of them want to vote to elect the credible leaders, 69 (30.1%) want to vote in order to exercise civic right, 46 (20.1%) want to vote to remove bad leaders, 5 (2.2%) want to vote in order to ensure democratic stability, while 4 (1.7%) of the respondents want to vote in order to receive money. Figure 10 below is the bar chart of the respondents' reasons for wanting to vote in 2015.

Figure 13: Bar chart of planned voting pattern in the 2015 election



Source: Researchers Findings, 2015

Figure 13 above shows that, out of the 229 respondents who plan to vote in 2015, 209 (91.3%) of the respondents plan to vote in the presidential election, 87 (38%) of the respondents plan to vote in the senatorial election, 78 (34.1%) of the respondents plan to vote in the House of representative election, 138 (60.3%) of the respondents plan to vote in the governorship election and 71 (31%) of the respondents plan to vote in the House of assembly election. Of the 209 that plan to vote in the presidential election, 61 for their civic right, 47 to change the current one, 107 to elect credible individual, 13 to ensure democratic stability and 1 intend to vote because of the monetary benefit. Figure 14 displays the bar chart of the reasons behind the planned voting pattern in the 2015 election. The same also implies to other elections.


Table 4.3.7: Membership of a Political Party

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	59	18.6
No	259	81.4
Total	318	100.0

Sources: Researchers finding, 2015

Table 4.3.7 above shows that, 59 (18.6%) of the respondents are members of political parties, while 259 (81.4%) of the respondents are not members.

Figure 20: Bar chart of participation in demonstrations in last two years



Sources: Researchers' Finding, 2015

Figure 20 above shows that, 27 (8.5%) of the respondents participated in demonstrations once or twice, 16 (5%) participated several times, 18 (5.7%) participated often, 125 (39.3%) respondents had never participated and would never participate in demonstrations, 132 (41.5%) respondents had never participated but would participate if had the chance. Figure 20 above is the bar chart of the respondents' participation in demonstrations.

4.3.11 Membership of Any Religious Group, Voluntary Association or Community Group


Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	175	55.0
No	143	45.0
Total	318	100.0

Sources: Researchers’ Finding, 2015

Table 4.3.11 above shows that, 175 (55%) of the respondents are members of religious group, voluntary association or community group, while 143 (45%) of the respondents are not.

Figure 21 below shows that, 187 (58.8%) of the respondents often get news from radio, TV or Newspapers; 101 (31.8%) respondents sometimes get news from radio, TV or Newspapers; 19 (6%) respondents almost never get news from radio, TV or Newspapers; 11 (3.5%) respondents never get news from radio, TV or Newspapers. Figure 21 above is the bar chart of frequency of news gotten from radio, TV and Newspapers.

Figure 21: Bar chart of frequency of news gotten from radio, TV and Newspapers



Sources: Researchers Finding, 2015


Table 4.3.12: Access to Internet

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Often	216	67.9
Sometimes	89	28.0
Almost never	10	3.1
Never	3	0.9
Total	318	100.0

Sources: Researchers’ Findings, 2015

The table above shows that, 216 (67.9%) of the respondents often get access to the internet, 89 (28%) respondents sometimes get access to the internet, 10 (3.1%) respondents almost never get access to the internet, 3 (0.9%) respondents never get access to the internet.

Figure 22: Bar chart of responses on satisfaction on democracy




Sources: Researchers Findings, 2015

Figure 22 above shows that, 9 (2.8%) of the respondents are very satisfied with the way democracy works in Nigeria, 55 (17.3%) of the respondents are fairly satisfied, 17 (5.3%) of the

respondents are just satisfied, 148 (46.5%) of the respondents are not satisfied , 89 (28%) of the respondents are not at all satisfied.

Figure 23: Bar chart of responses on satisfaction on elected officials



Sources: Researchers’ Findings, 2015

Figure 23 above shows that, 16 (5%) of the respondents are very satisfied with the elected officials, 59 (18.6%) are fairly satisfied , 34 (10.7%) of the respondents are just satisfied, 131 (41.2%) of the respondents are not satisfied, 78 (24.5%) of the respondents are not at all satisfied with the elected officials.

Table4.3.13: Voting Helps to Pick Right Leaders

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	212	66.7
No	106	33.3
Total	318	100.0

Sources: Researchers Findings, 2015

Table 4.3.13 above shows that, 212 (66.7%) of the respondents believe that voting can help to pick right leaders, while 106 (33.3%) of the respondents do not believe that voting can.

Table4. 3.14: Youths Are Actively Involved In Politics

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	124	39.0
No	194	61.0
Total	318	100.0

Sources: Researchers Findings, 2015

Table 4.3.14 above shows that, 124 (39%) of the respondents believe that Kwara state youths are actively involved in politics, while 194 (61%) of the respondents do not believe that Kwara state youths are actively involved in politics.

4.4 Discussion of Main Findings

In chapter one, the arguments, questions, hypotheses and objectives were set out based on the expected relationship between youth political participation in Kwara state and the three explanatory variables (Voting turnout; which we discussed broadly as voting behaviour taking voter’s registration and casting of ballots in 2011 and intention to vote in 2015, political membership/ closeness to a political party and Engagement in a protest or demonstration. This chapter discusses the results of the logistic regression model analysis using the cross sectional data as discussed above.

4.4.1 Discussion of Findings on Voting Behaviour of Kwara Youth 2011-2015

The descriptive statistics showed that respondents were actively participated in the voter’s registration with over75.5% of the respondents been registered voters (Table, 4.3.1). Although, voter’s registration does not necessarily translate to turning out to vote, but its shows a great sense of engagement in politics in Kwara state. (Table, 4.3.3) actually supported the above claim, as only 56.3% of those who have voter’s card voted in 2011 elections. The reason giving for participating in voters’ registration and voting in 2011 differ, 51.5% (Figure, 4) and 58.1% (Figure, 7) did so to elect credible leaders respectively .We can argue that the Kwara youth are aware of the power of their balloting.

Generally, electoral participation is one of the three main indicators of democratic performance. According to (Dalton, 1988: 56) citizen involvement in the political process is essential for democracy to be viable and meaningful. Voting, though it requires little initiative and cooperation with others, is the most visible and widespread form of citizen involvement. This notwithstanding, electoral turnout is declining in most democracies (Blais 2006: 111).

In their studies of voter's apathy in Nigeria, (IDEA, 2011) and Sylvia, et al (2013), observed that voters turnout in presidential elections had recorded a low turnout, for instance, 52. 26% of eligible voters actually voted in 1999, it increased in 2003 to 69.08%, declined in 2007 to 57.49% and it's further slipped to 53.58% in 2011. From the survey carried out by the (Afrobarometer, 2007) Nigerians consistently support democracy but are much less enthusiastic about the way that democracy actually worked in their country- From a high percentage of 84% in 1999, immediately after the transition to democracy. Popular support for democracy plummeted to a low of 25% in 2005 before rebounding in 2007 to 39%. This observation by Afrobarometer reflected the votes cast in 2007 and 65% of Nigerians believed the 2011 election was better than that of the previous election in 2007 (Afrobarometer, 2013).

As a result of high fertility rates combined with low levels of life expectancy, Nigeria is currently grappling with an increase in youth demographic. In fact, the median age of Nigeria is 17.9 years compared with 42 years for Europeans (NPC, 2006), and the youth within the age bracket (18-35) comprise 31.7 per cent of Nigeria's population, youth unemployment also remains high in Nigeria, it stood at 24% (world Bank, 2011) and approximately 72 per cent of Africa's youth live on less than two dollars a day (World Bank 2009).

There is an increase on the percentage of those who intend to cast ballots in 2015 election. With 72% said they plan to cast ballot(s) in 2015 elections (Table, 4.3.5). The Presidential election having the highest number of intending voters, 91.3% and the Governorship election 60.3%, (Figure, 13). However, we can't verify if they actually voted, but the important message is that Kwara youths tend to vote in the executive elections when compare with that of parliamentary elections at both federal and state level. This trend was also reported by (INEC and FES, 2011)

commission report on the 2011 elections. The report found that more Nigerians of voting age captured indicated plans to vote during Presidential and Gubernatorial elections than in the National Assembly (NASS) election. The intention to vote during the gubernatorial election was as expected; Governors are closer to voters than the President. However, preference to vote more during the Presidential election compared to National Assembly election can be explained by historical tendency of the Nigerian electorate to consider elections into executive positions in the federation to be more crucial than elections into legislative seats, among other factors.

The actual voter's turnout announced by INEC for the March 28 election and April 11 elections also supported this claim. The 2015 presidential election had 43.65% turn out (INEC, 2015). However, the actual turnouts for other elections are not available at the time of this analysis. It was generally believed that the turnouts for the March 11, 2015 election were lower compare to that of the Presidential and NASS election. The reason to elect credible leaders was the highest reason given for participation in all elections in 2015(Figure, 14). We found out that, 46.5% and 28% of respondents are not satisfied and not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Nigeria respectively. Also, 41.2% and 24.5% of respondents are not satisfied and not at all satisfied with the performance of elected official. Only 2.8% of respondent were satisfied, 17.3% were fairly satisfied with elected officials (Figure, 23). The results of the respondents' perception on democracy and elected officials also show the same trend as the result of (Afrobarometer, 2015) indicated that, Only 29% are "very satisfied" or "fairly satisfied" with the way democracy is working in Nigeria, while 68% are "not very" or "not at all" satisfied. Although, our result suggest that 66.7% believe voting help pick right leaders (Table, 4.3.13). (Afrobarometer, 2015) also shows that despite the negative perception on democracy and elected officials, two-thirds (65%) of Nigerians favour democracy as the best form of government, a decrease from 69% in 2012, and one in five (21%) say non-democratic forms can sometimes be preferable.

The logistic regression of the voting behaviour of Kwara youth for the 2011 to 2015 using the voter's registration, voting in 2011 and intention to vote in 2015and full hypotheses interpretation were also given. We hypothesized, that local government of residence is independent of voter's registration, voting in 2011 elections and intention to vote in 2015 elections i.e. Local government of residence don't have any significance on the variables under discussion. The findings shows that not only that local government of residence has significant

bearing on the independent variables but others factors also had influence on the variables. On voters' registration, Based on the p-values in the results presented by (Appendix1) and the backward selection results given by (Appendix 2), the factors that influence voters' registration are LG of residence, years of residing in the LGA, age, religion, occupation, level of satisfaction by democracy and opinion on voting helping to pick right leaders. The odds ratios are interpreted as follows; the odds of a youth residing in Ilorin-west LG being a registered voter are 2.071 times those of a youth in Ilorin-south (reference category). Also, the odds of a youth residing in Irepodun LG are 1.984 times those of a youth in Ilorin-south, those of a youth residing in Moro are 2.648 times those of a youth in Ilorin-south, those of a youth residing in Offa are 1.679 times that of a youth in Ilorin-south, while those of Kaiama LG are 3.376×10^8 times that of a youth in Ilorin-south (see also, Figure 6).

Likewise, the odds of a youth whose age is in the bracket 18-23 are 0.998 times those of a youth whose age bracket is 30-35 (reference category), while those of whose age is in the bracket 24-29 are 2.48 times those of a youth whose age bracket 30-35. The odds of a youth whose religion is Islam being a registered voter are 3.239 times those of a youth who practice other (reference category) kind of religion (apart from Christianity), while those of whose religion is Christianity are 1.215 times those of a youth who practice other kind of religion (apart from Islam). The odds of a youth who has a paid-employment being a registered voter are 6.421×10^8 times those of a youth who is a student (reference category), those of a youth who is self-employed are 1.099 times those of a youth who is a student, while those of a youth who is unemployed are 3.305 times those of a youth who is a student.

Furthermore, the odds of a youth who is very satisfied by the way democracy works in Nigeria being a registered voter are 1.261 times those of a youth who is not at all satisfied (reference category), those of a youth who is fairly satisfied are 2.979 times those of a youth who is not at all satisfied, those of a youth who is just satisfied are 8.808×10^8 times those of a youth who is not at all satisfied, while those of a youth who is not satisfied are 0.871 times those of a youth who is not at all satisfied. Also, the odds of a youth who believes voting can help choose the right leader being a registered voter are 3.190 times those of a youth who doesn't believe that voting can help choose the right leader (reference category). The odds of a youth being a

registered voter increases by 1.043 per one year increase in duration in residing in LG of residence (Appendix 2 and Figure 6).

Based on the p-values in the results presented by (Appendix 3) and the backward selection, the factors that influence voting in 2011 elections are LG of residence, years of residing in the LGA, age, gender, education, marital status, membership in religious groups, voluntary organization or community group and opinion on voting helping to pick right leaders. The odds ratios are interpreted as in the case of voters' registration. The odds of a youth residing in Ilorin-west LG voting are 1.25 times those of a youth in Ilorin-south (reference category) and so on (also see, Figure 9). The study finds out that age has been one of the major factors responsible for turning out to vote in general election. The youth between the ages bracket of (24-29) have the highest number of turning out to vote. Although, we postulated that the older one get, the possibility of coming out to cast a ballot particularly in the mid year period. However, the finding as provided in the (Appendix 3) shows a decline of voting during the 2011 general election among the age bracket of (30-35) when compare with others.

In order to proof further for the reason for this trend, we observed that age singlehandedly can't explain the voting behaviour of Kwara youth but there are also others factors. The others factors are the socio-economic status of the electorate. When age alone is insufficient to explain the decline among the age bracket (30-35) that voted in 2011 general, the high rate of unemployment among this group can be a factor, given the fact that majority at this age are graduate. Notwithstanding, this study finds out that education plays significant role in the decision to cast a ballot or not. The findings however show that those with the only primary school education had the highest ratio of those who voted in 2011. While the odd ratio for a youth with Post-secondary other than university is lower when compare with those with University degree.

Membership of voluntary organization, community group and religion association also had significant influence on the electoral turn out in 2011 general election. As argued by Quintelier, (2008: 355-370) engaging in voluntary activities increase political participation, the impact of voluntarism to political engagement has not gained more currency in Africa literature. The act of voluntarism itself is on the low level in Nigeria. The marital status of respondents has influence on voting turn out in 2011 with the married having significance in the turning-out in 2011. The

impression that marriage brings along with it, the sense of responsibilities and to decides on government policies as it affects not only the couple but, also their dependents. The confidence in the electoral system also can be factor for casting ballots during the 2011 election. Finally, the result also shows that the odd ratio of male respondents who said they voted in 2011 elections is higher than the female.

For the 2015 general election, Based on the p-values in the results presented by (Appendix 4 and Figure 12) and the backward selection, the factors that influence decision to vote in 2015 elections are LG of residence, years of residing in the LGA, age, gender, religion, education, marital status, access to newspapers, radio or TV, level of satisfaction by democracy and opinion on voting helping to pick right leaders. The odds ratios are interpreted as in the case of voters' registration and 2011 elections. The odds of a youth residing in Kaiama LG voting in 2015 are 17.259 times those of a youth in Ilorin-south (reference category), the male is 2.152 times likely to vote in 2015 election to female. However, unlike the 2011 result as shown above, the plan to vote in 2015 shows that education actually influence decision to vote, those with post graduate education 2.965×10^{10} odd ratio/ are likely to vote when compare with those without formal education. And higher than the other level of education as provided for in the (Appendix 4). Satisfactions with democracy influence the decision to cast ballot in 2015, with odd ratio $3 \times 163 \times 10^{10}$ are likely to vote to those who are not at all satisfied with democracy. Finally, those who believe that voting help pick a right leader are also more likely to vote than those who don't believes (Appendix 4).

4.4.2 Discussion of Findings on Party Membership/ Closeness to a Political Party among Kwara Youths

The descriptive statistics of (Table 4.3.7) shows political party membership among Kwara youths to be very low. Only 18.6% of respondents say they are member of a political party. This shows that Kwara youths are not likely to be a member of political party. In other words, Kwara youths prefer voting in an election as a means of political participation to been a member of a political party. While 56.3% voted in 2011 elections, 72% say they plan to cast ballot(s) in 2015 elections (Table, 4.3.5). 54.2% respondents say they joined a political party to support credible leaders, 18.6% joined a political party as a means to contribute to the political development of the state. The low party membership can be attributed to what LaPalombara refers to as "lack of inter-

generational transfer of political affiliation” (Adebayo, 2006:69) which is as a result of prolonged military dictatorship. (Figure 16) shows that 56.4% of respondents who say they are not member of political party believe they are not just interested to be a member of a political party, 18.9% believe that Nigeria politics is too messy for their likeness, while 6.6% say they are not just ready of being a member of political party. As shown in (Table, 4.3.8), 37% of respondents believe they are close to a political party. Closeness to a political party doesn't not necessarily mean individual is a member of a political party, but a supports for a party's' candidate(s), policies and programmes as stated by the party manifestos. We can argue that Kwara youths believe closeness to political party is enough for them to be attached politically. Another interesting finding from party membership is that 73.3% of those who say they are close to a party believes, that they are close to All Progressive Party (APC), while 25% are close to Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP). The result of the general elections from the state supports this claim, where APC wins the presidential election, Governorship, all three Senate's seats in the state, all six House of Representatives and House of Assembly seats in the state.

The logistic regression of the party membership of Kwara youth based on the p-values in the results presented by (Appendix 5) and the backward selection, the factors that influence membership in political parties are LG of residence, occupation, membership in religious groups, voluntary organization or community group, access to newspapers, radio or TV, level of satisfaction by democracy and opinion on voting helping to pick right leaders. The result of the logistic regression as its concern party membership implies that age, level of education and gender are not at all influence decision to join a political party.

The odds ratios are interpreted as in the case of previous regression models. The odds of a youth residing in Kaiama LG being a member of a political party are 3.261 times those of a youth in Ilorin-south (reference category).(also see, Figure 19) The odds ratio of self employed being a member of a political party is 4.832 to a student, 1.874 for paid employed and unemployed 0.886 respectively. This implies that self employed are likely to join a political party than those of the paid employed, unemployed and students. The paid employed can either be in public or private sector. Those in public servant are expected to be non-partisan and this can be a contributing

factor for this trend. For the unemployed seeking for employment may contribute to the less political membership among this group.

4.4.3 Discussion of Findings on Protest or Demonstrations among Kwara Youth

The descriptive statistics of (Table 4.3.7) shows that Kwara youth are not likely to engage in a protest. 41.5% say they have never engaged in protest but, would if had the chance and 39.3% say no and would never. By this result, out of the three variables, protest is the least form of political engagement among Kwara youth. The factor(s) responsible for this can further be x-rayed. Our findings suggest that only (8.5%) of respondent say they participated in demonstration once or twice, (5%) participated several times while (5.7%) participated often, despite the fact that the fuel subsidy protest in 2012 gained wider participation in Ilorin the state capital, and the only place apart from Lagos where protesters were killed.

The regression logistic based on the p-values in the results presented by (Appendix, 5) and the backward selection, the factors that influence protesting are LG of residence, occupation, membership in religious groups, voluntary organization or community group, access to newspapers, radio or TV, level of satisfaction by democracy and opinion on voting helping to pick right leaders. The odds ratios are interpreted as in the case of previous regression models. The odds of a youth residing in Kaiama LG being a member of a political party are 3.261 times those of a youth in Ilorin-south (reference category). The self employed are likely to engage in a protest than any student with the odd ratio of 4.832, membership of a voluntary organization, religious group e.tc are more likely to engage in a protest than non members.

4.4.4 Discussion of Findings on Youth Political Participation in Kwara State 2011-2015

On the whole, majority of the respondents believe that youth are not actively involved in politics of the state, 61% of them say the youth participation is low (Table 4.3.14). On the causes of low political participation of youth in Kwara state, 20.6% have no idea of the cause, 14.9% say godfatherism hinder youth political participations, meaning, majority consider it as a menace inhibiting youth political participation. In addition, 13.9% say older politicians are not retiring, and therefore, the space for their participation is limited. The recycling of politicians in Nigeria is a recurrent thing. Nigerians politicians consider politics as a business, in which they need to continually make investment for personal gains.

The elder politicians who serve during the first republic and in the military eras are still more around and command great influence on the polity. The former military officers cum politicians, who served in different capacities as military heads of state, governors, ministers and head of parastatals, with two staging a comeback as civilian President (Olusegun Obasanjo, 1999-2003 and Muhammedu Buhari, as the president-elect 2015), while some had served and still serving as their state executive governors, members of National Assembly. The lopsided political structure in the state and Nigeria which favour the elites and the political class is also consider to be a challenge for the youth political involvement. The high cost of electioneering campaign, nepotism, corruption and the messy nature of politics in Nigeria need urgent revisiting and solution. Furthermore, only 5.7% believe unemployment hinder political participation (4.3.15).

On steps that should be taken to encourage youth participation, 23.9% of the respondents believe enlightenment and education of the youth is necessary for improving on participation and also youth mobilization. Political socialisation and social justice will encourage youth to participate and get involved. The fact that respondents see godfather as a menace to their participation, only 0.9% thinks curbing it will encourage youth participations (Figure 25). The mobilisation of the youth through various community organisations, such as Ilorin Descendant Progressive Union and Offa Progressive Union etc, students' Union Governments of higher Institutions, occupational associations such as artisans and National Union of Road Transport Workers should be sustained.

The logistic regression base on the P-Value of (Appendix 1) shows that local government of residence is a determining factor of youth political participation in the state. The two local governments in Kwara North senatorial district have the highest odd ratio of a youth participating in the state when compare to the other four. Kaiama led by 4.793×10^8 odd ratios to Ilorin South (reference category). This implies that, the youth in Kaiama Local Government to be politically more active than any other local governments in the state, Moro Local government follows with 2.728 odd ratios to Ilorin South L.G our (reference category). The reason for this can be proven further.

In another analysis, the age ratio of a youth within the (24-29) is 1.241 to a youth within the age bracket (30-35) (reference category) and 0.687 for (18-23). Participation tends to increase from

the age bracket (18-23) to (24-29) and decrease among (30-35). What account for this trend may be that, at the latter years, respondents are graduate, unemployed and lack social security and as a result they see no need for participations? Or being employed in government agencies which demand non partisanship? Unlike the age, participation tends to increase with higher education with only those with primary education are likely to get involved politically than those with the secondary school (Appendix 1). The married are also likely to participate than the single, divorced and the separated. Membership of a voluntary organisation and religious group, access to radio, Television and Newspaper, Access to internet, satisfied with democracy, satisfied with elected officials, voting help pick right leaders and indigene (Kwaran) are all factors for political participation in Kwara State.

Conclusion

The central concern of this study is to examine the youth political participation in Kwara state using the variables of voting behaviour, political party membership and engagement in protest and demonstration within the time frame of 2011-2015 and to investigate factors that shaped the pattern of the youth political behaviour in the state within the time of reference.

The study of the youth political participation has gained more research attention in developed democracies and factors of the life-cycle and generational effect had been found to be a major determinant of the level of participation in that part of the world. However, the unstable Nigeria democratic system over the years has just made the study of this distinct group political engagement a new area of research. The period effects of the colonialism, military authoritarianism, with poor political socialisation limit the participation only to the political elites who also control the state's resources.

One of the goals that characterised this research is to divert from the previous methods of studying youth political participation basically on electoral violence to the use of quantitative method in investigating their political participation based on the variables of voting, party attachment /membership and engaging in protest and demonstrations. The second objective is to investigate the patterns of relationship between age and political participation and those contributing factors that shape the youth political participation in Kwara state in particular and Nigeria in general.

On voting behaviour, this study reveals that, the age group of (24-29) is likely to register as a voter, voted in 2011 and plan to vote in 2015 than any age group in this study. Other factors that affect voting are local government of residence, year(s) of residing in the local government, level of education, satisfaction with democracy and opinion on voting help pick right leader. Furthermore, the factors that influence membership in political parties are LG of residence, occupation, membership in religious groups, voluntary organization or community group, access to newspapers, radio or TV, level of satisfaction by democracy and opinion on voting helping to pick right leaders. The factors that influence protesting are LG of residence, occupation, membership in religious groups, voluntary organization or community group, access to newspapers, radio or TV, level of satisfaction by democracy and opinion on voting helping to pick right leaders. This study concludes that apart from age, local government of residences, level of education, and occupational status, years of residing in local government, marital status, gender, satisfaction of democracy, satisfaction of the elected officials, indigene of the state, access to radio, television, newspaper and internet are all factors that determine the political participation of youth in Kwara state.

To a fair extent, some of the objectives set out have been met. However, there are number of limitations to this study. First, the selected variables and their explanatory variables are too numerous to be understudy at a single research, especially when there is paucity of literature as it relates to Nigeria. Second, the number of respondents is considered to be small and a larger population will be required to validate or reject the findings in this study. In addition, a state-wide analysis would have been more validating.

Appendix 1

Results of full logistic regression model

	Coefficient	Standard error	Degrees of freedom	P value	Odds ratio
LG of residence			5	0.740	
Ilorin-West	0.499	0.534	1	0.350	1.648
Irepodun	0.704	0.614	1	0.252	2.021
Moro	1.004	0.705	1	0.154	2.728
Offa	0.410	0.605	1	0.498	1.507
Kaiana	19.988	4.990 x10 ³	1	0.997	4.793 x10 ⁸
Years of residence	0.050	0.029	1	0.084	1.052
Gender (Male)	0.782	0.420	1	0.063	2.185
Age			2	0.522	
18-23	-0.376	0.847	1	0.657	0.687
24-29	0.216	0.817	1	0.792	1.241
Religion			2	0.075	
Islam	1.136	1.452	1	0.434	3.115
Christianity	0.188	1.417	1	0.894	1.207
Education			5	0.340	
Primary	21.568	4.019 x10 ⁴	1	1.000	2.327 x10 ⁹
Secondary	20.754	4.019 x10 ⁴	1	1.000	1.031 x10 ⁹
Post-secondary other than University	21.912	4.019 x10 ⁴	1	1.000	3.282 x10 ⁹
University	21.955	4.019 x10 ⁴	1	1.000	3.428 x10 ⁹
Post-graduate	22.301	4.019 x10 ⁴	1	1.000	4.842 x10 ⁹
Occupation			3	0.716	
Paid employment	31.100	5.383 x10 ³	1	0.995	3.211 x10 ¹³
Self-employment	-0.176	0.673	1	0.794	0.839
Unemployed	0.874	0.812	1	0.282	2.397
Marital			4	0.252	
Single	1.295	4.050 x10 ⁴	1	1.000	3.651
Married	3.217	4.050 x10 ⁴	1	1.000	24.960
Separated	1.861	4.050 x10 ⁴	1	1.000	6.430
Divorced	-16.730	4.068 x10 ⁴	1	1.000	<0.0000001
Member of religious group etc.	-.554	0.403	1	0.169	0.574
Access to radio, TV etc.			3	0.258	

Often	0.206	0.987	1	0.834	1.229
Sometimes	-0.219	0.986	1	0.824	0.804
Almost never	-1.728	1.319	1	0.190	0.178
Access to internet			3	0.935	
Often	-18.045	1.808 x10 ⁴	1	0.999	<0.0000001
Sometimes	-18.334	1.808 x10 ⁴	1	0.999	<0.0000001
Almost never	-17.710	1.808 x10 ⁴	1	0.999	<0.0000001
Satisfaction by democracy			4	0.474	
Very satisfied	0.766	1.133	1	0.499	2.152
Fairly satisfied	1.269	0.696	1	0.068	3.557
Satisfied	21.844	7.814 x10 ³	1	0.998	3.067 x10 ⁹
Not satisfied	0.284	0.457	1	0.534	1.328
Satisfaction by elected officials			4	0.733	
Very satisfied	-0.996	0.956	1	0.298	0.370
Fairly satisfied	-0.332	0.665	1	0.618	0.718
Satisfied	0.111	0.751	1	0.883	1.117
Not satisfied	-0.473	0.509	1	0.352	0.623
Voting pick leaders (Yes)	1.298	0.423	1	0.002	3.661
State of origin (kwaran)	0.353	0.454	1	0.437	1.423
Constant	15.022	4.435 x10 ⁴	1	1.000	3.343x10 ⁶

Sources: Researchers Findings, 2015

Note: the missing categories in the table are the reference categories

Appendix 2

Results of final logistic regression model using backward selection for voter's Registration

	Coefficient	Standard error	Degrees of freedom	P value	Odds ratio
LG of residence			5	0.484	
Ilorin-West	0.728	0.476	1	0.126	2.071
Irepodun	0.685	0.499	1	0.170	1.984
Moro	0.974	0.545	1	0.074	2.648
Offa	0.518	0.522	1	0.321	1.679
Kaiama	19.637	5.261 x10 ³	1	0.997	3.376 x10 ⁸
Years of residence	0.042	0.023	1	0.066	1.043

Age			2	0.071	
18-23	-0.002	0.626	1	0.998	0.998
24-29	0.908	0.632	1	0.151	2.480
Religion			2	0.021	
Islam	1.175	1.334	1	0.378	3.239
Christianity	0.195	1.322	1	0.883	1.215
Occupation			3	0.415	
Paid employment	20.280	4.792 x10 ³	1	0.997	6.421 x10 ⁸
Self-employment	0.094	0.531	1	0.859	1.099
Unemployed	1.196	0.715	1	0.095	3.305
Satisfaction by democracy			4	0.281	
Very satisfied	0.232	0.966	1	0.810	1.261
Fairly satisfied	1.091	0.576	1	0.058	2.979
Satisfied	20.596	8.580 x10 ³	1	0.998	8.808 x10 ⁸
Not satisfied	-0.138	0.385	1	0.720	0.871
Voting pick leaders (Yes)	1.160	0.346	1	0.001	3.190
Constant	-2.310	1.613	1	0.152	0.099

Sources: Researchers Findings, 2015

LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF PARTICIPATION IN 2011 ELECTION ON VARIOUS FACTORS

The tables below are results of the logistic regression analysis using backward selection method to determine factors that significantly influence participation in the 2011 elections. The results are given below. Only the results of the analysis when all the insignificant factors have been removed by the backward selection procedure are presented here in the table below.

Note: the missing categories in the table are the reference categories.

Appendix 3

Table 43: Results of final logistic regression model for 2011 elections using backward selection

	Coefficient	Standard error	Degrees of freedom	P value	Odds ratio
LG of residence			5	0.040	
Ilorin-West	0.223	0.399	1	0.577	1.250
Irepodun	0.436	0.440	1	0.322	1.546
Moro	-0.447	0.485	1	0.357	0.640

Offa	1.174	0.476	1	0.014	3.234
Kaiama	0.994	0.569	1	0.081	2.703
Years of residence	0.047	0.017	1	0.007	1.048
Gender (Male)	0.537	0.298	1	0.071	1.711
Age			2	0.000	
18-23	-0.976	0.482	1	0.043	0.377
24-29	0.282	0.452	1	0.533	1.326
Education			5	0.094	
Primary	23.948	4.019 x10 ⁴	1	1.000	2.515 x10 ¹⁰
Secondary	21.786	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	2.894 X10 ⁹
Post-secondary other than University	22.941	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	9.184 X10 ⁹
University	22.968	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	9.434 X10 ⁹
Post-graduate	22.629	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	6.725 X10 ⁹
Marital			4	0.073	
Single	23.102	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	1.079 X10 ¹⁰
Married	24.313	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	3.621 X10 ¹⁰
Separated	24.120	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	2.987 X10 ¹⁰
Divorced	22.527	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	6.073 X10 ⁹
Member of religious group etc.(Yes)	0.512	0.279	1	0.067	1.669
Voting pick leaders (Yes)	0.574	0.310	1	0.064	1.775
Constant	-47.353	5.684 X10 ⁴	1	0.999	0.000

Sources: Researcher's Finding, 2015

LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF PLAN TO PARTICIPATE IN 2015 ELECTION ON VARIOUS FACTORS

The tables below are results of the logistic regression analysis using backward selection method to determine factors that significantly influence plan to participate in the 2015 elections. The results are given below.

Only the results of the analysis when all the insignificant factors have been removed by the backward selection procedure are presented here in the table below.

Note: the missing categories in the table are the reference categories.

Appendix 4

Results of Final Logistic Regression Model for 2015 Elections Using Backward Selection

	Coefficient	Standard error	Degrees of freedom	P value	Odds ratio
LG of residence			5	0.025	
Ilorin-West	0.057	0.455	1	0.900	1.059
Irepodun	0.536	0.529	1	0.312	1.709
Moro	1.414	0.575	1	0.014	4.112
Offa	0.005	0.486	1	0.992	1.005
Kaiama	2.848	1.125	1	0.011	17.259
Years of residence	0.084	0.023	1	0.000	1.088
Gender (Male)	0.767	0.337	1	0.023	2.152
Religion			2	0.076	
Islam	1.465	1.477	1	0.321	4.327
Christianity	0.726	1.471	1	0.621	2.068
Education			5	0.080	
Primary	23.792	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	2.152 X10 ¹⁰
Secondary	22.197	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	4.367 X10 ⁹
Post-secondary other than University	23.173	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	1.159 X10 ¹⁰
University	23.075	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	1.050 X10 ¹⁰
Post-graduate	24.113	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	2.965 X10 ¹⁰
Marital			4	0.017	
Single	-16.235	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	.000
Married	-14.620	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	.000
Separated	-15.430	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	.000
Divorced	-19.061	4.019 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	.000
Access to radio, TV etc.			3	0.009	
Often	-0.649	0.938	1	0.489	.523
Sometimes	-1.494	0.954	1	0.117	.225
Almost never	-2.808	1.218	1	0.021	.060
Satisfaction by democracy			4	0.799	
Very satisfied	1.302	1.167	1	0.264	3.677
Fairly satisfied	0.260	0.532	1	0.625	1.297
Satisfied	21.875	8.306 X10 ³	1	0.998	3.163 X10 ⁹
Not satisfied	0.310	0.373	1	0.406	1.363
Voting pick leaders (Yes)	0.837	0.345	1	0.015	2.309
Constant	-8.894	5.684 X10 ⁴	1	1.000	.000

Sources: Researchers Finding, 2015

Based on the p-values in the results presented by (Appendix 4) and the backward selection, the factors that influence decision to vote in 2015 elections are LG of residence, years of residing in the LGA, age, gender, religion, education, marital status, access to newspapers, radio or TV, level of satisfaction by democracy and opinion on voting helping to pick right leaders.

The odds ratios are interpreted as in the case of voters' registration and 2011 elections. The odds of a youth residing in Kaiama LG voting in 2015 are 17.259 times those of a youth in Ilorin-south (reference category) and so on.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP ON VARIOUS FACTORS

The tables below are results of the logistic regression analysis using backward selection method to determine factors that significantly influence political party membership. The results are given below.

Only the results of the analysis when all the insignificant factors have been removed by the backward selection procedure are presented here in the table below.

Note: the missing categories in the table are the reference categories.

Appendix 5

Results of Final Logistic Regression Model for Political Party Membership Using Backward Selection Method

	Coefficient	Standard error	Degrees of freedom	P value	Odds ratio
LG of residence			5	0.028	
Ilorin-West	0.416	0.510	1	0.414	1.517
Irepodun	-0.746	0.720	1	0.301	.474
Moro	-0.548	0.712	1	0.442	.578
Offa	0.722	0.581	1	0.213	2.059
Kaiama	1.182	0.511	1	0.021	3.261
Occupation			3	0.005	
Paid employment	0.171	0.458	1	0.708	1.187
Self-employment	1.575	0.454	1	0.001	4.832
Unemployed	-0.121	0.552	1	0.827	.886
Member of religious group etc.(Yes)	0.614	0.355	1	0.084	1.848
Access to radio, TV etc.			3	0.550	
Often	19.724	1.068 X10 ⁴	1	0.999	3.681 X10 ⁸

Sometimes	19.742	1.068 X10 ⁴	1	0.999	3.749 X10 ⁸
Almost never	20.725	1.068 X10 ⁴	1	0.998	1.002 X10 ⁹
Satisfaction by democracy			4	0.095	
Very satisfied	1.597	0.889	1	0.072	4.940
Fairly satisfied	1.386	0.523	1	0.008	3.998
Satisfied	0.725	0.873	1	0.406	2.065
Not satisfied	0.796	0.449	1	0.076	2.216
Voting pick leaders (Yes)	1.270	0.455	1	0.005	3.563
Constant	-23.958	1.068 X10 ⁴	1	0.998	.000

Sources: Researchers Findings, 2015

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