

ANTI-CHINA PROTESTS TURN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS?: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA AND AFRICA

Bryan Winter

Doctoral candidate in Geography, School of Geosciences, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida, U.S.

ABSTRACT

Over the last few years, localized anti-China protests have broken out in both Africa and Asia. While most have been linked to China's growing influence in the world, the motivations for these protests vary geographically and need to be understood in national contexts. This paper presents a brief examination of the similarities and differences between recent anti-China protests that have taken place in Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, and Zambia. The paper notes whether these instances of anti-China sentiment are movements that have been systematically organized, impromptu in nature, or have the potential to become wide-spread movements. I argue that these recent anti-China protests can be broadly sorted into two distinct categories: (1) nationalistic protests in opposition to China's territorial claims; and, (2) protests spurred by China's authority over natural resources outside of China. While anti-China protests in and around these four countries have all been triggered by China's immense need for natural resources and raw materials, the demonstrative responses to the perceived overuse of power by China have, however, not been universal in nature.

Keywords: Anti-China protests, social movements, nationalism, China, Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, Zambia

Introduction

On December 9, 2012, police in the Vietnamese capital of Hanoi dispersed over 200 anti-China protestors demonstrating their anger against China's claim to large swaths of resource rich waters in the South China Sea. Beginning their protest in front of the Hanoi Opera House in the city's

center the protestors took to the streets of central Hanoi's historic Hoàn Kiếm district carrying banners exclaiming "Down with China!" and "China's military expansion threatens world peace and security!" (*The Guardian*, 2012). In the end, 20 demonstrators who refused to disperse were detained by police and rounded onto a bus which quickly left the scene (*The Guardian*, 2013). Vietnam is not the only country where small-scale anti-China protests have occurred. A few months earlier, over 1,000 people in Manila, Philippines protested over what they saw as Chinese intrusion into Philippine waters, an area believed to be rich in oil and abundant in other natural resources. In the Philippines, like in Vietnam, anti-China protests have persisted into 2015 being spurred by China's increased presence in waters of the South China Sea understood to be sovereign by both Philippines and Vietnam. In 2013, a Global Day of Protest against China by Filipinos in Manila, Los Angeles, London, Sydney, Rome, and Israel organized by the West Philippine Sea Coalition (WPSC) a group named after the term used by the Philippine Government referring to the international waters on the country's west coast (*The Diplomat*, 2013) was initiated as a citizen-organized demonstrative action against China.

Anti-China demonstrations in both Vietnam and the Philippines have not ceased but have in fact become more widespread and aggressive in recent years. As the long-standing territorial disputes between China and its surrounding neighbors become potentially the largest "flashpoint" for confrontation in Asia (*Reuters*, 2013), anti-China protests in the region have grown in number. Additionally, anti-China protests like those mentioned above have also occurred in Japan as rekindled territorial disputes and historically-based friction between the two countries combine for a potentially dangerous geopolitical situation. Further, outside of Pacific Asia, anti-China protests have also occurred in Zambia regarding resource and economic exploitation in rural areas and towns of the southcentral African nation.

This paper does not engage with discourses concerning the implications of a now global China (Shirk, 2008), nor does it attempt to involve itself with discussions linked to the strategic and geopolitical chess game unfolding between China and the West in both Africa and the Pacific (Sautman and Yan, 2014; Odgaard, 2007). This paper does, however, present a brief examination of the similarities and differences between recent anti-China protests that have taken place in

Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, and Zambia as well as noting if these instances of anti-China sentiment are movements that have been systematically organized, impromptu in nature, and the reasons for protest. I argue here that these recent anti-China protests can be sorted into two distinct categories: (1) nationalistic protests in opposition to China's territorial claims; and, (2) protests spurred by China's authority over natural resources outside of China. Anti-China protests are not simply or exclusively a response to China's rapid rise as a regional and world superpower, but are more directly a response in which nations where anti-China protests occur see China impinging on their sovereignty.

While anti-China protests in Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, and Zambia are all triggered by China's immense need for natural resources within or near these countries' borders, the demonstrative responses to the perceived overuse of power by China have, however, not been universal in character with some having large followings and others being minute in number. As one can presume, anti-China protests are distinctly shaped by the political, economic, and historical interactions between China and the individual nation where anti-China protests have recently taken place. Anti-China protests in Japan, for instance, are often fueled by right-wing politically-motivated elements of civil society who are reflecting historical angst toward China as well as the Japanese government's rigid stance over island disputes in the East China Sea, whereas in Zambia resource extraction by China has fueled protests linked to unfair wage labor.

The countries where anti-China protests have recently occurred are not only analyzed through the lens of how and why they take place but also from the viewpoint of how wide-spread anti-China sentiment is within that country. These concerns spring from the comparative nature of the two primary questions that I try to answer in this paper: First, what are the similarities and differences among these recent anti-China protests? And, secondly, can these protests be seen as movements that are systematically organized or have potential to become social movements? In addition, this short paper seeks to add the lack of literature on anti-China protests around the world.

After briefly discussing the limited literature connected to the topic this paper describes the origins of anti-China sentiment in the Asia-Pacific region and Africa. It then describes the

characteristics of different protests within the context of natural resource-based themes, and provides some examples of what might be called anti-China movements. In this paper, the territorial and resource claims by China will be only briefly mentioned. My primary concern here takes into account the characteristics of recent anti-China protests in Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, and Zambia that have been fueled by China's need for natural resources and their possibility of becoming social movements.

Literature

The need to understand anti-China protest is compelling, not merely because China's unprecedented growth since the end of the twentieth century has placed it in a dominant position to expand its influence in the world—though that is reason enough—and not simply because anti-China protest in the non-Western world has gone largely ignored by social scientists. Indeed, it is compelling in both a practical and intellectual basis. In practical terms, the comparing of anti-China protests can help explain and elaborate not only the differences between protests but also if there are any patterns of anti-China sentiment between them. Unfortunately, theories involved with protest have had little to do with resource acquisition and conflict with other nations while even fewer have involved protests against China. In an intellectual sense, the comparing of anti-China protests can help us determine the long-term effects of such demonstrations and to hopefully see if these various anti-China protests may develop into something larger such as a large-scale movement.

Scholarship on anti-China sentiment has been minimal and has not been poised to show in a comparative sense the motivations which develop into anti-China protests around the world. In the case of Asia, academic works on anti-China protest are surprisingly rare. Without question, over the last decade and a half, China has vigorously stamped its influence on the African political and economic landscape (Negi, 2008). Hence, it is no surprise that the occurrence of Chinese investment in Africa has grabbed the attention of social scientists from a myriad of disciplines. Studies on the implications of China's influence in Africa have been especially focused on geopolitics (Mawdsley, 2007; Wenping, 2007), and international economics (Alden

and Davies, 2006) leaving little research being conducted on the actual presence of Chinese in Africa and the anti-China sentiment that has sporadically arisen over the last few years.

Negi's (2008) research shows how China's rise and its control of vital oil and mineral reserves in Africa has led to uneasiness in the West spurring an immediate castigation of China as simply being the newest colonial power in Africa. Negi (2008) contends that despite the rising instances and protests of resentment in Africa over China's uneven presence there, the need to situate China in specific African contexts is vital to understand the causes of anti-China sentiment there. Furthermore, in the Zambian case, Negi (2008) makes clear that the benefits of the copper mining boom that have taken place in the country over the last decade have been widely seen by Zambian workers as unjustly accruing to only Chinese mining companies who bought up and run the copper mines during the privatization process that occurred across the African continent during the 1990s. Similarly, Lim (2012) has shown how local media have fueled anti-China sentiment in Zambia. Certainly, Zambia has been the location where anti-China sentiment in Africa has been among the strongest (McGreal, 2007).

Literature regarding anti-China protests in Asia are surprisingly absent in scholarly writings also; thus, making this paper a short preamble to the subject. Manuscripts covering anti-China sentiment in Asia have focused primarily upon events such as territorial disputes (see Goldstein, 2011; Thayer, 2011) and the issue of Tibet (see Barnett, 2009; Riviera, 2012), leaving not only a gap as to how and why anti-China protest arise in other Asian nations, but also how they differ. Overall, despite the lack of detailed works on anti-China sentiment in Africa, and Asia in particular, there is a clear distinction between the motivational factors that lead to anti-China protest in these two regions. By placing anti-China protests that develop in Africa and Asia in two distinct categories (territorial disputes, and, anti-colonial sentiment) we can begin to better understand the motivations and factors that contribute to the development of anti-China protests in the non-western world.

Data and Methods

To provide a discussion on the differences between anti-China protests in Japan, The Philippines, Vietnam, and Zambia, it is crucial to investigate how exactly the mobilization of protestors is organized. In order to decipher the differences in anti-China protests, I examine online media sources from around the world during the period of 2008 to the present. Examining recent anti-China protest allows us to not only see why these protests occur, but how they are organized. The use of media sources, such as online newspapers, are important because of their ability to provide factual data on the protests, as well as allow for a comparative approach when studying numerous protests that may take place over a period of time. Anti-China protests usually occur after a confrontational incident between China and the protest country making online newspapers from around the world useful in exploring what made people protest as well as providing background information regarding the conflict that sparked the protest.

The paper takes both a descriptive and comparative approach to determine how anti-China protests have taken place, as well as how they differ from one another. However, as anti-China protests in the four countries examined here have only occurred recently, a comparative-historical approach (see Mahoney, 2004) was not used and a more discussion-based approach was followed for this introductory paper on the topic of anti-China protests. Recent anti-China protests are diverse in both form and goal. However, the four cases briefly investigated here are linked through some aspect of China's natural resource claims or extraction. With this in mind, this paper will present only a handful of places where resource-based anti-China protests have occurred.

The Origins of Recent Anti-China Protests

Since economic reforms were commenced in 1979, China's economy has become liberalized and shifted from a planned socialist economy to a free-market capitalist economy. China's leadership continues to define a course in which China is not simply seen as a third world country but a regional and world superpower (Shirk, 2008; Wang and Liu, 2007). When coupled with China's growing military power, rising diplomatic and economic influence abroad, a growing thirst for natural (especially petroleum) resources, and its refusal to have its sovereignty chastised by

international law (Saul, 2013), conflicts have inevitably arisen between China and smaller nations in the region like Japan, Philippines, and Vietnam among others. Certainly, the recognition of independent states to declare permanent sovereignty over their natural resources in the interests of economic development was one of the major achievements of international legalities post-World War II (Saul, 2013). However, the anti-China protests and sentiment focused upon in this paper— while certainly not the only places where anti-China protests exist — are the products of resource-based controversies between the protestors’ home nation and China. In Pacific Asia, we see that anti-China protests are closely aligned to political sovereignty and territorial claims as opposed to labor rights and worker protection in Chinese-driven investments in Africa.

Asia Pacific Region: Japan, Philippines, and Vietnam

It is not easy to compare anti-China protests in East Asia from those in Africa – despite all being motivated in some way by natural resource extraction – as the two regions have been placed in different positions because of their recent historical-political relationship with China. Furthermore, as one might imagine, anti-China protests within Asia are also diverse when compared with each other. Nevertheless, anti-China protests in the Asia-Pacific region have been fueled by at least one, or a combination of, two major factors in regards to China: first, a strained historical relationship in which both political and militaristic conflict in the past has affected present views; and second, the overwhelming regional dominance of China whom less economically developed nations see as a militaristic, economic, and overbearing threat. The former suggests that recent anti-China protests have not randomly materialized and show that governments in these countries have experienced dark episodes of historical discord with China while the latter suggests that current uneven power relations have been the cause for protest (see Figure 1).

Table 1. Major Anti-China Protests in Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, and Zambia from 2008 – 2016.

Date	Location	Number of Protestors
March 3, 2008	Sinazongwe, Zambia	600
October 22, 2010	Sinazongwe, Zambia	500
June 28, 2011	Hanoi, Vietnam	200
July 18, 2011	Hanoi, Vietnam	400
May 11, 2012	Manila, Philippines	300
July 8, 2012	Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam	200
July 19, 2012	Tokyo, Japan	700
July 22, 2012	Tokyo, Japan	2700
July 22, 2012	Hanoi, Vietnam	200
August 5, 2012	Hanoi, Vietnam	100
August 6, 2012	Sinazongwe, Zambia	1300
September 12, 2012	Manila, Philippines	>1,000
September 22, 2012	Tokyo, Japan	1,000
December 9, 2012	Hanoi, Vietnam	200
June 2, 2013	Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam	<100
July 24, 2013	Manila, Philippines	400
November 12, 2013	Sinazongwe, Zambia	400
May 15, 2014	Hanoi, Vietnam	>1,000
May 16, 2014	Manila, Philippines	300
December 27, 2015	Pag-asa Island, South China Sea (Philippine nationals)	50
November 9, 2015	Manila, Philippines	250
June 12, 2016	Manila, Philippines	>500

Source: Gathered from multiple online international newspapers covering the protests.

The reason for developing these broad yet useful frameworks is twofold: First, as noted above, is that history has played a crucial role in the character of anti-China protest within Japan, Philippines, and Vietnam, while moreover, when combined with current political infrastructure has determined the growth and suppression of these protests as the two examples from Vietnam and Philippines have shown in the beginning of this paper.

In the Asia-Pacific region conflict between China and its neighbors has taken place in both the East and South China Seas where rapidly changing power dynamics, divergent economic interests, heated political rhetoric, historical grievances, and untapped natural resources have

spurred popular nationalism and occasional naval skirmishes (Goldstein, 2011). In regards to the South China Sea, large-scale military exercises by China began to occur in August of 2010 which clearly demonstrates the growing regional tensions in the area. Friction between China and its neighbors was strained further in May of 2011 when incidents occurred between Chinese naval vessels and ships from both Vietnam and the Philippines in which the Vietnamese ships sustained heavy damage (Goldstein, 2011). An Australian analysis of the situation was opined in the *Sydney Morning Herald* (2011, in Goldstein 2011) that: “Governments around the Pacific are preparing for war with China...all are terrified of China...not just wary or suspicious...but existentially terrified” (p. 322).

Anti-China protests have not developed in the same way nor are they undertaken in the same ways in Japan, Vietnam, and The Philippines. Japan and The Philippines have the most frequent and wide-spread protests when compared to Vietnam and is no doubt a reflection of a more active civil society than that in Vietnam who remains under an authoritative regime. However, protests in Vietnam have included violence against Chinese nationals living in Vietnam. In Japan, anti-China protests have stemmed from tension between the Chinese and Japanese government's claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands group in the East China Sea in which Tokyo's Governor, Shintaro Ishihara, “purchased” the islands in September of 2012 with cash collected from a national fundraising campaign (Smith, 2013: 27). The resource rich waters surrounding the islets, unsurprisingly, resulted in China condemning Japan's island-purchasing and labeling such as provocations that impinged on Chinese territory. In turn, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga exclaimed “The [Chinese] intrusion into territorial waters is extremely regrettable. In any case, the Senkaku Islands are Japan's own territory without a doubt!” (*International Business Times*, 2013). The islands' geographic location in the East China Sea continues to remain a contested space between Beijing and Tokyo to this day fueling both Anti-Japanese and Anti-China protests within both countries. The development of anti-China protests in Japan is also partly due to the mobilization of protestors by the right-wing advocacy group Ganbare Nippon.

Like Japan, anti-China protests in the Philippines have arisen due to the escalation of tension between the Philippine and Chinese governments over the ownership of Scarborough Shoal, an islet roughly 140 miles west of the Philippine island of Luzon. Perlez (2012) has shown that central to the dispute are sovereignty claims by both countries concerning territorial rights and the richness of the sea beds in providing large energy reserves. However, unlike Japan, many of the recent anti-China protests are organized by the left-wing Akbayan Citizens' Action Party, a social movement group and political party whose main goal as stated on its website is to promote "greater participation in public-decision making" (www.akbayan.org). In Vietnam, protests have evolved out of disputes with China over the Spratley and Paracel island groups both of which are uninhabited but are believed to hold large undersea oil and gas reserves. Anti-China protests in Vietnam contrast greatly to those that take place in Japan or The Philippines in two major ways: First, anti-China protests in Vietnam are quickly quelled because they take place in under an authoritarian regime, however, protests were allowed to continue after reports of a Vietnamese fishing boat was rammed by a Chinese naval vessel in June of 2013. Secondly, protests in Vietnam do not seem to be organized in any way by a particular institution and are ad hoc in nature.

Although the formation, organization, and radicalism of anti-China sentiment in these countries differ, the tension with China over natural resources has also led to protestors claims regarding sovereignty. The formation of anti-China protests in Asia are strongly influenced by local politics as the critical themes section of this paper will show.

Zambia and Anti-China sentiment in Africa

Perhaps the most characteristic of a social movement among the four cases analyzed here is that of Zambia. China has invested all over Africa, but Chinese owned copper mines in Zambia have witnessed particularly violent conflicts on matters related to wages and work conditions that have sharpened increasing dislike of Chinese. China and Zambia have shared a close relationship built upon anti-imperialism and later on the need for mutual economic development (Taylor, 2006). Yet, as Negi (2008: 54) has shown, opposition to China has grown in Zambia and has been increasingly seen as a "foreign exploiter" (p. 54) in four key ways. First, frequent mining

accidents, poor work conditions, and the spread of worker unrest at Chinese-owned copper mines has been highly publicized throughout Zambian media. Second, copper is not only central to the Zambian economy but also to Zambian identity and the dominance of China in the copper mining industry has proved problematic. Third, Zambia's Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), a political party in the country, maintained extremely close ties to China which eventually brought intense conflict among other parties. Finally, the Patriotic Front Party (PF), another Zambian political party, has continuously pointed the finger at China for dominating and dictating economic development in the country.

China has remained the African continent's largest trading partner. After 2010, the amount of trade boomed to nearly 200 billion dollars, an increase of around 33% from the previous year. A trade dependence has developed between Africa and China. As Tiffen (2014) points out, numerous Africa countries have remained central as sites of affordable resource extraction for China's ever-growing and consumption oriented society in which Namibia is one of the largest suppliers of fish, Cote d'Ivoire providing "a vast majority" of China's cocoa, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali supplying nearly a quarter of China's demand for cotton, and roughly one third of China's oil supplies being extracted from Nigeria and Angola to which much investment in housing stock has been invested there. Zambia has remained a key source of copper and precious metals for China and it has been in the country's Copperbelt region where anti-China protests have remained the most fervent. As China's presence in poor rural regions and towns begins to take influence on the everyday livelihoods of Zambian residents as well as on working conditions, it is no surprise that small-scale anti-China protests have stemmed from the region.

Different Types of Anti-China Protests

Territorial Disputes

One of the major themes within anti-China protests is in regards to a struggle for regional power. This is characteristic of the anti-China protests that occur in Japan. For example, the dispute over a tiny stretch of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea between the two countries has been the subject of an intermittent diplomatic spat since the early 1970s and has been ever-intensifying over the past few years. Known for its high possibility of undersea oil reserves the Senkaku

islands as they are called in Japan, and as the Diaoyuislands in Chinese, are also crucial in drawing an economic and political border between China and Japan. China, which says it has a claim to the islands dating back to ancient history, has repeatedly sent ships to their vicinity in a show of strength and its citizens have previously tried to land there to hold protests with counter-protest landings made by nationalist Japanese (Smith, 2013).

While some anti-China protests in Japan have been ad hoc, the largest of which have been organized by Ganbare Nippon, a right-wing advocacy group known for its attention-grabbing demonstrations and large-scale events criticizing opponent parties such as the Democratic Party of Japan as well as regional foreign policy with Korea and China (Nagata, 2011). On September 22, 2012 nearly 1,000 Japanese marched through downtown Tokyo protesting against China's claims to the disputed islands. Organized by Ganbare Nippon, the highly nationalist group assembled the protestors as a response to anti-Japanese protests that took place in Beijing days earlier (Kurtenbach, 2012). Carrying signs stating "Sink the Chinese boats in our waters" and "Do not give in to the Beijing terrorists" the Ganbare Nippon protestors made their way to the Chinese consulate in Tokyo (Kurtenbach, 2012).

Despite the continuation of anti-China protests in Japan, when compared to anti-Japanese protests in China, they are small. There is little evidence showing that these anti-China demonstrations have the potential to turn into a social movement as their demands are largely nationalistic in nature. However, the historical enmity between the two countries has allowed for a mutual distrust and resentment for each other largely due to the brutality of the Japanese invasion during the Second World War. While these anti-China protests do not seem to be movements in general, the regional implications of such demonstrations have had profound economic after effects with hundreds-of-millions of dollars lost due to decreased trade between China and Japan (RT.com). Because the majority of large anti-China protests in Japan are organized by Ganbare Nippon, the likelihood of these protests transforming into a social movement in the country is slim. Ganbare Nippon has consistently taken a radical stance towards Japanese politics and maintains only a small following.

Anti-China protests in Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam have all been in regards to territorial disputes with China. Yet they have all been unfolded in a different ways. In Vietnam, despite anti-China protests being quickly suppressed by police, demonstrations have continued to persist across the country. Initially, a number of anti-China protests were allowed by the one-party Communist state, but later clamped down detaining dozens of people in 2012 (*The Australian*, 2012). Because of the strength the Vietnamese state has in suppressing group protest, a large-scale social movement against China is unlikely for two major reasons. First, China and Vietnam have had a tense and violent history making protest in Vietnam against their giant neighbor to the north making anti-China protests a delicate topic for the state to handle. Second, many of the anti-China protestors involve citizens who are also somewhat critical of the government (*The Australian*, 2012). However, most anti-China protests in Vietnam are nationalistic in nature rather than political.

Over the last few years, a series of intense protests across Vietnam have occurred. During May of 2014, anti-China protests across the country spurred much international concern about the stability of the region. On May 15, 2014, 21 people died and around 100 injured across Vietnam when violent protests erupted across the country. In the southcentral province of Ha Tinh, angry crowds destroyed and set on fire Chinese-owned factories in an industrial park while chasing down Chinese nationals who worked there (Hodal and Kaiman, 2014). Clashes with police also took place during the protest. In the end, 5 Vietnamese and 16 Chinese were killed in the protests while nearly 100 were sent to the hospital. Of further concern, was the revealing that the factory was not owned by China, but Taiwan, in which Taipei later condemned the protests as reckless and careless (Hodal, 2014a). The violent protest was set into motion after Vietnam's condemnation of China stationing an oil rig 150 miles off shore of the Vietnamese coast. A few days after the storming of the factories in southcentral Vietnam, an elderly woman died after setting herself on fire in downtown Ho Chi Minh City in support of Vietnamese fisherman (*The Guardian*, 2014). After the escalation of anti-China protests across Vietnam, China evacuated around 3,000 Chinese nationals from Vietnam (Hodal, 2014b).

In the Philippines, anti-China protests have frequently occurred. Like Japan, territory disputes between the Philippine and Chinese governments have sparked citizens to mobilize asking China

to “stop bullying” in the South China Sea (*Pinoy Weekly*, 2013). Despite the frequency of protests, a recent study by the US-based think tank Pew Research Center noted that two in every five Filipinos perceive China as an “enemy,” but roughly 90 percent of the respondents believe the sea disputes are a major problem (*Pinoy Weekly*, 2013). The largest organizer of anti-China protests in the Philippines has been the West Philippine Sea Coalition (WPSC). A coalition formed out of various Filipino groups in the summer of 2013, the WPSC’s primary goal is to raise awareness over China’s over use of power against the Philippines while also calling for China to be a responsible leader in the region. Further, a global anti-China protest day in July of 2013 was organized by WPSC.

The WPSC is comprised of numerous former Philippine officials and is headed by former Interior Secretary Rafael Alunan III. Filipino media describes the coalition as being made up of “former government officials, youth leaders, netizens, and even Filipino-Americans” (Keck, 2013). The former National Security Adviser Rolio Golez told media that “This [global anti-China] rally is only going to be the start of something that we intend to become bigger, not only in the Philippines but worldwide, in order to tell the world what is happening in our backyard – the bullying that’s being done by our big neighbor” (Keck, 2013). The global day of protest led to demonstrations taking place across the world where Filipinos live. The main site of the protest was outside the Chinese consulate in Makati City, Philippines, just outside Manila, where crowds of more than 3,000 were estimated to have taken part.

The anti-China protests in the Philippines have also escalated due to a lack of communication over the island disputes between the two governments (Keck, 2013). However, the anti-China demonstrations organized by the WPSC are primarily to raise awareness of the issue. The WPSC’s protests claim that China has been occupying maritime territory that the Philippines claim as their own. In May of 2014, a Filipino-Vietnamese joint protest took place in Manila demanding China cease drilling in contested waters in the South China Sea. The several hundred protestors needed to be blocked by riot police as they marched on the Chinese consulate in the Philippine capital (*The Straits Times*, 2014). Furthermore, in December 2015, around 50 Filipino youths took a symbolic protest against China as they sailed to a remote Philippine-controlled island in the South China Sea. The tiny island of Pag-asa was the site of their week-long protest

against China's claims to the strategic and symbolic waterway (Mogato, 2015). In short, the anti-China protests which have taken place in Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam differ greatly from each other in their motivation, form, and frequency. Certainly, anti-China protests that have erupted in the Philippines have been characterized by the most diversity in the form of island protests, world-wide days of protests among Filipinos, marches on Chinese consulates, and even a temporary call for a nation-wide boycott of Chinese goods in the country. In Japan, much anti-Chinese sentiment stems from right-wing citizens highly critical of the Japanese government's handling of international affairs concerning both China and the United States. Finally, Vietnam has remained the only place in Pacific Asia where anti-China protests have turned violent. However, anti-China protests in Zambia have also involved violence and have erupted for very different reasons.

Anti-Colonial Sentiment

As mentioned above, China has invested heavily in Zambia's copper and coal mines. Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) now represents around 30% of FDI flowing into the country and jumped from over 330 million USD to around 540 million USD in 2014 alone. However, China's growing influence in Zambia over the past decade has spurred labor-related protests, political instability, and at times violence. Chinese companies are not only in charge of many of the copper mines that are central to the Zambian economy; they are also running restaurants, shops, and farms which many Zambians argue displace them and their right to work. On September 23, 2011, Zambian opposition leader Michael Sata became president of the country winning 43 percent of the total votes (Associated Press, 2011). Sata ran a campaign based on anti-China rhetoric which threatened to expel "bogus" Chinese investors and create a Zambia for Zambians (Associated Press, 2011). Despite Sata failing to expel Chinese managers who control the mines slight pay raises have occurred for miners in the hinterlands of Zambia. Through his anti-China rhetoric, Sata maintained a large following of anti-China sentiment and the promotion of economic nationalism through the party he led, the Patriotic Front (PF). Sata, in the words of Negi (2008) "exploited the latent dissatisfactions [with China] while further fueling them" (p.53). Sata's 2006 campaign criticized "the continued control outsiders" over the Zambian copper industry leading Sata to second-place in the presidential election of that year. PF won

every urban parliamentary seat in Zambia's Copper-belt Province (Larmer and Fraser, 2007), the region most impacted by Zambia's privatization (Negi, 2008).

Sata would not be successful in his push for the presidency until 2011. Through Sata's "populist campaign" opposing China's domination of the Zambian economy (Negi, 2008: 54) tensions have risen between Zambian and Chinese. In 2005, five Zambian miners were shot and wounded by managers during a riot of mineworkers. Five years later, in 2010, at another Chinese-owned mine, violence erupted between Zambian miners and Chinese managers over the delayed paying of wages owed to the miners. That same year, one miner died in a police cell after a dispute he had with one of the Chinese managers at the same mine (Mutale, 2011) and thirteen miners were wounded when their managers responded by firing live rounds at them. Incidents such as these led to a rapid increase in support for Sata who remains as Zambia's president today.

Negi's (2008) research on anti-China sentiment in Zambia has shown that popular Zambian beliefs of the Chinese in Zambia have become soured over the past few years, escalating tension not only at the mines and workplaces but within other aspects of daily life as well. As is often the case, many Zambians "do not know what they [the Chinese] are doing here" and are commonly coupled with racist undertones against the Chinese. In Zambia, popular politics can have the ability to enforce changes in state strategy and vice versa. Initially, anti-China sentiment was primarily located at the mines in which Chinese managers oversaw their Zambian workers. However, tension has escalated over the Chinese' infiltration of the town markets and has led to serious racial disputes within Zambia.

While an active social movement against China has not occurred in Zambia, there remains the possibility that China's growing influence in Africa may spark a large-scale movement against the Chinese who have begun to be seen not as developers, but as colonizers. While anti-China rhetoric during Michael Sata's presidential campaign was well organized, the sporadic anti-China protests have been ad hoc in nature. Furthermore, it remains to be seen how Zambians will react after Sata has exclaimed that China will remain an integral part of the Zambian economy. In October of 2011, Sata stated, "When we were campaigning people complaining about the

Chinese and I promised that I will sort the Chinese out...They are also going to sort me out and so we are going to use them to develop” (*Lusaka Times*, 2011). Drastically changing from his earlier anti-China rhetoric, Sata further exclaimed:

Don’t blame the Chinese, blame yourself because the Chinese are willing to work, they are very hard working people...use them [the Chinese] properly and if you find there are more Chinese on one job, don’t blame the Chinese, blame the immigration officer who gave them work permits. Do they deserve those work permits? (*Lusaka Times*, 2011).

Clearly the rapid change in political relations between Sata and the Chinese could lead to further instability between civil society and the Chinese who now work and live in Zambia. However, a large-scale anti-China movement has not occurred under Sata and remains to be seen if one will in Africa’s largest copper mining nation.

Conclusion

In Vietnam, anti-China protests have become widespread and have largely been fueled by historical enmity between the two nations stemming from their 1979 border war. However, anti-China protests in Vietnam, as well as Zambia, have been the two places where violence has occurred from such protests.

It is fascinating to see the different motivations for developing anti-China protests. While this paper shows that in Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, and Zambia, there is an unlikelihood of these anti-China protests escalating into something larger than they already have; the protests themselves have been formed in different ways and by different groups. This is important to understand as China’s influence in the world grows and the competition for resources continues.

Anti-China protests in the Philippines have been the most wide-spread in regards to frequency and numbers. The West Philippine Sea Coalition is a menagerie of political and social groups united in speaking out against what they see as Chinese aggression against its neighbor. In Japan, the protests are frequently organized after anti-Japan protests occur in China. The anti-China

protests that take place in Japan are fueled by historical enmity between the two countries and a geopolitical rivalry regarding maritime borders. Vietnam's anti-China protests have been less frequent than those in Japan or the Philippines but have nonetheless spread quickly across the Southeast Asian country. The anti-China protests that have occurred over the last few years in Zambia are because of China's ownership of many copper mines in the country. Initially, anti-China protests in Zambia occurred because of the miners' poor working conditions and decreasing wages but have now grown into the towns where many Zambians see the Chinese living there as an economic threat to their livelihoods since the Chinese living there can sell goods at decreased prices. However, at the root of these protests are the questions being asked by local Zambians as to when they will reap the rewards of their government's deals with China?, since it is them doing the arduous work that makes international investment possible.

China's growing influence in the world may surely continue to give rise to these demonstrations. It is the hope of this paper to introduce and suggest the need to better understand these types of protests that have occurred in Pacific Asia and in parts of Africa. For instance, how do these anti-China protests compare to anti-America protests that have stemmed from the United States' global influence? How do they compare with the frequent anti-China protests which have occurred recently in Hong Kong or Taiwan? Are anti-China protests only a temporary issue that has stemmed from China's rapid rise as a global superpower and will these protests persist into the future in the four countries that have been investigated in this paper?

This work has provided a short introduction to the development of anti-China protests which have recently occurred in four countries. It has also shown that there are two major categories for anti-China demonstrations; 1) for territorial and sovereignty claims, and, 2) against a perceived domination of resources and labor in a quasi-colonial manner. Certainly, this paper can only be seen as a preliminary investigation of the anti-China protests which have taken place over the last few years in these countries. My hope in this work is to spark more interest and work on the topic of anti-China protests because they may very well continue as China's need for natural resources and its growing influence in the world can potentially lead to conflict with other nations at many scales. The lack of scholarship on anti-China protests reveals that there is a

fertile ground for further examination of not only where or why anti-China protests occur, but how they are developed and organized in Asian and African contexts.

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