

## **SUBSIDISING BOKO HARAM TERRORISM? STAKEHOLDERS' DISCORDANCE AND THE TRIAL OF THE ONGOING COUNTER TERRORISM IN NIGERIA**

**Samuel O. Oyewole**  
Security Analyst, Nigeria

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### **ABSTRACT**

Boko Haram (BH) terrorism is increasingly becoming a national and international security concern among Nigeria's stakeholders. This horrendous array of targeted mass killings has continued to flourish at the backdrop of weak institutional capacity of Nigerian government. This paper attributes government's weak institutional capacity and the emergence of BH terrorism to the long experienced stakeholders' discordance. We also argue that government weakness has returned to place stakeholders' trends perception at the core of BH discourse. Consequently, the historical stakeholders' suspiciousness are exposed, as the need to device viable counterterrorism measures is causing trends perception discordance, which cycle back to sharpen the existing stakeholders' discordance. This paper observes the trends and impacts of stakeholders' discordance on the Nigeria's counterterrorism measures among other.

**Key Words:** Boko Haram, subsidising terrorism, stakeholders' discordance, counter terrorism.

### **INTRODUCTION**

Ever since its activation in 2003, Boko Haram (BH) has remained thorny in Nigeria's security calculus. Long before they became mainstream flash points on intelligence networks and the choice topic of discussion in offices and newspaper vendor spots; the group *Jama'atu ahus Sunnah da awaatil Jihad* (People of the Way of the Prophet Muhammad--peace be upon

him) known in common parlance as BH had existed in self alienation in Maiduguri (Abdulkadir 2011). It is emerging from the northern Nigeria to violently oppose secular and religious authorities as it seek to mobilise Nigeria's politically alienated, economically marginalised, and largely youthful northern populations with its expanding array of targets and gradual adoption of modern terror tactics in a new and deeply alarming turn (Cooke 2011).

The sect operations include bombing, explosion, killing, maiming and massive destruction (Abolurin 2011:70). Its operations have left about 2000 dead (Olalekan 2012:2). Therefore, it is truly becoming a season of death in the Northern Nigeria. As it were, the fear of BH is increasingly gaining the appellation of the begging of wisdom in the present day Nigeria, as the country's security continues to depreciate with BH activation. Thus, it has distinguished itself from other Islamic sects with terrorism (Isa 2010). Today, BH threats and audacious acts have now pushed the sect to the front burner of national discourse (Gabriel 2011).

The appeal for truce is crucial, because tears have continued to flow in different parts of the North and Abuja, as BH seemed to have stepped up its evil campaign (Suleiman 2012:50). Under this condition, threat remains imminent and there emerges an overriding need to chart a viable counter terrorism strategy. Meanwhile, viable counterterrorism strategy is demanding ability to capitalise on terrorist vulnerability for success. Such consideration include host of valuable nubs in terrorists network like leaders, patrons, friendly activists, sources of arms supply, new recruits and financial resources (Kuperwasser 2009:138-139). Thus, rooting out these nubs' subsidies is strategic in successful counterterrorism (Owens 2009). Worryingly, however, urgent policy needed to stabilise the country have continued to meet stakeholders' discordance, which have emerged as obstacles for government to work out a concise policy plan against BH terrorism. Accordingly, President Jonathan recently acknowledged that this is the most complicated issue in the country's history (Mordi 2012:43). In his words, 'efforts to stamp out terrorism in the country were being hampered by politics' (Abimboye 2012:15).

As stakeholders' discordance is weakening the government, it also enhances trends perception of discordance among stakeholders on BH discourse. We therefore argue that stakeholders' discordance is the root cause of BH terrorism. Consequently we explore the fragile state of stakeholders' discordance, government's weak institutional capacity, the

sensitiveness of trends perception on BH subsidies and their impacts on the ongoing counterterrorism. We further discuss factors that are accountable for trend of declining discordance in our conclusion and the resultant degree of counterterrorism success against BH.

## STAKEHOLDERS' DISCORDANCE AS THE FOUNDATIONAL CAUSE OF BH TERRORISM

Stakeholder is a concisely defined actor with a vested interest to secure in a given phenomenon. Stakeholder is a party with an established link and defined interest, featuring independently/dependently within/outside an organised discourse. For our focus, two levels of analysis (domestic and international levels) are used in such a way that we distinguish local stakeholders from their international counterparts. Nevertheless, this attempt is limited, as the line between global and local events becomes increasingly blurred; we cannot but appreciate the structure of evolving glocal stakeholders in this discourse (cf Oyeniya 2009).

Stakeholders' discordance is a context where parties with vested interest in an organised discourse valiantly advance incompatible position or trends perception, with little or no headway for compromise. Relationship is anchored on perception, and critical issues are determined by trends perception. Accordingly, we argue that trends perception discordance is the foundation of stakeholders' discordance. However, one of the challenges of trends perception discordance is that, with time, it often develops stakeholders' suspicion.

In Nigeria, stakeholders' discordance is a product of the relationship between the domestic vulnerability and the international sensitivity. Moreover, trend of events reflected a growing internalised battle, as the country's vulnerability is sprouting foreign interests' apostles that have successfully branded themselves as local. Consequently, we are left to gather mush from domestic scene with references at international level. Hence, without discarding connection between the two, we assume that domestic discordance is required for international intrusion.

At the domestic level, history of stakeholders' discordance on vital national issues has reduced the state's viability. Because, no matter the intention of the Nigerian state in executing those goods that only justifies its existence, stakeholders' discordance is an ever

present limitation. As a result, virtually all events in the country's history have been mounted by conflicting trends perceptions (cf Diamond et al. 1997; Falola 1998; Osaghae & Onuwudiwe eds. 2007; Osaghae 2011; Tamuno 2012). Often and dangerously, these discordances are sensitively modelled by ethnic, regional and religious identity, or their combination. Obviously, foremost issue of high stakeholders' discordance in Nigeria revolves around Sharia discourse, and this explains why the issue of BH is even more important.

At the international level, globalisation is creating meaningful and considerably powerful stakeholders in domestic affairs of all states across the world. Weak states like Nigeria are more affected by this development. For states like Nigeria, domestic challenges have created greater vulnerability and unlimited intrusion from external stakeholders. Primarily, as suggested by the concentric circles of Nigerian foreign policy, the neighbouring states in West Africa are core to Nigerian security, hence, Nigeria is a stakeholder in their affairs and vice versa. As the Nigeria's stakeholders' discordance in this consideration further suggests; the relationship between the Muslim world and the Western world has also produced some external stakeholders for Nigeria, most especially, in the recent past. The IMF and World Bank imposed adjustment programme is reference memory that such consideration will include non-state actors. However, attempt by these external stakeholders, to erect pulpit in the country, has re-driven us to glocalisation of stakeholders.

One will comprehend such discordance if the country is evaluated with special consideration to criteria adopted by Fund for Peace's Failed State Index. Rating along 1 to 10, ranging from excellent, good, moderate, weak to poor; its 2012 report rated Nigeria's demographic pressure at 8.4, refugees and internal displacement at 6.5, group grievances at 9.7, brain drain and human flight at 7.6, uneven economic development at 8.9, poverty and economic decline at 7.5, state legitimacy at 9.1, provision of public services at 9.1, Human rights and Rule of law at 8.6, security apparatus at 9.2, factionalised elites at 9.8, and external intervention at 6.6. This understanding presented the state's deficiency— there is little order and the system is full of rowdy discordance that increases trends of external intervention in domestic affairs.

Upon such demographic pressure, inequality, human right abuse, poverty, inadequate public services, group grievances, inability to control spread of means of violence, elites discordance and external intervention, proliferation of groups like BH, which intend to

uphold their stake by all means, is predestined in such context like Nigeria. Moreover, the foundational stakeholders' discordant, that provide template for the emergence of BH among other violent armed groups in Nigeria, also provide reasons for stakeholders' suspicious trend monitoring that often develop into trends perception discordance, which is similar to the one that greeted BH discourse and government response.

#### SUBSIDISING BH TERRORISM? TRENDS PERCEPTION<sup>1</sup>

Several recent studies point at the inconsistencies and inadequacies of existing legal definitions, as well as to the contradictions between them (Meisels 2009:331). Accordingly, the use of the words terror, terrorist, and terrorism carries political and moral weight when invoked (Brown 2007:29). Moreover, Charles Kegley (2003:7) pointed out that, 'terrorism seems destined to remain a highly subjective, sensational, and emotional phenomenon, surrounded by polemics, double standards, and hypocrisy'. Therefore, how governments, leaders, and policymakers perceive the motives of terrorist organizations is paramount to understand and respond to terrorism (Brown 2007:28).

Confronted by sharp stakeholders' discordance and weak institutional capacity, consensus on definition of the event of the day is rarely easy to achieve in Nigeria. Meanwhile the structure of Nigeria stakeholders' discordance has lengthily incapacitated government to come up with viable policy against BH, by displaying uncompromised competing stakeholders trends perception discordance. Thus, the above background of Nigerian politics has left stakeholders with little choice beyond trends perception discordance on BH, most especially on its subsidy. Subsidy is here conceived beyond financing to include geopolitical, socio-political, philosophical, theological, ecological, genealogical and strategic aids. As the need for government to unveil forces subsidising BH terrorism in Nigeria emerged, objective and subjective sensations from stakeholders' trends perception increasingly troop in. However, most trends perception revolved around blocs of stakeholders as presented below.

#### NIGERIAN MUSLIM AND NORTHERNERS' SUBSIDIES

Owing to the geographical sanctuary provided by northern Nigeria and the spiritual subsidy the sect seeks in Islam; Muslims and Northerners bloc is the centre trend for stakeholders' perceptions. Because the region is dominated by Muslims, isolating regional interest from

religious ones is difficult (Kukah 1993). However, distinction is sometimes imperative, for example, the July 2012 Jos crisis shows sharp trend perception discordance among northern Christians and Muslims, which even extends to factionalise Northern Governors' Forum (NGF) accordingly. As a result, some observers preferred to call this bloc by core-North. Notwithstanding, we prefer to use Muslim-Northerners to mean all Nigerian Muslims with emphasis on the Northern Muslims.

It is the perception of some Nigeria's stakeholders that Muslim-Northern leaders, politicians, officers, business managers, advocates, traditional rulers, clerics, top bureaucrats, cabals, political parties, civil societies and governments are the trend subsidising BH terrorism for their political, economic and religious interests. This position is further strengthened with the arrest of Kabiru Sokoto (a member of the Sura Committee—the highest advisory/decision-making board of BH) by SSS. Upon screening of his handsets, several text messages and call logs to influential political figures and traditional rulers were reportedly discovered.

Accordingly, we attempt to classify as we recognise political subsidies, that is, provision of direct or indirect political cause, operation and shield for BH. To proponents of this position, the post-1999 civilianisation of Nigeria is to the disadvantage of the North and because coup d'état is now generally costly; BH has emerged to halt this development. Thus, it is conceived that, firstly, BH is subsidised by Muslim-northern dominated interest that feel excluded and betrayed by Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) zoning policy. General Azazi's (President Jonathan's security adviser until June 2012) also shared this trend perception, that PDP discriminatory zoning policy caused BH terrorism. He premised its argument on an established links between zoning, the crises that followed President Yar'Adua's illness and the 2011 Presidential election, which are recorded to the disadvantage of northern elites. Not far fetched, the national chairman of PDP, Alhaji Bamangar Tukur, a Muslim-northerner, once claimed that BH is fighting for justice (Kayode 2012:25). This trend also coloured trend perception of BH demand for President Jonathan resignation and his Vice President, a Muslim-Northerner, swear in or Jonathan convert to Muslim, as the only condition for peace.

Secondly, PDP's (currently favouring Christian-Southerner) hegemony against other political parties with monopoly of legitimate means of violence has also been argued to have pushed Muslim-Northern political parties to source for illegitimate alternate means of violence. In

Nigeria garrison democracy, however, this alternative is a normal occurrence (Omotola 2009; 2010). Considerably, *Citizens for Nigeria* (2009) argued that ‘the political elite in north-eastern Nigeria attempted to use BH for militancy as in the Niger Delta. The ANPP likely uses BH in its own violent campaign tactics in emulation of Niger Delta politics, which means a crackdown on the ANPP, the PDP's strongest challenger in the rigged 2007 elections’. Similarly, the massacre of about 800 people that followed the 2011 election, in the North, as a response to Congress for Progress Change (CPC) defeat, also propelled some observers to link the party hierarchy with BH terrorism (Ploch 2011).

Apart from politics, some trend perceptions have traced the financial origin of BH, with its line of domestic operation. Alhaji Buji Foi, a commissioner for Religious Affairs during the first term of Governor Ali Modu Sheriff in Borno State, once the Chairman of Kaga Local Council, was reported and extra-judicially killed by Nigerian police in 2009 for financing BH. Also, Ex-BH spokesmen in the SSS custody, Abu Qaqa, have also named Senator Ali Ndume from Borno as one of their financiers. The state security service had on 7 July 2004, released Alhaji Bello Damagun (a businessman and director of Media Trust Ltd) along with Mallam Mohammed Nazifi Inuwa and Mallam Mu’awuya Babayo, who were arrested, interrogated and detained since June 2001, on the allegation of illegally sponsoring some students to Mauritania for Islamic studies, for perhaps radicalisation (Sani 2011:22). Also, Sheik Sani Haliru in his interview with a New York based *Republic Report* (2012), categorically noted General Ibrahim Babangida, General Mohammadu Buhari and Alhaji Abubaka Atiku to be behind BH operation.<sup>2</sup> Believing that Governor Ali Modu Sheriff has used some elements of BH in the past, Owen (2012) also described him as the ‘father of BH’.

Similarly, BH reportedly claimed that the Shekarau administration reached an agreement as far back as 2004 to be paying a monthly support of N5 million to the group which was later raised to N10 million sometime in 2009 (Johnson 2012; Adagba, Ugwu and Okechukwu 2012). Governor Yuguda of Bauchi State allegedly reached a similar agreement with the leadership of the sect for the payment of N10million monthly to the group alongside the provision of training grounds on the many mountains scattered in Bauchi State. However, both states have allegedly stopped this payment since May 2011 after the election. It is also claimed that some Northern states had promised the sect’s security against the federal

government. Even, Yuguda is once reported to have pardoned 2 BH members with other 16 prisoners on the account that they have repented (Michael 2010:2). This tacit subsidy partly accounted for reasons why the sect also demanded for the ‘prosecution of former Governor Ali Modu Sheriff and Alhaji Abubakar Ibn Umar Garbai El-Kanemi, Shehu of Borno, according to Islamic Law for allowing security agents to kill its leader, Sheik Mohammed Yusuf during the 2009 crisis’ (Gabriel 2011). Moreover, the January 2012 BH massive bombing in Kano and Borno is reportedly declared as the consequence of financial stoppage.

Certain trend perception also see political and moral subsidies in an attempt to chart a viable political cause for BH, as Governor Lamido Sanusi of the Central Bank of Nigeria, justified actions of the Islamic fundamentalists, as an attempt to redress historic grievances caused by the payment of 13 percent derivation to oil rich Niger Deltan states from federation account. NGF also canvassed in support ‘that the 13 percent derivation to South-Southern states was a major causative factor in the rise of the activities of BH’ for sparing little funds to develop the North. For instance, in 2008, the allocation to Akwa Ibom state alone was N204.5 billion, which was more than the allocations of N176.2 billion to the five states in the South East and more than the N198.4 billion allocated to the six states in the North East while the six states in the North Central zone of the country also got N197.2 billion for the same year under review (Adeniyi, 2011:84-85). Consequently, Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) preferred to equate BH with Niger Delta militants who fought for resources control till 2009.

There is also spiritual subsidy for BH terrorism, that is, art of rationalising Islamic thought on jihad for radicalisation of new recruits and effort that tend to provide spiritual justification of their cause, to mobilise the Nigerian Muslims and compromise solidarity for government counterterrorism. It is well known that the emergence of this sect is largely rooted in spiritual subsidy sourced from Muhammad Yusuf’s charismatic preaching. The sect is reported as Salafi revivalism and Abdullahi Damasak is recently recognised as its spiritual adviser. As a caution, it is reported that majority of the detained sect members in SSS custody do not show deep knowledge in memorising Quran. Defensively, however, Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria (DCCN) (2009) claimed that BH members are not so bad for Muslims to quickly denounce them as unbelievers or to excommunicate them from Islam. Certain trend

perception has captured DCCN effort as moral and spiritual subsidies in the face of growing criticism of the sect among Islamic scholars and organisations.

Also, there is what we can describe as bureaucratic subsidy for BH. In the cases where security officers and civil servants compromised for sectional interest, BH is believed to enjoy support of civil servants, technocrats, the intelligentsia and that the sect draws its membership from these classes (Akowe 2011:3). Attesting to this argument is the sudden disappearance of Kabiru Sokoto who masterminded the Christmas Day bombing of St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla, where 44 lives were lost, from police custody. Similarly President Jonathan claimed that BH members are in all arms of Nigerian governments, including his cabinet.

Finally, there is a historical subsidy, that is, BH can find its place among the history of sectarian cleansings and violent insurgency that had adopted similar line. On this background, some trend perceptions preferred to situate BH terrorism in history of violence conflict and Islamic insurgency like Maitatsine uprising and numerous riots, killings and sectarian crises in Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Bauchi, and Maiduguri among others (Adesoji 2010; 2011; Danjibo; 2009).

On this background, there are grown convictions that there are mixed elements of political, religious and socio-economic interests in BH with high reference to Muslim-Northerners. Meanwhile, some trend perception had justified Muslim-Northerners BH subsidisations; with claims raging from attempts to destabilise Jonathan government, Islamise Nigeria, dispose Sokoto Caliphate, secession, improve general welfare and develop the region etc.

#### GOVERNMENT'S SUBSIDIES

Unable to act as balancer of competing interests with ample records of militarisation of stakeholders' relations, government is a notable political and historical subsidiser of BH terrorism. Specifically, the operating amoral politics has provided socio-political subsidies for BH in two ways. The government run amoral politics has made subsidisation of BH attractive to other stakeholders. In addition, it propelled BH to perceive an overriding need to chart alternative paradigm to the country's politics. Also, Bureaucratic inefficiency has homed strategic subsidy as BH reportedly sourced some of their ammunitions from state security

agents. The state of the country's economy and bad government policies are also subsidising rooms for recruitment among millions of poverty riding Nigerians. Accumulations of Nigeria's socio-political economy contradiction have provided historical subsidies for BH terrorism among other host of other violent actors.

With poor past human right records, government military solution is perceived by some trend perception as subsidy to BH terrorism. For example, the 2009 'killing of the duo, which was initially celebrated by the government and security agents as a major breakthrough in curbing the bloody violence from the *Boko Haram* group, has, ironically, now turned out to be a sour grape (Ojo 2010:51). The reason for this is that as soon as the news broke that the arrested sect leaders of the notorious Islamic sect were killed, human rights activists and amnesty group went to town, condemning the killing of Yusuf and Foi by the police, describing it as another of the numerous cases of extra-judicial killings by the police (Ojo 2010:51).

Concisely, therefore, trend perception on government BH subsidies include recognised state ineffectiveness, failed democratisation and amoral politics, militarisation and human rights abuse, corruption and transparency deficit, alienation tendency, infrastructure deficiency, poor economy policies, leadership crisis, bureaucratic inefficiency etc.

#### NIGERIAN CHRISTIAN AND SOUTHERNERS' SUBSIDIES

Concern about kinsmen and reference by co-believer in the north, Christian-Southerners bloc of BH discourse remains active. To certain trend perception, however, southerners are subsidising BH to discredit northerners and to destabilise the region, with the sole interest of undermining their presidential ambition. Others have blamed Christians for their intolerance about Muslims' *Sharia* ambition and the general Islamic way of life. Some trend perceptions have even seen Muslims as victims of popular stereotype of been terrorists, as a subsidy. Nigerian Inter-Religious Council Report (2009) found out similarly that, 'labelling is a major cause of conflict between religious groups in Nigeria. A Muslim is often referred to as terrorist, extremist or fundamentalist.'

#### INTERNATIONAL SUBSIDIES

Today, almost all acts of terrorism have international colouration. In addition to domestic dichotomy, some couple of states and non-state actors across the world have also been

charged by different trend perceptions for conventional, non-conventional, direct and indirect BH subsidies. Most cited actors include Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, Britain, Israel, U.S., Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Shabaab etc. For instance, some of the sect members were reported to have come from Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. Equally, Mamman Nur (a Chadian) is formerly the third highest-ranked in BH's leadership behind Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau.

In the aftermath of the government crackdown in 2009, Nur is believed to have gone to Somalia, where he and his followers trained in al Shabaab camps and forged links with transnational jihadist networks (Pham 2012:6). Similarly, Shekau and other top BH leaders reportedly escaped to Cameroon followed their Kano operation that claimed about 180 victims in January 2012. Reports also indicated that Nigerians associated with BH had and are now operating alongside AQIM in Gao, Mali. Many other Nigerian fanatics are further been trained in Sudan and Somalia, just to end-up as terrorists.

Core partners and concerned states of the western world have also been noted for subsidizing BH. That the name BH directly reflects its disaffection for western culture is a point. BH simply means western education is a sin or should be forbidden. Western colonial legacy, capitalist exploitation, international political manipulations are prominently noted as the bases of all problems in Muslim world including Nigeria. Therefore, global jihad against the west and its value is argued as the platform upon which current spate of global wave of 'Islamic terrorism' is mounted (cf Walid 2008). Consequently, BH terrorism is a segment of global jihad against the west and its puppet government (like Nigeria) across the world.

British colonial legacy as to the amalgamation of north and south protectorate; establishment of imbalanced federation; westernisation of the south and not the north; discriminatory citizenship by setting up Hausa/Fulani hegemony in the north and northern hegemony in Nigeria was historical subsidies for the emergence of BH terrorism (see Osaghae 2011). The global capitalist exploitation of the Muslims world by the west is also recognised (Hoffmann 2002). Western, most especially, U.S. support for Israel, invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan also contribute to global jihad (Riddell and Cottrell 2003). This is based on trend perception that BH is an element in global jihad, hence, a front in East-West cultural clash.

Consequently, western efforts are noted as ideological, moral and historical subsidies for global terrorism, including BH.

Middle Eastern states attempt to strengthen Islamic assertiveness and readiness to subsidise Sharia states and its fighters for soft power is not without recognition. The issue of Islamic banking that recently bisected Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria have been argued by some Christians as a means to aid easy transfer of money from Middle-East to their Sharia activists and fighters in Nigeria (Adebayo 2011). Saudi Arabia, Gulf States and Iran are the major reference states, even though their direct link is yet to be established, their past global record is a trend (see Ehrenfeld and Lappen 2009; Taylor 2007; Independent Task Force 2003). Moreover, that states like Yemen can provide fatal ground for AQAP to train global terrorists, like Nigeria's Farouk Abdumutallab; while Gaddafi's Libya can show unbroken trend of subsidising anti-Nigeria fanatics are important consideration.

Beyond state-centric assumptions, the emergence of non-state actors to part/supplant states in securing civilisations is threatening human security in Africa. Accordingly, the emergence of al Shabaab and AQIM, and their aspiration of securing global jihad base on their alliance with al-Qaida, is subsidising BH terrorism in Nigeria (Samuel 2012:77). AQIM and al Shabaab have opened their training camps for BH members; hence, improving the latter's terrorist capability. BH have also make use of AQIM media wing, Al-Andalus, to disseminate its international propaganda. It has also been revealed by the government that an Algerian terrorist group transferred 40 million Naira to Boko Haram in Nigeria (Ajayi 2012:105).

#### STAKEHOLDERS TRENDS PERCEPTION DISCORDANCE AND NIGERIA'S COUNTERTERRORISM

The above pictures denote two meaning. It means that government is prompt in gathering intelligence and perhaps Nigerians are well informed. Alternatively, it means that, there are different trends perception, competing to attract government and peoples' attentions, from different stakeholders. Based on the formalised structure of stakeholders' discordance in Nigeria, the latter meaning of the above picture is considerable. Perhaps, the picture depicted stakeholders' enthusiasm to brand their perceived adversary as BH subsidiser, such that BH discourse soon becomes an avenue to gain political scores over opponents who is ever targeted for discredit. For instance, one will question the logic behind claimed ANPP's BH

subsidies, if the party's 26 March 2011 election rally could be targeted for bombing. Consequently, we did not rule out that some trends perceptions may be media effect or political, which is only useful at theoretical level and their validity is perhaps subjected to further investigation.

Either real or imagined, the ongoing counterterrorism appeared to have been tie-up, as it became attractive for stakeholders to contextualise their political pursuits. For instance, there are some disagreements between federal government (FG) and the concerned state governments (CSGs) on what counterterrorism against BH should entail, resulting from trends perception discordance. These include different claims, responses, and implementations that are nearly incompatible. As the FG is perceived as pro-Christian-South in the North, and as CSGs is perceived by FG as BH subsidisers, their relationships with each other appears beyond any convergence. While the FG relies on its military prowess to tackle BH terrorism, in absence of such, CSGs have embarked on settlement of relevant actors to buy peace in their societies and to relieve victims. However, to CSGs among host of other Muslim-North affiliate stakeholders FG action amounts to high human rights violation and determined war effort against the region, with Christian-South hiding agenda. On the other hand, FG and perhaps Christians and Southerners suspiciously see CSGs among other relative stakeholders' actions as synonymous with subsidising BH.

Glocalising its effects, Nigerian Christians and Western States are suspicious in monitoring Middle-Eastern states, and the linkages between al Shabaab, AQIM and BH. Similarly also, Western support for FG is not without creating the fear that Nigerian Muslims are enmeshed by crusader. British Special Force once came into Nigeria to rescue a British and an Italian from BH hostage. Also, America recently designated three BH leaders (Shekau, Abubakar Kamar, Khalid al-Barnawi) as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT). Meanwhile, the military solution of the FG is reinforced by Nigeria-US Bi-National Commission. Consequently, Borno Elders and Leaders of Thought (BELT) and many Northern-Muslims affiliate have not declined from warning President Jonathan that incursion of external military power may translate to mean the end of the Nigerian state.

These among other dichotomies presented Nigeria's experienced stakeholders' trends perception discordance, with massive impacts on the ongoing counterterrorism against BH.

Specifically, it makes government to lose focus on BH and seek more precious time to balance or reconcile suspicious stakeholders. Similarly, it delays government counterterrorism success, as both objective and subjective stakeholders' claims are preferably investigated. However, stakeholders' discordance makes government choice difficult, as investigated or evidence implicated stakeholders are often difficult to prosecute, perhaps, owing to firm elites' constructions in their ethnocentric-constituencies and sensitiveness of identity in this discourse, which often attract government compromise with evidence. As a result, government is always cautioned to target a constituency, not to appear as sectional. As time goes on, these reduce government incentive to investigate some claims, hence, making it difficult to distinguish between facts and propaganda.

One need to also note that government is a stakeholder, though with different capability and status, which competes, cooperates, compromises and coerces others for its view. However, government often exhibits hegemony in discourse, depending on its viability. Studying the nexus between power and hegemony in discourse, Howarth (2010:310) argued that, 'on one hand, hegemony is a kind of political practice that captures the making and breaking of political projects and discourse coalitions. But on the other hand it is also a form of rule or governance that speaks to the maintenance of the policies, practices and regimes that are formed by such forces'. By implication, government choice is bound to emerge from its relations with other stakeholders. Thus, stakeholders' trends perception is normal, stakeholders' discordance is not totally bad and government hegemony is not unexpected.

Specifically, Stakeholders' trends perception discordance is said to give broad philosophy to counterterrorism as its present diverse view to enhance government focus, and when well managed, it gives government popular legitimacy. However, stakeholders' discordance is a popular feature of plural states, but not exclusive, and does not automatically mean a disadvantage. Paul Collier (2010:51) similarly pointed out that 'a society can function perfectly well if its citizens hold multiple identities, but problems arise when those sub-national identities arouse loyalties that override loyalty to the nation as a whole'. In addition, we argue here, that problems only come when stakeholders' discordance is meeting weak state with little or no 'popular' hegemony platform for government in discourse.

For instance, in response to 9/11 attacks, the U.S. immediately attempted to build a broad-based anti-terrorism coalition in what is known as the ‘War on Terrorism’. Possessing viable institutional structure, American government hegemonic power against other stakeholders is successfully activated. However, this position is not popular; because it gave little room for stakeholders’ trends perception, and neither does it appeared to aptly manage stakeholders’ discordance. Accordingly, the actions that emerged from such hegemonic trend perception soon turned to ‘High Hopes, Hard Facts’ and ‘Dream on, America’ in Andrew Moravcsik (2005) consideration. Fareed Zakaria (2006) later described it as a ‘downdown option’ and does not decline to appreciate U.S. need to confront reality. This is as a result of displeasure for trends perception and unmanaged stakeholders’ discordance that backfired.

In Nigeria, however, the state is lacking in institutional capacity and government hegemonic capability over other stakeholders on BH discourse has suffered. As a result, government does not have a clear, concise, comprehensive and well coordinated policy plan against BH, beyond military actions--until recent. Also, government have largely appeared to be sectional, hence, it does not enjoy the cooperation of some dominant stakeholders. Most especially, Muslim-Northern affiliated stakeholders and some other section of the international community. In the recent time however, government seems to be accommodating more trends perception into its counterterrorism framework, and as such, gain more headway against BH.

## **CONCLUSION**

There are improving trends of stakeholders relations in Nigeria. Perhaps this is as a result of increases in FG capacity building efforts, which is improving hegemonic trend perception of common threat. Due to uneven economic development in the North and South, group grievance and host of other recognised factors, Northern elites’ disagreement with FG position is predestined in their society. As some of them have argued, the issues is that, the Northerners, most especially the youths, feel their leaders have failed them. One of them recognised that, ‘they hate this presidency with passion and any defender of the president is a marked target. So we are all endangered species up Niger’ (Rasheed 2012:26). As a result, one could understand stakeholders’ discordance at elite level, most especially with the North: searching for security against BH. But now, Northern elites have discovered that their refusal to cooperate with the security, out of fear of the sect, has not guaranteed them of their safety

nor has it made the sect members to ease their operation (Orode 2012:30). In addition, FG commitments to protect citizens have been yielding supporters, which in return cumulated with elites' new thinking, to the general enhancement in stakeholders' relations.

Moreover, as of now, many states in the international community are increasingly harmonising their stake in the country with FG counterterrorism efforts, with emphasis that aimed to enhance the latter's institution capacity. In this regard UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force has been supportive in building on the ongoing dialogue between Nigeria and its international partners. For instance, CTED organised a Stakeholder Coordination meeting on 24-25 January, where participants shared views and analysis on recent terrorist trends, and also discussed priority of technical assistance needs for relevant authorities in Nigeria, to enhance internal coordination to combat terrorism including at border-crossing points (CTITF 2012:3). As a result of improving stakeholder relations at virtually all level, the FG is recording higher success in both technical improvement and operation management, which has generally caused the sect to be retreating in the recent time.

#### NOTE

1. We recognised the sensitiveness of some trends perception, therefore, we acknowledge that all trends perception review in this essay are not deliberately targeted against concerned stakeholders, but they are popular perceptions that are well documented by referenced daily news papers, weekly magazines, online sources, journals and books, and in case of necessity there are more.
2. Sheik Sani Haliru claimed in the interview that he was a former BH member that has now converted to Christianity. He shared his frustration to reveal more evidence to SSS among other relevant authorities. However, Abubakar' comments made him an outstanding scrutiniser of major position claimed in the interview.

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